<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2026-2582</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2026-06-05</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2026-06-05</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2026-06-05</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2026-06-05</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer

With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads
to the following splat:

[  250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0
[  250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core
[  250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d
[  250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95
[  250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0
[  250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39
[  250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[  250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8
[  250.232454] FS:  00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  250.233851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  250.236117] Call Trace:
[  250.236599]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  250.236967]  ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130
[  250.237920]  debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310
[  250.238762]  ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10
[  250.239658]  ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70
[  250.240369]  __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140
[  250.241172]  ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10
[  250.242058]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.242842]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  250.243474]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.244262]  __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120
[  250.245015]  HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci]
[  250.245704]  __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510
[  250.246461]  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10
[  250.247338]  do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360
[  250.247924]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro.
Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update.(CVE-2025-39833)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

platform/x86/amd/pmc: Add support for Van Gogh SoC

The ROG Xbox Ally (non-X) SoC features a similar architecture to the
Steam Deck. While the Steam Deck supports S3 (s2idle causes a crash),
this support was dropped by the Xbox Ally which only S0ix suspend.

Since the handler is missing here, this causes the device to not suspend
and the AMD GPU driver to crash while trying to resume afterwards due to
a power hang.(CVE-2025-68334)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add

Attempting to add a port device that is already up will expectedly fail,
but not before modifying the team device header_ops.

In the case of the syzbot reproducer the gre0 device is
already in state UP when it attempts to add it as a
port device of team0, this fails but before that
header_ops-&gt;create of team0 is changed from eth_header to ipgre_header
in the call to team_dev_type_check_change.

Later when we end up in ipgre_header() struct ip_tunnel* points to nonsense
as the private data of the device still holds a struct team.

Example sequence of iproute2 commands to reproduce the hang/BUG():
ip link add dev team0 type team
ip link add dev gre0 type gre
ip link set dev gre0 up
ip link set dev gre0 master team0
ip link set dev team0 up
ping -I team0 1.1.1.1

Move team_dev_type_check_change down where all other checks have passed
as it changes the dev type with no way to restore it in case
one of the checks that follow it fail.

Also make sure to preserve the origial mtu assignment:
  - If port_dev is not the same type as dev, dev takes mtu from port_dev
  - If port_dev is the same type as dev, port_dev takes mtu from dev

This is done by adding a conditional before the call to dev_set_mtu
to prevent it from assigning port_dev-&gt;mtu = dev-&gt;mtu and instead
letting team_dev_type_check_change assign dev-&gt;mtu = port_dev-&gt;mtu.
The conditional is needed because the patch moves the call to
team_dev_type_check_change past dev_set_mtu.

Testing:
  - team device driver in-tree selftests
  - Add/remove various devices as slaves of team device
  - syzbot(CVE-2025-68340)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix neighbour use-after-free

We sometimes observe use-after-free when dereferencing a neighbour [1].
The problem seems to be that the driver stores a pointer to the
neighbour, but without holding a reference on it. A reference is only
taken when the neighbour is used by a nexthop.

Fix by simplifying the reference counting scheme. Always take a
reference when storing a neighbour pointer in a neighbour entry. Avoid
taking a referencing when the neighbour is used by a nexthop as the
neighbour entry associated with the nexthop already holds a reference.

Tested by running the test that uncovered the problem over 300 times.
Without this patch the problem was reproduced after a handful of
iterations.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88817f8e3420 by task ip/3929

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3929 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-virtme-g36b21a067510 #3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Nvidia SN5600/VMOD0013, BIOS 5.13 05/31/2023
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6e/0x300
 print_report+0xfc/0x1fb
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x110
 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x35f/0x510
 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1ea/0x730
 mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xa1/0x1b0
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_lag_event+0xcc/0x130
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_event+0xf5/0x3c0
 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x1015/0x1580
 notifier_call_chain+0xcc/0x150
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7e/0x100
 __netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x10b/0x210
 netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x79/0xa0
 vrf_del_slave+0x18/0x50
 do_set_master+0x146/0x7d0
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x9a0/0x2880
 rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fe/0xb90
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x123/0x380
 netlink_unicast+0x4a3/0x770
 netlink_sendmsg+0x75b/0xc90
 __sock_sendmsg+0xbe/0x160
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5b2/0x7d0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0x124/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[...]

Allocated by task 109:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x790
 neigh_alloc+0x6af/0x8f0
 ___neigh_create+0x63/0xe90
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init+0x430/0x7e0
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_type_init+0x212/0x960
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_info_init.constprop.0+0x81f/0x1280
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get+0x392/0x6a0
 mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create+0x46a/0xfd0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_replace+0x1ed/0x5f0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_event_work+0x10a/0x2a0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Freed by task 154:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
 kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x1eb/0x5e0
 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1f2/0x260
 kfree_rcu_work+0x130/0x1b0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8c/0xa0
 kvfree_call_rcu+0x93/0x5b0
 mlxsw_sp_router_neigh_event_work+0x67d/0x860
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20(CVE-2025-68801)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

svcrdma: bound check rq_pages index in inline path

svc_rdma_copy_inline_range indexed rqstp-&gt;rq_pages[rc_curpage] without
verifying rc_curpage stays within the allocated page array. Add guards
before the first use and after advancing to a new page.(CVE-2025-71068)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iavf: fix off-by-one issues in iavf_config_rss_reg()

There are off-by-one bugs when configuring RSS hash key and lookup
table, causing out-of-bounds reads to memory [1] and out-of-bounds
writes to device registers.

Before commit 43a3d9ba34c9 (&quot;i40evf: Allow PF driver to configure RSS&quot;),
the loop upper bounds were:
    i &lt;= I40E_VFQF_{HKEY,HLUT}_MAX_INDEX
which is safe since the value is the last valid index.

That commit changed the bounds to:
    i &lt;= adapter-&gt;rss_{key,lut}_size / 4
where `rss_{key,lut}_size / 4` is the number of dwords, so the last
valid index is `(rss_{key,lut}_size / 4) - 1`. Therefore, using `&lt;=`
accesses one element past the end.

Fix the issues by using `&lt;` instead of `&lt;=`, ensuring we do not exceed
the bounds.

[1] KASAN splat about rss_key_size off-by-one
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888102c50134 by task kworker/u8:6/63

  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 63 Comm: kworker/u8:6 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2-enjuk-tnguy-00378-g3005f5b77652-dirty #156 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: iavf iavf_watchdog_task
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
   print_report+0x170/0x4f3
   kasan_report+0xe1/0x1a0
   iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
   iavf_watchdog_task+0x2be7/0x3230
   process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
   worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
   kthread+0x344/0x660
   ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 63:
   kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
   __kmalloc_noprof+0x246/0x6f0
   iavf_watchdog_task+0x28fc/0x3230
   process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
   worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
   kthread+0x344/0x660
   ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888102c50100
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 52-byte region [ffff888102c50100, ffff888102c50134)

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x102c50
  flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
  page_type: f5(slab)
  raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000418c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff888102c50000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffff888102c50080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  &gt;ffff888102c50100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                       ^
   ffff888102c50180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffff888102c50200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc(CVE-2025-71087)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/i915/gem: Zero-initialize the eb.vma array in i915_gem_do_execbuffer

Initialize the eb.vma array with values of 0 when the eb structure is
first set up. In particular, this sets the eb-&gt;vma[i].vma pointers to
NULL, simplifying cleanup and getting rid of the bug described below.

During the execution of eb_lookup_vmas(), the eb-&gt;vma array is
successively filled up with struct eb_vma objects. This process includes
calling eb_add_vma(), which might fail; however, even in the event of
failure, eb-&gt;vma[i].vma is set for the currently processed buffer.

If eb_add_vma() fails, eb_lookup_vmas() returns with an error, which
prompts a call to eb_release_vmas() to clean up the mess. Since
eb_lookup_vmas() might fail during processing any (possibly not first)
buffer, eb_release_vmas() checks whether a buffer&apos;s vma is NULL to know
at what point did the lookup function fail.

In eb_lookup_vmas(), eb-&gt;vma[i].vma is set to NULL if either the helper
function eb_lookup_vma() or eb_validate_vma() fails. eb-&gt;vma[i+1].vma is
set to NULL in case i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init() fails; the
current one needs to be cleaned up by eb_release_vmas() at this point,
so the next one is set. If eb_add_vma() fails, neither the current nor
the next vma is set to NULL, which is a source of a NULL deref bug
described in the issue linked in the Closes tag.

When entering eb_lookup_vmas(), the vma pointers are set to the slab
poison value, instead of NULL. This doesn&apos;t matter for the actual
lookup, since it gets overwritten anyway, however the eb_release_vmas()
function only recognizes NULL as the stopping value, hence the pointers
are being set to NULL as they go in case of intermediate failure. This
patch changes the approach to filling them all with NULL at the start
instead, rather than handling that manually during failure.

(cherry picked from commit 08889b706d4f0b8d2352b7ca29c2d8df4d0787cd)(CVE-2025-71130)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference

Problem description
-------------------

DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device
and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn&apos;t make sense.

There are two distinct problems.

1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases
   the elevated refcount on the conduit&apos;s kobject. Nominally, the OF and
   non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference
   counts taken, and it is already suspicious that
   dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in
   dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue
   exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command
   &quot;before&quot; and &quot;after&quot; applying this patch:

(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2)
echo 0000:00:00.2 &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind

we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch
applied:

kobject: &apos;eno2&apos; (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: &apos;109&apos; (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)

2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF),
   it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived,
   but in this case stale, cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointer. Holding the net
   device&apos;s underlying kobject isn&apos;t actually of much help, it just
   prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject
   directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being
   unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold()
   and dev_put()).

Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on
user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 (&quot;net: dsa: link interfaces with
the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings&quot;), via netdev_upper_dev_link().
But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial
of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time
during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn&apos;t know
about it.

So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to
prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev
tracker having acquired the reference.

Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() /
dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
   ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a (&quot;net: dsa: Do not
   make user port errors fatal&quot;), and the cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointers
   remain valid.  I haven&apos;t audited all call paths to see whether they
   will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they
   do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is
   associated to, and we can get into a situation where we&apos;ve moved all
   user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to
   it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn&apos;t let it go nonetheless
   - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit()
   and LAG conduits which disappear.
   We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU
   port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
   say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a
   reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.

As for the conduit&apos;s kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don&apos;t
care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device
object itself.

History and blame attribution
-----------------------------

The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to
follow and properly attribute a blame, but I&apos;ll try to make a short
history which I hope to be correct.

We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 i
---truncated---(CVE-2025-71152)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type

When wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it
currently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether
the given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular
transaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines
which transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but
this check was missing in wait_current_trans().

This can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and
pending ordered extents:

  1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state

  2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction()
     with TRANS_JOIN

  3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in
     TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING

  4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes

  5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING)

  6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B&apos;s
     pending ordered extents

  7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and
     enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START

  8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B
     in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits
     unconditionally

  9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
     according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[]

  10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete

  11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent
      waits for Transaction B

This can be illustrated by the following call stacks:
  CPU0                              CPU1
                                    btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
                                      start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN)
                                        join_transaction()
                                          # -EBUSY (Transaction A is
                                          # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING)
  # Transaction A completes
  # Transaction B created
  # ordered extent added to
  # Transaction B&apos;s pending list
  btrfs_commit_transaction()
    # Transaction B enters
    # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
    # waiting for pending ordered
    # extents
                                        wait_current_trans()
                                          # waits for Transaction B
                                          # (should not wait!)

Task bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered
extents:

  __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
  schedule+0x64/0xe0
  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs]
  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Task kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit:

  Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
  schedule+0x64/0xe0
  wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs]
  start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs]
  process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0
  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
  kthread+0x12d/0x150
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and
checking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans-&gt;state] against the given
type before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which
are allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily
wait and cause deadlocks.(CVE-2025-71194)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source()

Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)-&gt;vlan.

Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear
entry-&gt;vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts.

This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over
entries queued for freeing.

Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they
are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)).

https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/(CVE-2026-23001)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: ip_gre: make ipgre_header() robust

Analog to commit db5b4e39c4e6 (&quot;ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust&quot;)

Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel
in ipgre_header() [1].

This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically
change their dev-&gt;needed_headroom and/or dev-&gt;hard_header_len

In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb
with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack()
was called, syzbot managed to attach an ipgre device.

[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89ea3cb7 len:2030915468 put:2030915372 head:ffff888058b43000 data:ffff887fdfa6e194 tail:0x120 end:0x6c0 dev:team0
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1322 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:213
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline]
  skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641
  ipgre_header+0x67/0x290 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:897
  dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline]
  neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618
  NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
  ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
  NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
  mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246(CVE-2026-23011)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/page_alloc: prevent pcp corruption with SMP=n

The kernel test robot has reported:

 BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kcompactd0/28
  lock: 0xffff888807e35ef0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kcompactd0/28, .owner_cpu: 0
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-00127-ga06157804399 #1 PREEMPT  8cc09ef94dcec767faa911515ce9e609c45db470
 Call Trace:
  &lt;IRQ&gt;
  __dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:95)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
  spin_dump (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:71)
  do_raw_spin_trylock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:?)
  _raw_spin_trylock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138)
  __free_frozen_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2973)
  ___free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5295)
  __free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5334)
  tlb_remove_table_rcu (include/linux/mm.h:? include/linux/mm.h:3122 include/asm-generic/tlb.h:220 mm/mmu_gather.c:227 mm/mmu_gather.c:290)
  ? __cfi_tlb_remove_table_rcu (mm/mmu_gather.c:289)
  ? rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:?)
  rcu_core (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2607 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861)
  rcu_core_si (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2879)
  handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623)
  __irq_exit_rcu (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 kernel/softirq.c:725)
  irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:741)
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052)
  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  &lt;TASK&gt;
 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
  free_pcppages_bulk (mm/page_alloc.c:1494)
  drain_pages_zone (include/linux/spinlock.h:391 mm/page_alloc.c:2632)
  __drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2731)
  drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2747)
  kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3115)
  kthread (kernel/kthread.c:465)
  ? __cfi_kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3166)
  ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
  ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)
  ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
  ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Matthew has analyzed the report and identified that in drain_page_zone()
we are in a section protected by spin_lock(&amp;pcp-&gt;lock) and then get an
interrupt that attempts spin_trylock() on the same lock.  The code is
designed to work this way without disabling IRQs and occasionally fail the
trylock with a fallback.  However, the SMP=n spinlock implementation
assumes spin_trylock() will always succeed, and thus it&apos;s normally a
no-op.  Here the enabled lock debugging catches the problem, but otherwise
it could cause a corruption of the pcp structure.

The problem has been introduced by commit 574907741599 (&quot;mm/page_alloc:
leave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations&quot;).  The pcp locking scheme
recognizes the need for disabling IRQs to prevent nesting spin_trylock()
sections on SMP=n, but the need to prevent the nesting in spin_lock() has
not been recognized.  Fix it by introducing local wrappers that change the
spin_lock() to spin_lock_iqsave() with SMP=n and use them in all places
that do spin_lock(&amp;pcp-&gt;lock).

[(CVE-2026-23025)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: hv_netvsc: reject RSS hash key programming without RX indirection table

RSS configuration requires a valid RX indirection table. When the device
reports a single receive queue, rndis_filter_device_add() does not
allocate an indirection table, accepting RSS hash key updates in this
state leads to a hang.

Fix this by gating netvsc_set_rxfh() on ndc-&gt;rx_table_sz and return
-EOPNOTSUPP when the table is absent. This aligns set_rxfh with the device
capabilities and prevents incorrect behavior.(CVE-2026-23054)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc

Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc.
We need to check for that constraint.

Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this
issue for the curious.

GangMin Kim &lt;(CVE-2026-23074)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()

Patch series &quot;mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl.  using
mmu_gather)&quot;, v3.

One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.

I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point. 
While doing that I identified the other things.

The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees &quot;fairly&quot;
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.

Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().

The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather.
Read: complicated

There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that&apos;s all out of scope for this series.

Runtime tested, with a focus on fixing the performance regression using
the original reproducer [2] on x86.


This patch (of 4):

We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count.  Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc-&gt;pt_share_count to identify
sharing.

We didn&apos;t convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.

Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive.  In smaps we would account them as &quot;private&quot; although they are
&quot;shared&quot;, and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.

Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared().(CVE-2026-23100)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording

A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu
events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code
called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.

Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect
events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is
in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).

Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against
recursion.

Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing
stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the
bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately.(CVE-2026-23138)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset

This reverts 28ee1b746f49 (&quot;secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets&quot;)

tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017.

Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via
SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways.

One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization.

As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation
to provide both an ISN and a TS offset.(CVE-2026-23247)

In the Linux kernel, a vulnerability exists in the AppArmor module&apos;s unpack_pdb function. The vulnerability occurs due to failure to validate that DFA start states are within bounds, which can lead to out-of-bound reads. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability through specially crafted policy files, potentially leading to information disclosure or system crashes.(CVE-2026-23269)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: unconditionally bump set-&gt;nelems before insertion

In case that the set is full, a new element gets published then removed
without waiting for the RCU grace period, while RCU reader can be
walking over it already.

To address this issue, add the element transaction even if set is full,
but toggle the set_full flag to report -ENFILE so the abort path safely
unwinds the set to its previous state.

As for element updates, decrement set-&gt;nelems to restore it.

A simpler fix is to call synchronize_rcu() in the error path.
However, with a large batch adding elements to already maxed-out set,
this could cause noticeable slowdown of such batches.(CVE-2026-23272)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: kaweth: validate USB endpoints

The kaweth driver should validate that the device it is probing has the
proper number and types of USB endpoints it is expecting before it binds
to it.  If a malicious device were to not have the same urbs the driver
will crash later on when it blindly accesses these endpoints.(CVE-2026-23312)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs

When shrinking the number of real tx queues,
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush
qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used.

qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with
qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is
serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc-&gt;seqlock instead, so
qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs
while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF.

This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy
traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs:

  iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 &amp;
  while :; do
    ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
    ethtool -L eth0 combined 2
  done

With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ...
   __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550
   ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110
   ip_output+0x1a7/0x410
   ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480
   udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590
   udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0
   ...
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s:
   ...
   alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0
   sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830
   __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0
   ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0
   udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0
   ...

  Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s:
   ...
   kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0
   pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580
   qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0
   netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840
   virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net]
   ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0
   ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890
   ...

Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by
taking qdisc-&gt;seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the
serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue().

Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state
reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling.(CVE-2026-23340)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: act_ife: Fix metalist update behavior

Whenever an ife action replace changes the metalist, instead of
replacing the old data on the metalist, the current ife code is appending
the new metadata. Aside from being innapropriate behavior, this may lead
to an unbounded addition of metadata to the metalist which might cause an
out of bounds error when running the encode op:

[  138.423369][    C1] ==================================================================
[  138.424317][    C1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.424906][    C1] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880077f4ffe by task ife_out_out_bou/255
[  138.425778][    C1] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 255 Comm: ife_out_out_bou Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-00169-gfbdfa8da05b6 #624 PREEMPT(full)
[  138.425795][    C1] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  138.425800][    C1] Call Trace:
[  138.425804][    C1]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[  138.425808][    C1]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[  138.425828][    C1]  print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
[  138.425839][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425844][    C1]  ? __virt_addr_valid (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:975 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/mmzone.h:2207 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:54 (discriminator 1))
[  138.425853][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425859][    C1]  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:597)
[  138.425868][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425878][    C1]  kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/generic.c:200 (discriminator 1))
[  138.425884][    C1]  __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84 (discriminator 2))
[  138.425889][    C1]  ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425893][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:171)
[  138.425898][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425903][    C1]  ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:57)
[  138.425910][    C1]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:114)
[  138.425916][    C1]  ? __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 (discriminator 3))
[  138.425921][    C1]  ? __pfx_ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:45)
[  138.425927][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425931][    C1]  tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:847 net/sched/act_ife.c:879)

To solve this issue, fix the replace behavior by adding the metalist to
the ife rcu data structure.(CVE-2026-23378)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: Fix memory leak in ice_set_ringparam()

In ice_set_ringparam, tx_rings and xdp_rings are allocated before
rx_rings. If the allocation of rx_rings fails, the code jumps to
the done label leaking both tx_rings and xdp_rings. Furthermore, if
the setup of an individual Rx ring fails during the loop, the code jumps
to the free_tx label which releases tx_rings but leaks xdp_rings.

Fix this by introducing a free_xdp label and updating the error paths to
ensure both xdp_rings and tx_rings are properly freed if rx_rings
allocation or setup fails.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review.(CVE-2026-23389)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage

The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple
times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked
with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the
inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters
at each iteration and therefore skip input characters.
This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past
the input buffer boundary.

[   94.984676] ==================================================================
[   94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976

[   94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   94.986329] Call Trace:
[   94.986341]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   94.986347]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[   94.986374]  print_report+0xc8/0x270
[   94.986384]  ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986388]  kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[   94.986401]  ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986405]  aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986408]  __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400
[   94.986418]  aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0
[   94.986424]  apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570
[   94.986431]  security_file_open+0x5c/0x140
[   94.986442]  do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120
[   94.986450]  vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0
[   94.986453]  ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0
[   94.986466]  path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30
[   94.986469]  ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[   94.986477]  do_file_open+0x19d/0x360
[   94.986487]  do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100
[   94.986491]  __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[   94.986499]  do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[   94.986515]  ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0
[   94.986526]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986540]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0
[   94.986551]  ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320
[   94.986558]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986561]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986563]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0
[   94.986572]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986574]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0
[   94.986587]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986588]  ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590
[   94.986595]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea

Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char,
ensuring single evaluation per outer loop.(CVE-2026-23406)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()

The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state
is not differentially encoded.

When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain,
it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without
validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] &gt;= state_count,
therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes.

[   57.179855] ==================================================================
[   57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993

[   57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   57.181563] Call Trace:
[   57.181572]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   57.181577]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[   57.181596]  print_report+0xc8/0x270
[   57.181605]  ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181608]  kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[   57.181620]  ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181623]  verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181627]  aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740
[   57.181629]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470
[   57.181640]  unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0
[   57.181647]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181653]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181656]  ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300
[   57.181659]  aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30
[   57.181662]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181664]  ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700
[   57.181681]  ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80
[   57.181683]  ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[   57.181686]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0
[   57.181688]  ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[   57.181693]  ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130
[   57.181697]  ? policy_update+0x154/0x330
[   57.181704]  aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0
[   57.181707]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181710]  ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[   57.181712]  ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140
[   57.181715]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181717]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70
[   57.181730]  policy_update+0x17a/0x330
[   57.181733]  profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0
[   57.181735]  ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0
[   57.181740]  vfs_write+0x235/0xab0
[   57.181745]  ksys_write+0xb0/0x170
[   57.181748]  do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[   57.181762]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2

Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE
entries unconditionally.(CVE-2026-23407)

A race condition vulnerability exists in the AppArmor security module of the Linux kernel, leading to a use-after-free issue. This vulnerability can be triggered when an attacker simultaneously opens rawdata files and removes an associated AppArmor profile. Since rawdata inodes are not refcounted, there is a time window during profile removal where the i_private pointer may reference freed memory, causing the system to access freed memory regions. This can result in program crashes, unexpected value usage, or arbitrary code execution, threatening the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.(CVE-2026-23410)

A vulnerability exists in the AppArmor security module of the Linux kernel when handling the i_private field of the inode structure. AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs callback functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. This vulnerability could allow a local attacker to bypass AppArmor&apos;s access control policies through a specially crafted request, leading to privilege escalation and impacting system confidentiality, integrity, and availability.(CVE-2026-23411)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp_tunnel: fix NULL deref caused by udp_sock_create6 when CONFIG_IPV6=n

When CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, the udp_sock_create6() function returns 0
(success) without actually creating a socket. Callers such as
fou_create() then proceed to dereference the uninitialized socket
pointer, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.

The captured NULL deref crash:
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
  RIP: 0010:fou_nl_add_doit (net/ipv4/fou_core.c:590 net/ipv4/fou_core.c:764)
  [...]
  Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.constprop.0 (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114)
    genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209)
    [...]
    netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
    genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
    netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
    netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
    __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 1))
    __sys_sendto (./include/linux/file.h:62 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/file.h:83 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2183 (discriminator 1))
    __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2213 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1))
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (net/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

This patch makes udp_sock_create6 return -EPFNOSUPPORT instead, so
callers correctly take their error paths. There is only one caller of
the vulnerable function and only privileged users can trigger it.(CVE-2026-23439)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix race condition during IPSec ESN update

In IPSec full offload mode, the device reports an ESN (Extended
Sequence Number) wrap event to the driver. The driver validates this
event by querying the IPSec ASO and checking that the esn_event_arm
field is 0x0, which indicates an event has occurred. After handling
the event, the driver must re-arm the context by setting esn_event_arm
back to 0x1.

A race condition exists in this handling path. After validating the
event, the driver calls mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm() to update the
kernel&apos;s xfrm state. This function temporarily releases and
re-acquires the xfrm state lock.

So, need to acknowledge the event first by setting esn_event_arm to
0x1. This prevents the driver from reprocessing the same ESN update if
the hardware sends events for other reason. Since the next ESN update
only occurs after nearly 2^31 packets are received, there&apos;s no risk of
missing an update, as it will happen long after this handling has
finished.

Processing the event twice causes the ESN high-order bits (esn_msb) to
be incremented incorrectly. The driver then programs the hardware with
this invalid ESN state, which leads to anti-replay failures and a
complete halt of IPSec traffic.

Fix this by re-arming the ESN event immediately after it is validated,
before calling mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm(). This ensures that any
spurious, duplicate events are correctly ignored, closing the race
window.(CVE-2026-23440)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Prevent concurrent access to IPSec ASO context

The query or updating IPSec offload object is through Access ASO WQE.
The driver uses a single mlx5e_ipsec_aso struct for each PF, which
contains a shared DMA-mapped context for all ASO operations.

A race condition exists because the ASO spinlock is released before
the hardware has finished processing WQE. If a second operation is
initiated immediately after, it overwrites the shared context in the
DMA area.

When the first operation&apos;s completion is processed later, it reads
this corrupted context, leading to unexpected behavior and incorrect
results.

This commit fixes the race by introducing a private context within
each IPSec offload object. The shared ASO context is now copied to
this private context while the ASO spinlock is held. Subsequent
processing uses this saved, per-object context, ensuring its integrity
is maintained.(CVE-2026-23441)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: always free skb on ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() failure

ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them
free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning
TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the
fragmentation check both do.

Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent,
and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76,
mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free.

Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function&apos;s kdoc.(CVE-2026-23444)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check

cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE
entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for
ndpoffset:

  if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) &gt; skb_in-&gt;len)

but the second check omits it:

  if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
       ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) &gt; skb_in-&gt;len)

This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if
the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is
placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can
extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes.
cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating
the DPE array.

Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to
express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.(CVE-2026-23448)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()

Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].

smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path
(softirq) via icsk_af_ops-&gt;syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP
listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock
pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed
concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock-&gt;sk_user_data
to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself
can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().

This leads to two issues:

1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when
   accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the
   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,
   ori_af_ops) are accessed.

The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]
triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -&gt;
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path
has the same race):

  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)

  tcp_v4_rcv()
    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
    sk = req-&gt;rsk_listener
    sock_hold(sk)
    /* No lock on listener */
                               smc_close_active():
                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 sk_user_data = NULL
                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 ...
                                 smc_clcsock_release()
                                 sock_put(smc-&gt;sk) x2
                                   -&gt; smc_sock freed!
    tcp_check_req()
      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
        smc = user_data(sk)
          -&gt; NULL or dangling
        smc-&gt;queued_smc_hs
          -&gt; crash!

Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects
with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the
clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the
smc_sock from being freed.

Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely
access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in
the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on
sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN
flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.

- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that
  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace
  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when
  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&amp;smc-&gt;sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the
  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close
  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.

Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of
sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for
NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing
any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.

Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,
the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9(CVE-2026-23450)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal

The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev-&gt;parent
pointer after the parent device has been freed:

	/* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */
	if (parent &amp;&amp; !parent-&gt;power.ignore_children) {
		spin_unlock(&amp;dev-&gt;power.lock);

		spin_lock(&amp;parent-&gt;power.lock);
		rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC);
		spin_unlock(&amp;parent-&gt;power.lock);

		spin_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;power.lock);
	}

Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove().

Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint
sporadically:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310
 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0
 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60
 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230
 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50
 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0
 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770
 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120
 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410
 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0
 kthread+0x37b/0x480
 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990
 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod]
 __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod]
 store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Freed by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80
 kfree+0x225/0x6c0
 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod]
 sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810(CVE-2026-23452)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_unregister_user

After commit ab4eedb790ca (&quot;Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in
hci_chan_del&quot;), l2cap_conn_del() uses conn-&gt;lock to protect access to
conn-&gt;users. However, l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user()
don&apos;t use conn-&gt;lock, creating a race condition where these functions can
access conn-&gt;users and conn-&gt;hchan concurrently with l2cap_conn_del().

This can lead to use-after-free and list corruption bugs, as reported
by syzbot.

Fix this by changing l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user()
to use conn-&gt;lock instead of hci_dev_lock(), ensuring consistent locking
for the l2cap_conn structure.(CVE-2026-23461)

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.(CVE-2026-23473)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: fix statistics allocation

The controller per-cpu statistics is not allocated until after the
controller has been registered with driver core, which leaves a window
where accessing the sysfs attributes can trigger a NULL-pointer
dereference.

Fix this by moving the statistics allocation to controller allocation
while tying its lifetime to that of the controller (rather than using
implicit devres).(CVE-2026-23475)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option

Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against
a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with
wrong credentials.  It turned out the client was reusing SMB session
from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a
different username= option had been specified to the other mounts.

By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for
principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since
cifs-utils-4.8.  So fix this by matching username mount option in
match_session() even with Kerberos.

For example, the second mount below should fail with -ENOKEY as there
is no &apos;foobar&apos; principal in keytab (/etc/krb5.keytab).  The client
ends up reusing SMB session from first mount to perform the second
one, which is wrong.

```
$ ktutil
ktutil:  add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts
Password for (CVE-2026-31392)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/rmap: fix incorrect pte restoration for lazyfree folios

We batch unmap anonymous lazyfree folios by folio_unmap_pte_batch.  If the
batch has a mix of writable and non-writable bits, we may end up setting
the entire batch writable.  Fix this by respecting writable bit during
batching.

Although on a successful unmap of a lazyfree folio, the soft-dirty bit is
lost, preserve it on pte restoration by respecting the bit during
batching, to make the fix consistent w.r.t both writable bit and
soft-dirty bit.

I was able to write the below reproducer and crash the kernel. 
Explanation of reproducer (set 64K mTHP to always):

Fault in a 64K large folio.  Split the VMA at mid-point with
MADV_DONTFORK.  fork() - parent points to the folio with 8 writable ptes
and 8 non-writable ptes.  Merge the VMAs with MADV_DOFORK so that
folio_unmap_pte_batch() can determine all the 16 ptes as a batch.  Do
MADV_FREE on the range to mark the folio as lazyfree.  Write to the memory
to dirty the pte, eventually rmap will dirty the folio.  Then trigger
reclaim, we will hit the pte restoration path, and the kernel will crash
with the trace given below.

The BUG happens at:

	BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&amp;ptc-&gt;anon_map_count) &gt; 1 &amp;&amp; rw);

The code path is asking for anonymous page to be mapped writable into the
pagetable.  The BUG_ON() firing implies that such a writable page has been
mapped into the pagetables of more than one process, which breaks
anonymous memory/CoW semantics.

[   21.134473] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:118!
[   21.134497] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
[   21.135917] Modules linked in:
[   21.136085] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1735 Comm: dup-lazyfree Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-00116-g018018a17770 #1028 PREEMPT
[   21.136858] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[   21.137019] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   21.137308] pc : page_table_check_set+0x28c/0x2a8
[   21.137607] lr : page_table_check_set+0x134/0x2a8
[   21.137885] sp : ffff80008a3b3340
[   21.138124] x29: ffff80008a3b3340 x28: fffffdffc3d14400 x27: ffffd1a55e03d000
[   21.138623] x26: 0040000000000040 x25: ffffd1a55f7dd000 x24: 0000000000000001
[   21.139045] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffffd1a55f217f30
[   21.139629] x20: 0000000000134521 x19: 0000000000134519 x18: 005c43e000040000
[   21.140027] x17: 0001400000000000 x16: 0001700000000000 x15: 000000000000ffff
[   21.140578] x14: 000000000000000c x13: 005c006000000000 x12: 0000000000000020
[   21.140828] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 005c000000000000 x9 : ffffd1a55c079ee0
[   21.141077] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 005c03e000040000 x6 : 000000004000ffff
[   21.141490] x5 : ffff00017fffce00 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000002
[   21.141741] x2 : 0000000000134510 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c08228c0
[   21.141991] Call trace:
[   21.142093]  page_table_check_set+0x28c/0x2a8 (P)
[   21.142265]  __page_table_check_ptes_set+0x144/0x1e8
[   21.142441]  __set_ptes_anysz.constprop.0+0x160/0x1a8
[   21.142766]  contpte_set_ptes+0xe8/0x140
[   21.142907]  try_to_unmap_one+0x10c4/0x10d0
[   21.143177]  rmap_walk_anon+0x100/0x250
[   21.143315]  try_to_unmap+0xa0/0xc8
[   21.143441]  shrink_folio_list+0x59c/0x18a8
[   21.143759]  shrink_lruvec+0x664/0xbf0
[   21.144043]  shrink_node+0x218/0x878
[   21.144285]  __node_reclaim.constprop.0+0x98/0x338
[   21.144763]  user_proactive_reclaim+0x2a4/0x340
[   21.145056]  reclaim_store+0x3c/0x60
[   21.145216]  dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40
[   21.145585]  sysfs_kf_write+0x84/0xa8
[   21.145835]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1c8
[   21.145994]  vfs_write+0x2b8/0x368
[   21.146119]  ksys_write+0x70/0x110
[   21.146240]  __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
[   21.146380]  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
[   21.146513]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf8
[   21.146679]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
[   21.146798]  el0_svc+0x34/0x110
[   21.146926]  el0t
---truncated---(CVE-2026-31398)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization

Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in
nd_async_device_register().

Commit b6eae0f61db2 (&quot;libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while
scheduling async init&quot;) correctly added a reference on the parent device
to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete.  However, if
device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the
device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed.  Thus
resulting in use after free.

The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix.  Save a reference to the
parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the
outcome of device_add().(CVE-2026-31399)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release

When a reader&apos;s file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading
a cache_request (rp-&gt;offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the
request&apos;s readers count but never checks whether it should free the
request.

In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the
cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer
and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.

The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is
cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from
set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was
still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no
subsequent call will clean it up.

Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after
decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear,
and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request.(CVE-2026-31400)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSD: Hold net reference for the lifetime of /proc/fs/nfs/exports fd

The /proc/fs/nfs/exports proc entry is created at module init
and persists for the module&apos;s lifetime. exports_proc_open()
captures the caller&apos;s current network namespace and stores
its svc_export_cache in seq-&gt;private, but takes no reference
on the namespace. If the namespace is subsequently torn down
(e.g. container destruction after the opener does setns() to a
different namespace), nfsd_net_exit() calls nfsd_export_shutdown()
which frees the cache. Subsequent reads on the still-open fd
dereference the freed cache_detail, walking a freed hash table.

Hold a reference on the struct net for the lifetime of the open
file descriptor. This prevents nfsd_net_exit() from running --
and thus prevents nfsd_export_shutdown() from freeing the cache
-- while any exports fd is open. cache_detail already stores
its net pointer (cd-&gt;net, set by cache_create_net()), so
exports_release() can retrieve it without additional per-file
storage.(CVE-2026-31403)

In the Linux kernel, the Bluetooth SCO module&apos;s sco_recv_frame() function contains a use-after-free vulnerability. The function reads conn-&gt;sk under sco_conn_lock() but immediately releases the lock without holding a reference to the socket. A concurrent close() operation can free the socket between the lock release and the subsequent sk-&gt;sk_state access, resulting in a use-after-free vulnerability. Other functions in the same file (sco_sock_timeout(), sco_conn_del()) correctly use sco_sock_hold() to safely hold references under the lock. The vulnerability is fixed by using sco_sock_hold() to acquire a reference before releasing the lock and adding sock_put() on all exit paths.(CVE-2026-31408)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_fw: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks

The old-method path in fw_classify() calls tcf_block_q() and
dereferences q-&gt;handle.  Shared blocks leave block-&gt;q NULL, causing a
NULL deref when an empty cls_fw filter is attached to a shared block
and a packet with a nonzero major skb mark is classified.

Reject the configuration in fw_change() when the old method (no
TCA_OPTIONS) is used on a shared block, since fw_classify()&apos;s
old-method path needs block-&gt;q which is NULL for shared blocks.

The fixed null-ptr-deref calling stack:
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
 RIP: 0010:fw_classify (net/sched/cls_fw.c:81)
 Call Trace:
  tcf_classify (./include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860)
  tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4401)
  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4535 net/core/dev.c:4790)(CVE-2026-31421)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_flow: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks

flow_change() calls tcf_block_q() and dereferences q-&gt;handle to derive
a default baseclass.  Shared blocks leave block-&gt;q NULL, causing a NULL
deref when a flow filter without a fully qualified baseclass is created
on a shared block.

Check tcf_block_shared() before accessing block-&gt;q and return -EINVAL
for shared blocks.  This avoids the null-deref shown below:

=======================================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
RIP: 0010:flow_change (net/sched/cls_flow.c:508)
Call Trace:
 tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2432)
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6980)
 [...]
=======================================================================(CVE-2026-31422)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: EC: clean up handlers on probe failure in acpi_ec_setup()

When ec_install_handlers() returns -EPROBE_DEFER on reduced-hardware
platforms, it has already started the EC and installed the address
space handler with the struct acpi_ec pointer as handler context.
However, acpi_ec_setup() propagates the error without any cleanup.

The caller acpi_ec_add() then frees the struct acpi_ec for non-boot
instances, leaving a dangling handler context in ACPICA.

Any subsequent AML evaluation that accesses an EC OpRegion field
dispatches into acpi_ec_space_handler() with the freed pointer,
causing a use-after-free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800721de38 by task init/1
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
  acpi_ec_space_handler (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1362)
  acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch (drivers/acpi/acpica/evregion.c:293)
  acpi_ex_access_region (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:246)
  acpi_ex_field_datum_io (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:509)
  acpi_ex_extract_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:700)
  acpi_ex_read_data_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfield.c:327)
  acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value (drivers/acpi/acpica/exresolv.c:392)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 1:
  acpi_ec_alloc (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1424)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1692)

 Freed by task 1:
  kfree (mm/slub.c:6876)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1751)

The bug triggers on reduced-hardware EC platforms (ec-&gt;gpe &lt; 0)
when the GPIO IRQ provider defers probing. Once the stale handler
exists, any unprivileged sysfs read that causes AML to touch an
EC OpRegion (battery, thermal, backlight) exercises the dangling
pointer.

Fix this by calling ec_remove_handlers() in the error path of
acpi_ec_setup() before clearing first_ec. ec_remove_handlers()
checks each EC_FLAGS_* bit before acting, so it is safe to call
regardless of how far ec_install_handlers() progressed:

  -ENODEV  (handler not installed): only calls acpi_ec_stop()
  -EPROBE_DEFER (handler installed): removes handler, stops EC(CVE-2026-31426)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head

SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2
value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc
bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use
skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from
skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.

However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact
requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller
(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the
requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then
slab_build_skb() -&gt; ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting
skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free
the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original
kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:

  kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected
  skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k

Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps
the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification
for KFENCE objects.(CVE-2026-31429)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions

Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with
empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of
the extension is read before checking its length.  Fix it.

The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a
specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API.
Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly
disclosed off-list.(CVE-2026-31430)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix memory leak when a wq is reset

idxd_wq_disable_cleanup() which is called from the reset path for a
workqueue, sets the wq type to NONE, which for other parts of the
driver mean that the wq is empty (all its resources were released).

Only set the wq type to NONE after its resources are released.(CVE-2026-31441)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible invalid memory access after FLR

In the case that the first Function Level Reset (FLR) concludes
correctly, but in the second FLR the scratch area for the saved
configuration cannot be allocated, it&apos;s possible for a invalid memory
access to happen.

Always set the deallocated scratch area to NULL after FLR completes.(CVE-2026-31442)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: fix use-after-free in update_super_work when racing with umount

Commit b98535d09179 (&quot;ext4: fix bug_on in start_this_handle during umount
filesystem&quot;) moved ext4_unregister_sysfs() before flushing s_sb_upd_work
to prevent new error work from being queued via /proc/fs/ext4/xx/mb_groups
reads during unmount. However, this introduced a use-after-free because
update_super_work calls ext4_notify_error_sysfs() -&gt; sysfs_notify() which
accesses the kobject&apos;s kernfs_node after it has been freed by kobject_del()
in ext4_unregister_sysfs():

  update_super_work                ext4_put_super
  -----------------                --------------
                                   ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb)
                                     kobject_del(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_kobj)
                                       __kobject_del()
                                         sysfs_remove_dir()
                                           kobj-&gt;sd = NULL
                                         sysfs_put(sd)
                                           kernfs_put()  // RCU free
  ext4_notify_error_sysfs(sbi)
    sysfs_notify(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_kobj)
      kn = kobj-&gt;sd              // stale pointer
      kernfs_get(kn)             // UAF on freed kernfs_node
                                   ext4_journal_destroy()
                                     flush_work(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_sb_upd_work)

Instead of reordering the teardown sequence, fix this by making
ext4_notify_error_sysfs() detect that sysfs has already been torn down
by checking s_kobj.state_in_sysfs, and skipping the sysfs_notify() call
in that case. A dedicated mutex (s_error_notify_mutex) serializes
ext4_notify_error_sysfs() against kobject_del() in ext4_unregister_sysfs()
to prevent TOCTOU races where the kobject could be deleted between the
state_in_sysfs check and the sysfs_notify() call.(CVE-2026-31446)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes

ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting
index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before
accessing path[k].p_idx-&gt;ei_block, there is no validation that
p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that
level.

If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted
eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated
buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at
both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent
with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent
tree code.(CVE-2026-31449)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: publish jinode after initialization

ext4_inode_attach_jinode() publishes ei-&gt;jinode to concurrent users.
It used to set ei-&gt;jinode before jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(),
allowing a reader to observe a non-NULL jinode with i_vfs_inode
still unset.

The fast commit flush path can then pass this jinode to
jbd2_wait_inode_data(), which dereferences i_vfs_inode-&gt;i_mapping and
may crash.

Below is the crash I observe:
```
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000010beb47f4
PGD 110e51067 P4D 110e51067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4850 Comm: fc_fsync_bench_ Not tainted 6.18.0-00764-g795a690c06a5 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:xas_find_marked+0x3d/0x2e0
Code: e0 03 48 83 f8 02 0f 84 f0 01 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 89 c3 48 39 c6 0f 82 fd 01 00 00 48 85 c9 74 3d 48 83 f9 03 77 63 4c 8b 0f &lt;49&gt; 8b 71 08 48 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 f1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02
RSP: 0018:ffffbbee806e7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000010beb4 RBX: 000000000010beb4 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000002000300000 RDI: ffffbbee806e7c10
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000002000300000 R09: 000000010beb47ec
R10: ffff9ea494590090 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000002000300000
R13: ffffbbee806e7c90 R14: ffff9ea494513788 R15: ffffbbee806e7c88
FS: 00007fc2f9e3e6c0(0000) GS:ffff9ea6b1444000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000010beb47f4 CR3: 0000000119ac5000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
filemap_get_folios_tag+0x87/0x2a0
__filemap_fdatawait_range+0x5f/0xd0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __schedule+0x3e7/0x10c0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? cap_safe_nice+0x37/0x70
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors+0x12/0x40
ext4_fc_commit+0x697/0x8b0
? ext4_file_write_iter+0x64b/0x950
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? vfs_write+0x356/0x480
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
ext4_sync_file+0xf7/0x370
do_fsync+0x3b/0x80
? syscall_trace_enter+0x108/0x1d0
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
```

Fix this by initializing the jbd2_inode first.
Use smp_wmb() and WRITE_ONCE() to publish ei-&gt;jinode after
initialization. Readers use READ_ONCE() to fetch the pointer.(CVE-2026-31450)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: replace BUG_ON with proper error handling in ext4_read_inline_folio

Replace BUG_ON() with proper error handling when inline data size
exceeds PAGE_SIZE. This prevents kernel panic and allows the system to
continue running while properly reporting the filesystem corruption.

The error is logged via ext4_error_inode(), the buffer head is released
to prevent memory leak, and -EFSCORRUPTED is returned to indicate
filesystem corruption.(CVE-2026-31451)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: convert inline data to extents when truncate exceeds inline size

Add a check in ext4_setattr() to convert files from inline data storage
to extent-based storage when truncate() grows the file size beyond the
inline capacity. This prevents the filesystem from entering an
inconsistent state where the inline data flag is set but the file size
exceeds what can be stored inline.

Without this fix, the following sequence causes a kernel BUG_ON():

1. Mount filesystem with inode that has inline flag set and small size
2. truncate(file, 50MB) - grows size but inline flag remains set
3. sendfile() attempts to write data
4. ext4_write_inline_data() hits BUG_ON(write_size &gt; inline_capacity)

The crash occurs because ext4_write_inline_data() expects inline storage
to accommodate the write, but the actual inline capacity (~60 bytes for
i_block + ~96 bytes for xattrs) is far smaller than the file size and
write request.

The fix checks if the new size from setattr exceeds the inode&apos;s actual
inline capacity (EXT4_I(inode)-&gt;i_inline_size) and converts the file to
extent-based storage before proceeding with the size change.

This addresses the root cause by ensuring the inline data flag and file
size remain consistent during truncate operations.(CVE-2026-31452)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: add GFP_NOIO in the bio completion if needed

The bio completion path in the process context (e.g. dm-verity)
will directly call into decompression rather than trigger another
workqueue context for minimal scheduling latencies, which can
then call vm_map_ram() with GFP_KERNEL.

Due to insufficient memory, vm_map_ram() may generate memory
swapping I/O, which can cause submit_bio_wait to deadlock
in some scenarios.

Trimmed down the call stack, as follows:

f2fs_submit_read_io
  submit_bio                      //bio_list is initialized.
    mmc_blk_mq_recovery
      z_erofs_endio
        vm_map_ram
          __pte_alloc_kernel
            __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim
              shrink_folio_list
                __swap_writepage
                  submit_bio_wait  //bio_list is non-NULL, hang!!!

Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to wrap up this path.(CVE-2026-31467)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio_net: Fix UAF on dst_ops when IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is cleared and napi_tx is false

A UAF issue occurs when the virtio_net driver is configured with napi_tx=N
and the device&apos;s IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE flag is cleared
(e.g., during the configuration of tc route filter rules).

When IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is removed from the net_device, the network stack
expects the driver to hold the reference to skb-&gt;dst until the packet
is fully transmitted and freed. In virtio_net with napi_tx=N,
skbs may remain in the virtio transmit ring for an extended period.

If the network namespace is destroyed while these skbs are still pending,
the corresponding dst_ops structure has freed. When a subsequent packet
is transmitted, free_old_xmit() is triggered to clean up old skbs.
It then calls dst_release() on the skb associated with the stale dst_entry.
Since the dst_ops (referenced by the dst_entry) has already been freed,
a UAF kernel paging request occurs.

fix it by adds skb_dst_drop(skb) in start_xmit to explicitly release
the dst reference before the skb is queued in virtio_net.

Call Trace:
 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80007e150000
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6236 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPT
  ...
  percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x158 lib/percpu_counter.c:98 (P)
  dst_release+0xe0/0x110  net/core/dst.c:177
  skb_release_head_state+0xe8/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:1177
  sk_skb_reason_drop+0x54/0x2d8 net/core/skbuff.c:1255
  dev_kfree_skb_any_reason+0x64/0x78 net/core/dev.c:3469
  napi_consume_skb+0x1c4/0x3a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1527
  __free_old_xmit+0x164/0x230  drivers/net/virtio_net.c:611 [virtio_net]
  free_old_xmit drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1081 [virtio_net]
  start_xmit+0x7c/0x530 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:3329 [virtio_net]
  ...

Reproduction Steps:
NETDEV=&quot;enp3s0&quot;

config_qdisc_route_filter() {
    tc qdisc del dev $NETDEV root
    tc qdisc add dev $NETDEV root handle 1: prio
    tc filter add dev $NETDEV parent 1:0 \
	protocol ip prio 100 route to 100 flowid 1:1
    ip route add 192.168.1.100/32 dev $NETDEV realm 100
}

test_ns() {
    ip netns add testns
    ip link set $NETDEV netns testns
    ip netns exec testns ifconfig $NETDEV  10.0.32.46/24
    ip netns exec testns ping -c 1 10.0.32.1
    ip netns del testns
}

config_qdisc_route_filter

test_ns
sleep 2
test_ns(CVE-2026-31469)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: use generic driver_override infrastructure

When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus&apos; match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.

Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.

Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1]

Also note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct
bus_type, as SPI - in contrast to most other buses - passes &quot;&quot; to
sysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing
&quot;\n&quot; instead of &quot;(null)\n&quot;.(CVE-2026-31487)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks

Replace manual range and mask validations with netlink policy
annotations in ctnetlink code paths, so that the netlink core rejects
invalid values early and can generate extack errors.

- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_STATE: reject values &gt; TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT2 at
  policy level, removing the manual &gt;= TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX check.
- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_WSCALE_ORIGINAL/REPLY: reject values &gt; TCP_MAX_WSCALE
  (14). The normal TCP option parsing path already clamps to this value,
  but the ctnetlink path accepted 0-255, causing undefined behavior when
  used as a u32 shift count.
- CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS/REPLY_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with
  CTA_FILTER_F_ALL, removing the manual mask checks.
- CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with NF_CT_EXPECT_MASK, adding
  a new mask define grouping all valid expect flags.

Extracted from a broader nf-next patch by Florian Westphal, scoped to
ctnetlink for the fixes tree.(CVE-2026-31495)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: skip expectations in other netns via proc

Skip expectations that do not reside in this netns.

Similar to e77e6ff502ea (&quot;netfilter: conntrack: do not dump other netns&apos;s
conntrack entries via proc&quot;).(CVE-2026-31496)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix ERTM re-init and zero pdu_len infinite loop

l2cap_config_req() processes CONFIG_REQ for channels in BT_CONNECTED
state to support L2CAP reconfiguration (e.g. MTU changes). However,
since both CONF_INPUT_DONE and CONF_OUTPUT_DONE are already set from
the initial configuration, the reconfiguration path falls through to
l2cap_ertm_init(), which re-initializes tx_q, srej_q, srej_list, and
retrans_list without freeing the previous allocations and sets
chan-&gt;sdu to NULL without freeing the existing skb. This leaks all
previously allocated ERTM resources.

Additionally, l2cap_parse_conf_req() does not validate the minimum
value of remote_mps derived from the RFC max_pdu_size option. A zero
value propagates to l2cap_segment_sdu() where pdu_len becomes zero,
causing the while loop to never terminate since len is never
decremented, exhausting all available memory.

Fix the double-init by skipping l2cap_ertm_init() and
l2cap_chan_ready() when the channel is already in BT_CONNECTED state,
while still allowing the reconfiguration parameters to be updated
through l2cap_parse_conf_req(). Also add a pdu_len zero check in
l2cap_segment_sdu() as a safeguard.(CVE-2026-31498)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix deadlock in l2cap_conn_del()

l2cap_conn_del() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() for both info_timer
and id_addr_timer while holding conn-&gt;lock. However, the work functions
l2cap_info_timeout() and l2cap_conn_update_id_addr() both acquire
conn-&gt;lock, creating a potential AB-BA deadlock if the work is already
executing when l2cap_conn_del() takes the lock.

Move the work cancellations before acquiring conn-&gt;lock and use
disable_delayed_work_sync() to additionally prevent the works from
being rearmed after cancellation, consistent with the pattern used in
hci_conn_del().(CVE-2026-31499)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iavf: fix out-of-bounds writes in iavf_get_ethtool_stats()

iavf incorrectly uses real_num_tx_queues for ETH_SS_STATS. Since the
value could change in runtime, we should use num_tx_queues instead.

Moreover iavf_get_ethtool_stats() uses num_active_queues while
iavf_get_sset_count() and iavf_get_stat_strings() use
real_num_tx_queues, which triggers out-of-bounds writes when we do
&quot;ethtool -L&quot; and &quot;ethtool -S&quot; simultaneously [1].

For example when we change channels from 1 to 8, Thread 3 could be
scheduled before Thread 2, and out-of-bounds writes could be triggered
in Thread 3:

Thread 1 (ethtool -L)       Thread 2 (work)        Thread 3 (ethtool -S)
iavf_set_channels()
...
iavf_alloc_queues()
-&gt; num_active_queues = 8
iavf_schedule_finish_config()
                                                   iavf_get_sset_count()
                                                   real_num_tx_queues: 1
                                                   -&gt; buffer for 1 queue
                                                   iavf_get_ethtool_stats()
                                                   num_active_queues: 8
                                                   -&gt; out-of-bounds!
                            iavf_finish_config()
                            -&gt; real_num_tx_queues = 8

Use immutable num_tx_queues in all related functions to avoid the issue.

[1]
 BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
 Write of size 8 at addr ffffc900031c9080 by task ethtool/5800

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5800 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 6.19.0-enjuk-08403-g8137e3db7f1c #241 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
  kasan_report+0xe1/0x180
  iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
  iavf_get_ethtool_stats+0x14c/0x2e0
  __dev_ethtool+0x3d0c/0x5830
  dev_ethtool+0x12d/0x270
  dev_ioctl+0x53c/0xe30
  sock_do_ioctl+0x1a9/0x270
  sock_ioctl+0x3d4/0x5e0
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x1c0
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x690
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7da0e6e36d
 ...
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 The buggy address belongs to a 1-page vmalloc region starting at 0xffffc900031c9000 allocated at __dev_ethtool+0x3cc9/0x5830
 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
 index:0xffff88813a013de0 pfn:0x13a013
 flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
 raw: 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: ffff88813a013de0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffffc900031c8f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ffffc900031c9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 &gt;ffffc900031c9080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
                    ^
  ffffc900031c9100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ffffc900031c9180: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8(CVE-2026-31505)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref on l2cap_sock_ready_cb

Before using sk pointer, check if it is null.

Fix the following:

 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000260-0x0000000000000267]
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5985 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-00029-ga989fde763f4 #1 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-9.fc43 06/10/2025
 Workqueue: events l2cap_info_timeout
 RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30
 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df &lt;0f&gt; b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce
 veth0_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00005582615a5008 CR3: 000000007007e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __kasan_check_byte+0x12/0x40
  lock_acquire+0x79/0x2e0
  lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100
  ? l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160
  l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160
  l2cap_conn_start+0x779/0xff0
  ? __pfx_l2cap_conn_start+0x10/0x10
  ? l2cap_info_timeout+0x60/0xa0
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  l2cap_info_timeout+0x68/0xa0
  ? process_scheduled_works+0xa8d/0x18c0
  process_scheduled_works+0xb6e/0x18c0
  ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
  ? assign_work+0x3d5/0x5e0
  worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0
  kthread+0x388/0x470
  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x51e/0xb90
  ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
 veth1_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode
  ? __switch_to+0xc7d/0x1450
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Modules linked in:
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_0
 batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_1
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim0: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim1: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim2: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim3: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30
 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df &lt;0f&gt; b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce
 ieee80211 phy39: Selected rate control algorithm &apos;minstrel_ht&apos;
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f7e16139e9c CR3: 000000000e74e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception(CVE-2026-31510)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete

This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory.(CVE-2026-31511)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate PDU length before reading SDU length in l2cap_ecred_data_rcv()

l2cap_ecred_data_rcv() reads the SDU length field from skb-&gt;data using
get_unaligned_le16() without first verifying that skb contains at least
L2CAP_SDULEN_SIZE (2) bytes. When skb-&gt;len is less than 2, this reads
past the valid data in the skb.

The ERTM reassembly path correctly calls pskb_may_pull() before reading
the SDU length (l2cap_reassemble_sdu, L2CAP_SAR_START case). Apply the
same validation to the Enhanced Credit Based Flow Control data path.(CVE-2026-31512)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown

A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item
policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue.

The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing
struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down
before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have
been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory.

xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown,
but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work.

Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the
queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a
freed struct net.(CVE-2026-31516)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto

When the TX queue for espintcp is full, esp_output_tail_tcp will
return an error and not free the skb, because with synchronous crypto,
the common xfrm output code will drop the packet for us.

With async crypto (esp_output_done), we need to drop the skb when
esp_output_tail_tcp returns an error.(CVE-2026-31518)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN

The BPF interpreter&apos;s signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.

The verifier&apos;s abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.

Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter&apos;s sdiv32/smod32 handlers.

s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().(CVE-2026-31525)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for groups

Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access
when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back.

This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when
the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU
are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in()
using pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu.

Turns out, inherit uses event-&gt;pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the
move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use
pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context.

Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for the
group case.(CVE-2026-31528)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: nexthop: allocate skb dynamically in rtm_get_nexthop()

When querying a nexthop object via RTM_GETNEXTHOP, the kernel currently
allocates a fixed-size skb using NLMSG_GOODSIZE. While sufficient for
single nexthops and small Equal-Cost Multi-Path groups, this fixed
allocation fails for large nexthop groups like 512 nexthops.

This results in the following warning splat:

 WARNING: net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395 at rtm_get_nexthop+0x176/0x1c0, CPU#20: rep/4608
 [...]
 RIP: 0010:rtm_get_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395)
 [...]
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6989)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
  netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
  ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:721 net/socket.c:736 net/socket.c:2585)
  ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2641)
  __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2671)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fix this by allocating the size dynamically using nh_nlmsg_size() and
using nlmsg_new(), this is consistent with nexthop_notify() behavior. In
addition, adjust nh_nlmsg_size_grp() so it calculates the size needed
based on flags passed. While at it, also add the size of NHA_FDB for
nexthop group size calculation as it was missing too.

This cannot be reproduced via iproute2 as the group size is currently
limited and the command fails as follows:

addattr_l ERROR: message exceeded bound of 1048(CVE-2026-31531)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: raw: fix ro-&gt;uniq use-after-free in raw_rcv()

raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(),
but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window
where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section
after raw_release() frees ro-&gt;uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the
percpu uniq storage.

Move free_percpu(ro-&gt;uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific
socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the
socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from
sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant
callbacks have drained.

[mkl: applied manually](CVE-2026-31532)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption

The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 (&quot;net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests&quot;), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.

When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge-&gt;offset, sge-&gt;length) and decrements
ctx-&gt;encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.

The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.

Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.(CVE-2026-31533)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/i915/gt: Check set_default_submission() before deferencing

When the i915 driver firmware binaries are not present, the
set_default_submission pointer is not set. This pointer is
dereferenced during suspend anyways.

Add a check to make sure it is set before dereferencing.

[   23.289926] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[   23.293558] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[   23.298010] Freezing user space processes
[   23.302771] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.000 seconds)
[   23.309766] OOM killer disabled.
[   23.313027] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[   23.318540] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[   23.342038] serial 00:05: disabled
[   23.345719] serial 00:02: disabled
[   23.349342] serial 00:01: disabled
[   23.353782] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.358993] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.361635] ata1.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.368863] ata2.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.445187] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   23.452194] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[   23.457896] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[   23.463065] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   23.465640] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   23.469869] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/u48:18 Tainted: G S      W           6.19.0-rc4-00020-gf0b9d8eb98df #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[   23.482512] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[   23.496511] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[   23.501087] RIP: 0010:0x0
[   23.503755] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[   23.510324] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a60065fca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   23.515592] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f428290e000 RCX: 000000000000000f
[   23.522765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff9f428290e000
[   23.529937] RBP: ffff9f4282907070 R08: ffff9f4281130428 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[   23.537111] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9f42829070f8
[   23.544284] R13: ffff9f4282906028 R14: ffff9f4282900000 R15: ffff9f4282906b68
[   23.551457] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f466b2cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.559588] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.565365] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000031c230001 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
[   23.572539] PKRU: 55555554
[   23.575281] Call Trace:
[   23.577770]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   23.579905]  intel_engines_reset_default_submission+0x42/0x60
[   23.585695]  __intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x191/0x200
[   23.590360]  intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x20/0x40
[   23.594675]  gt_sanitize+0x15e/0x170
[   23.598290]  i915_gem_suspend_late+0x6b/0x180
[   23.602692]  i915_drm_suspend_late+0x35/0xf0
[   23.607008]  ? __pfx_pci_pm_suspend_late+0x10/0x10
[   23.611843]  dpm_run_callback+0x78/0x1c0
[   23.615817]  device_suspend_late+0xde/0x2e0
[   23.620037]  async_suspend_late+0x18/0x30
[   23.624082]  async_run_entry_fn+0x25/0xa0
[   23.628129]  process_one_work+0x15b/0x380
[   23.632182]  worker_thread+0x2a5/0x3c0
[   23.635973]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   23.640279]  kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
[   23.643464]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.647263]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.651045]  ret_from_fork+0x131/0x190
[   23.654837]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.658634]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   23.662597]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   23.664826] Modules linked in:
[   23.667914] CR2: 0000000000000000
[   23.671271] ------------[ cut here ]------------

(cherry picked from commit daa199abc3d3d1740c9e3a2c3e9216ae5b447cad)(CVE-2026-31540)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/platform/uv: Handle deconfigured sockets

When a socket is deconfigured, it&apos;s mapped to SOCK_EMPTY (0xffff). This causes
a panic while allocating UV hub info structures.

Fix this by using NUMA_NO_NODE, allowing UV hub info structures to be
allocated on valid nodes.(CVE-2026-31542)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: bonding: fix NULL deref in bond_debug_rlb_hash_show

rlb_clear_slave intentionally keeps RLB hash-table entries on
the rx_hashtbl_used_head list with slave set to NULL when no
replacement slave is available. However, bond_debug_rlb_hash_show
visites client_info-&gt;slave without checking if it&apos;s NULL.

Other used-list iterators in bond_alb.c already handle this NULL-slave
state safely:

- rlb_update_client returns early on !client_info-&gt;slave
- rlb_req_update_slave_clients, rlb_clear_slave, and rlb_rebalance
compare slave values before visiting
- lb_req_update_subnet_clients continues if slave is NULL

The following NULL deref crash can be trigger in
bond_debug_rlb_hash_show:

[    1.289791] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[    1.292058] RIP: 0010:bond_debug_rlb_hash_show (drivers/net/bonding/bond_debugfs.c:41)
[    1.293101] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a7d00 EFLAGS: 00010286
[    1.293333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102b48200 RCX: ffff888102b48204
[    1.293631] RDX: ffff888102b48200 RSI: ffffffff839daad5 RDI: ffff888102815078
[    1.293924] RBP: ffff888102815078 R08: ffff888102b4820e R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.294267] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888100f929c0
[    1.294564] R13: ffff888100f92a00 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc900004a7ed8
[    1.294864] FS:  0000000001395380(0000) GS:ffff888196e75000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.295239] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.295480] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102adc004 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[    1.295897] Call Trace:
[    1.296134]  seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231)
[    1.296341]  seq_read (fs/seq_file.c:164)
[    1.296493]  full_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:378 (discriminator 1))
[    1.296658]  vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572)
[    1.296981]  ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:717)
[    1.297132]  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
[    1.297325]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Add a NULL check and print &quot;(none)&quot; for entries with no assigned slave.(CVE-2026-31546)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path

Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:

    WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524

When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in &apos;exiting&apos;.

After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().

  CPU0			     CPU1		       CPU2
  futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
  // acquires the PI futex
  exit()
    futex_cleanup_begin()
      futex_state = EXITING;
			     futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 attach_to_pi_owner()
				   // observes EXITING
				   *exiting = owner;  // takes ref
				   return -EBUSY
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
				 put_task_struct();   // drops ref
			       // exiting still points to owner
			       goto retry;
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 lock_pi_update_atomic()
				   cmpxchg(uaddr)
					*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
				   // value changed
				 return -EAGAIN;
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
				 WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)

Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.(CVE-2026-31555)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: Fix fence put before wait in amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib

amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() submits a GPU job and gets a fence
from amdgpu_ib_schedule(). This fence is used to wait for job
completion.

Currently, the code drops the fence reference using dma_fence_put()
before calling dma_fence_wait().

If dma_fence_put() releases the last reference, the fence may be
freed before dma_fence_wait() is called. This can lead to a
use-after-free.

Fix this by waiting on the fence first and releasing the reference
only after dma_fence_wait() completes.

Fixes the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c:697 amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() warn: passing freed memory &apos;f&apos; (line 696)

(cherry picked from commit 8b9e5259adc385b61a6590a13b82ae0ac2bd3482)(CVE-2026-31566)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: gw: fix OOB heap access in cgw_csum_crc8_rel()

cgw_csum_crc8_rel() correctly computes bounds-safe indices via calc_idx():

    int from = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;from_idx, cf-&gt;len);
    int to   = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;to_idx,   cf-&gt;len);
    int res  = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;result_idx, cf-&gt;len);

    if (from &lt; 0 || to &lt; 0 || res &lt; 0)
        return;

However, the loop and the result write then use the raw s8 fields directly
instead of the computed variables:

    for (i = crc8-&gt;from_idx; ...)        /* BUG: raw negative index */
    cf-&gt;data[crc8-&gt;result_idx] = ...;    /* BUG: raw negative index */

With from_idx = to_idx = result_idx = -64 on a 64-byte CAN FD frame,
calc_idx(-64, 64) = 0 so the guard passes, but the loop iterates with
i = -64, reading cf-&gt;data[-64], and the write goes to cf-&gt;data[-64].
This write might end up to 56 (7.0-rc) or 40 (&lt;= 6.19) bytes before the
start of the canfd_frame on the heap.

The companion function cgw_csum_xor_rel() uses `from`/`to`/`res`
correctly throughout; fix cgw_csum_crc8_rel() to match.

Confirmed with KASAN on linux-7.0-rc2:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cgw_csum_crc8_rel+0x515/0x5b0
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880076619c8 by task poc_cgw_oob/62

To configure the can-gw crc8 checksums CAP_NET_ADMIN is needed.(CVE-2026-31570)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SEV: Drop WARN on large size for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION

Drop the WARN in sev_pin_memory() on npages overflowing an int, as the
WARN is comically trivially to trigger from userspace, e.g. by doing:

  struct kvm_enc_region range = {
          .addr = 0,
          .size = -1ul,
  };

  __vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &amp;range);

Note, the checks in sev_mem_enc_register_region() that presumably exist to
verify the incoming address+size are completely worthless, as both &quot;addr&quot;
and &quot;size&quot; are u64s and SEV is 64-bit only, i.e. they _can&apos;t_ be greater
than ULONG_MAX.  That wart will be cleaned up in the near future.

	if (range-&gt;addr &gt; ULONG_MAX || range-&gt;size &gt; ULONG_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;

Opportunistically add a comment to explain why the code calculates the
number of pages the &quot;hard&quot; way, e.g. instead of just shifting @ulen.(CVE-2026-31590)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Stop cmd_handler work in epf_ntb_epc_cleanup

Disable the delayed work before clearing BAR mappings and doorbells to
avoid running the handler after resources have been torn down.

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800083f46004
  [...]
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1]  SMP
  [...]
  Call trace:
   epf_ntb_cmd_handler+0x54/0x200 [pci_epf_vntb] (P)
   process_one_work+0x154/0x3b0
   worker_thread+0x2c8/0x400
   kthread+0x148/0x210
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20(CVE-2026-31595)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1

Zen1&apos;s hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial
results from previous operations.  Those results can be leaked by
another, attacker thread.

Fix that with a chicken bit.(CVE-2026-31628)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with &quot;%pISpc&quot;.

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

  [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter&apos;s maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
  explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
  mapped-v4 example(CVE-2026-31630)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect

Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to
the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free.(CVE-2026-31651)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy

nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().

Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.

KASAN report:
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80

 Call Trace:
  nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
  nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
  nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
  __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
  tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
  __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320

 Allocated by task 75:
  nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
  nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
  nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
  nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00

 Freed by task 26:
  nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
  process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0(CVE-2026-31665)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core

A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered
reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for
example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5
controller):

  ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; input_mutex -&gt; dev-&gt;mutex -&gt; ff-&gt;mutex

The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:

1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff-&gt;mutex and calls
   uinput_dev_upload_effect() -&gt; uinput_request_submit() -&gt;
   uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev-&gt;mutex.

2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev-&gt;mutex and calls
   uinput_create_device() -&gt; input_register_device(), which acquires
   input_mutex.

3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and
   calls kbd_connect() -&gt; input_register_handle(), which acquires
   dev-&gt;mutex.

4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under
   dev-&gt;mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff-&gt;mutex.

Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect
udev-&gt;state and udev-&gt;dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of
acquiring udev-&gt;mutex.  The function only needs to atomically check
device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via
uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock
(ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep).  This
breaks the ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; udev-&gt;mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in
the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.

To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect
writes to udev-&gt;state in uinput_create_device() and
uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.

Additionally, move init_completion(&amp;request-&gt;done) from
uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before
uinput_request_reserve_slot().  Once the slot is allocated,
uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from
the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the
request becomes visible.

Lock ordering after the fix:

  ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
  udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
  udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; input_mutex -&gt; dev-&gt;mutex -&gt; ff-&gt;mutex (no back-edge)(CVE-2026-31667)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: sch_netem: fix out-of-bounds access in packet corruption

In netem_enqueue(), the packet corruption logic uses
get_random_u32_below(skb_headlen(skb)) to select an index for
modifying skb-&gt;data. When an AF_PACKET TX_RING sends fully non-linear
packets over an IPIP tunnel, skb_headlen(skb) evaluates to 0.

Passing 0 to get_random_u32_below() takes the variable-ceil slow path
which returns an unconstrained 32-bit random integer. Using this
unconstrained value as an offset into skb-&gt;data results in an
out-of-bounds memory access.

Fix this by verifying skb_headlen(skb) is non-zero before attempting
to corrupt the linear data area. Fully non-linear packets will silently
bypass the corruption logic.(CVE-2026-31675)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: af_alg - limit RX SG extraction by receive buffer budget

Make af_alg_get_rsgl() limit each RX scatterlist extraction to the
remaining receive buffer budget.

af_alg_get_rsgl() currently uses af_alg_readable() only as a gate
before extracting data into the RX scatterlist. Limit each extraction
to the remaining af_alg_rcvbuf(sk) budget so that receive-side
accounting matches the amount of data attached to the request.

If skcipher cannot obtain enough RX space for at least one chunk while
more data remains to be processed, reject the recvmsg call instead of
rounding the request length down to zero.(CVE-2026-31677)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

openvswitch: defer tunnel netdev_put to RCU release

ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy() may run after NETDEV_UNREGISTER already
detached the device. Dropping the netdev reference in destroy can race
with concurrent readers that still observe vport-&gt;dev.

Do not release vport-&gt;dev in ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy(). Instead, let
vport_netdev_free() drop the reference from the RCU callback, matching
the non-tunnel destroy path and avoiding additional synchronization
under RTNL.(CVE-2026-31678)

In the Linux kernel, a memory out-of-bounds access vulnerability exists in the act_csum module&apos;s tcf_csum_act() function when processing nested VLAN headers. When an skb still carries in-payload VLAN tags, the function walks nested VLAN headers directly from skb-&gt;data. The current code reads vlan-&gt;h_vlan_encapsulated_proto and then pulls VLAN_HLEN bytes without first ensuring that the full VLAN header is present in the linear area. If only part of an inner VLAN header is linearized, accessing h_vlan_encapsulated_proto reads past the linear area, and the following skb_pull(VLAN_HLEN) may violate skb invariants.(CVE-2026-31684)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets

`eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address
and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address.

The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when
`par-&gt;fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par-&gt;fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()`
can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid.

Fix this by removing the `par-&gt;fragoff != 0` condition so that packets
with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.(CVE-2026-31685)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

EDAC/mc: Fix error path ordering in edac_mc_alloc()

When the mci-&gt;pvt_info allocation in edac_mc_alloc() fails, the error path
will call put_device() which will end up calling the device&apos;s release
function.

However, the init ordering is wrong such that device_initialize() happens
*after* the failed allocation and thus the device itself and the release
function pointer are not initialized yet when they&apos;re called:

  MCE: In-kernel MCE decoding enabled.
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kobject: &apos;(null)&apos;: is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
  WARNING: lib/kobject.c:734 at kobject_put, CPU#22: systemd-udevd
  CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(full)
  RIP: 0010:kobject_put
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   edac_mc_alloc+0xbe/0xe0 [edac_core]
   amd64_edac_init+0x7a4/0xff0 [amd64_edac]
   ? __pfx_amd64_edac_init+0x10/0x10 [amd64_edac]
   do_one_initcall
   ...

Reorder the calling sequence so that the device is initialized and thus the
release function pointer is properly set before it can be used.

This was found by Claude while reviewing another EDAC patch.(CVE-2026-31689)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don&apos;t attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388

  CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
   sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.(CVE-2026-31697)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the PDH cert, don&apos;t attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033

  CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc.                                                       Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
   sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.(CVE-2026-31698)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the PEK CSR, don&apos;t attempt to copy the blob to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405

  CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
   sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.(CVE-2026-31699)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path

smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path.  The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp-&gt;Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.

A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.

Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload.  Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.(CVE-2026-31708)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vxlan: validate ND option lengths in vxlan_na_create

vxlan_na_create() walks ND options according to option-provided
lengths. A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the
computed option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.

Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address.(CVE-2026-31738)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bridge: br_nd_send: validate ND option lengths

br_nd_send() walks ND options according to option-provided lengths.
A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the computed
option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.

Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address.(CVE-2026-31752)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: cdns3: gadget: fix NULL pointer dereference in ep_queue

When the gadget endpoint is disabled or not yet configured, the ep-&gt;desc
pointer can be NULL. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when
__cdns3_gadget_ep_queue() is called, causing a kernel crash.

Add a check to return -ESHUTDOWN if ep-&gt;desc is NULL, which is the
standard return code for unconfigured endpoints.

This prevents potential crashes when ep_queue is called on endpoints
that are not ready.(CVE-2026-31755)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: move wake reason storage into validated event handlers

hci_store_wake_reason() is called from hci_event_packet() immediately
after stripping the HCI event header but before hci_event_func()
enforces the per-event minimum payload length from hci_ev_table.
This means a short HCI event frame can reach bacpy() before any bounds
check runs.

Rather than duplicating skb parsing and per-event length checks inside
hci_store_wake_reason(), move wake-address storage into the individual
event handlers after their existing event-length validation has
succeeded. Convert hci_store_wake_reason() into a small helper that only
stores an already-validated bdaddr while the caller holds hci_dev_lock().
Use the same helper after hci_event_func() with a NULL address to
preserve the existing unexpected-wake fallback semantics when no
validated event handler records a wake address.

Annotate the helper with __must_hold(&amp;hdev-&gt;lock) and add
lockdep_assert_held(&amp;hdev-&gt;lock) so future call paths keep the lock
contract explicit.

Call the helper from hci_conn_request_evt(), hci_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_sync_conn_complete_evt(), le_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_le_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(),
hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_pa_sync_established_evt(), and
hci_le_past_received_evt().(CVE-2026-31771)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state

The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored
STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH.
That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing
flow actually achieved.

For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear
and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local
side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when
storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.

This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code,
which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.(CVE-2026-31773)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix potential out-of-bounds read in iwl_mvm_nd_match_info_handler()

The memcpy function assumes the dynamic array notif-&gt;matches is at least
as large as the number of bytes to copy. Otherwise, results-&gt;matches may
contain unwanted data. To guarantee safety, extend the validation in one
of the checks to ensure sufficient packet length.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2026-31779)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/ioc32: stop speculation on the drm_compat_ioctl path

The drm compat ioctl path takes a user controlled pointer, and then
dereferences it into a table of function pointers, the signature method
of spectre problems.  Fix this up by calling array_index_nospec() on the
index to the function pointer list.(CVE-2026-31781)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load

Load Long Term Keys stores the user-provided enc_size and later uses
it to size fixed-size stack operations when replying to LE LTK
requests. An enc_size larger than the 16-byte key buffer can therefore
overflow the reply stack buffer.

Reject oversized enc_size values while validating the management LTK
record so invalid keys never reach the stored key state.(CVE-2026-43020)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: use skb_header_pointer() for TCPv4 GSO frag_off check

Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value warning in gso_features_check()
called from netif_skb_features() [1].

gso_features_check() reads iph-&gt;frag_off to decide whether to clear
mangleid_features. Accessing the IPv4 header via ip_hdr()/inner_ip_hdr()
can rely on skb header offsets that are not always safe for direct
dereference on packets injected from PF_PACKET paths.

Use skb_header_pointer() for the TCPv4 frag_off check so the header read
is robust whether data is already linear or needs copying.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1543a7d954d9c6d00407(CVE-2026-43036)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipv6: ndisc: fix ndisc_ra_useropt to initialize nduseropt_padX fields to zero to prevent an info-leak

When processing Router Advertisements with user options the kernel
builds an RTM_NEWNDUSEROPT netlink message. The nduseroptmsg struct
has three padding fields that are never zeroed and can leak kernel data

The fix is simple, just zeroes the padding fields.(CVE-2026-43040)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: af-alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalk

The AF_ALG interface fails to unmark the end of a Scatter/Gather List (SGL)
when chaining a new af_alg_tsgl structure. If a sendmsg() fills an SGL
exactly to MAX_SGL_ENTS, the last entry is marked as the end. A subsequent
sendmsg() allocates a new SGL and chains it, but fails to clear the end
marker on the previous SGL&apos;s last data entry.

This causes the crypto scatterwalk to hit a premature end, returning NULL
on sg_next() and leading to a kernel panic during dereference.

Fix this by explicitly unmarking the end of the previous SGL when
performing sg_chain() in af_alg_alloc_tsgl().(CVE-2026-43043)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

serial: 8250: Fix TX deadlock when using DMA

`dmaengine_terminate_async` does not guarantee that the
`__dma_tx_complete` callback will run. The callback is currently the
only place where `dma-&gt;tx_running` gets cleared. If the transaction is
canceled and the callback never runs, then `dma-&gt;tx_running` will never
get cleared and we will never schedule new TX DMA transactions again.

This change makes it so we clear `dma-&gt;tx_running` after we terminate
the DMA transaction. This is &quot;safe&quot; because `serial8250_tx_dma_flush`
is holding the UART port lock. The first thing the callback does is also
grab the UART port lock, so access to `dma-&gt;tx_running` is serialized.(CVE-2026-43061)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix not releasing workqueue on .release()

The workqueue associated with an DSA/IAA device is not released when
the object is freed.(CVE-2026-43064)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/intel/uncore: Skip discovery table for offline dies

This warning can be triggered if NUMA is disabled and the system
boots with fewer CPUs than the number of CPUs in die 0.

WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 7257 at uncore.c:1157 uncore_pci_pmu_register+0x136/0x160 [intel_uncore]

Currently, the discovery table continues to be parsed even if all CPUs
in the associated die are offline.  This can lead to an array overflow
at &quot;pmu-&gt;boxes[die] = box&quot; in uncore_pci_pmu_register(), which may
trigger the warning above or cause other issues.(CVE-2026-43079)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: icmp: fix null-ptr-deref in icmp_build_probe()

ipv6_stub-&gt;ipv6_dev_find() may return ERR_PTR(-EAFNOSUPPORT) when the
IPv6 stack is not active (CONFIG_IPV6=m and not loaded), and passing
this error pointer to dev_hold() will cause a kernel crash with
null-ptr-deref.

Instead, silently discard the request. RFC 8335 does not appear to
define a specific response for the case where an IPv6 interface
identifier is syntactically valid but the implementation cannot perform
the lookup at runtime, and silently dropping the request may safer than
misreporting &quot;No Such Interface&quot;.(CVE-2026-43099)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/smp: Add check for kcalloc() failure in parse_thread_groups()

As kcalloc() may fail, check its return value to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference when passing it to of_property_read_u32_array().(CVE-2026-43148)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: pegasus: enable basic endpoint checking

pegasus_probe() fills URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:

  - usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev, 1) for RX data
  - usb_sndbulkpipe(dev, 2) for TX data
  - usb_rcvintpipe(dev, 3)  for status interrupts

A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.

Add a pegasus_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic
constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and
usb_check_int_endpoints() calls before any resource allocation to
verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched
descriptors at probe time, and avoid triggering assertion.

Similar fix to
- commit 90b7f2961798 (&quot;net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking&quot;)
- commit 9e7021d2aeae (&quot;net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking&quot;)(CVE-2026-43156)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md/bitmap: fix GPF in write_page caused by resize race

A General Protection Fault occurs in write_page() during array resize:
RIP: 0010:write_page+0x22b/0x3c0 [md_mod]

This is a use-after-free race between bitmap_daemon_work() and
__bitmap_resize(). The daemon iterates over `bitmap-&gt;storage.filemap`
without locking, while the resize path frees that storage via
md_bitmap_file_unmap(). `quiesce()` does not stop the md thread,
allowing concurrent access to freed pages.

Fix by holding `mddev-&gt;bitmap_info.mutex` during the bitmap update.(CVE-2026-43163)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()

On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace-&gt;nodelen
to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field
as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against
trace-&gt;type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are
present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits
0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated
region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory
and leads to a kernel panic.

Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to
derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:

  - in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
    the open-coded computation;
  - in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
    nodelen is inconsistent with the type field, before any data is
    written.

Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they
are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to
0xff1ffc00).(CVE-2026-43186)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

LoongArch: Make cpumask_of_node() robust against NUMA_NO_NODE

The arch definition of cpumask_of_node() cannot handle NUMA_NO_NODE -
which is a valid index - so add a check for this.(CVE-2026-43212)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel&apos;s ima kexec buffer

When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as &quot;mem=&lt;size&gt;&quot;, the physical range that contains the carried
over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a
kernel panic.

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
    RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) – not-present page

Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done
in commit cbf9c4b9617b (&quot;of: check previous kernel&apos;s ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds&quot;) do a similar check on x86.

Without carrying the measurement list across kexec, the attestation
would fail.(CVE-2026-43240)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: fiemap page fault fix

In gfs2_fiemap(), we are calling iomap_fiemap() while holding the inode
glock.  This can lead to recursive glock taking if the fiemap buffer is
memory mapped to the same inode and accessing it triggers a page fault.

Fix by disabling page faults for iomap_fiemap() and faulting in the
buffer by hand if necessary.

Fixes xfstest generic/742.(CVE-2026-43262)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: supply snapshot context in ceph_zero_partial_object()

The ceph_zero_partial_object function was missing proper snapshot
context for its OSD write operations, which could lead to data
inconsistencies in snapshots.

Reproducer:
../src/vstart.sh --new -x --localhost --bluestore
./bin/ceph auth caps client.fs_a mds &apos;allow rwps fsname=a&apos; mon &apos;allow r fsname=a&apos; osd &apos;allow rw tag cephfs data=a&apos;
mount -t ceph (CVE-2026-43273)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: move ext4_percpu_param_init() before ext4_mb_init()

When running `kvm-xfstests -c ext4/1k -C 1 generic/383` with the
`DOUBLE_CHECK` macro defined, the following panic is triggered:

==================================================================
EXT4-fs error (device vdc): ext4_validate_block_bitmap:423:
                        comm mount: bg 0: bad block bitmap checksum
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff110000fa2cc000
PGD 3e01067 P4D 3e02067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2386 Comm: mount Tainted: G W
                        6.18.0-gba65a4e7120a-dirty #1152 PREEMPT(none)
RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_add_batch+0x13/0xa0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted+0xcb/0xe0
 ext4_validate_block_bitmap+0x2a1/0x2f0
 ext4_read_block_bitmap+0x33/0x50
 mb_group_bb_bitmap_alloc+0x33/0x80
 ext4_mb_add_groupinfo+0x190/0x250
 ext4_mb_init_backend+0x87/0x290
 ext4_mb_init+0x456/0x640
 __ext4_fill_super+0x1072/0x1680
 ext4_fill_super+0xd3/0x280
 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x132/0x1d0
 vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xd0
 vfs_cmd_create+0x59/0xe0
 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4f6/0x6b0
 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
==================================================================

This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
        mkfs.ext4 -F -q -b 1024 /dev/sda 5G
        tune2fs -O quota,project /dev/sda
        mount /dev/sda /tmp/test

With DOUBLE_CHECK defined, mb_group_bb_bitmap_alloc() reads
and validates the block bitmap. When the validation fails,
ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted() attempts to update
sbi-&gt;s_freeclusters_counter. However, this percpu_counter has not been
initialized yet at this point, which leads to the panic described above.

Fix this by moving the execution of ext4_percpu_param_init() to occur
before ext4_mb_init(), ensuring the per-CPU counters are initialized
before they are used.(CVE-2026-43288)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/vmalloc: prevent RCU stalls in kasan_release_vmalloc_node

When CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is enabled, freeing KASAN shadow pages during
vmalloc cleanup triggers expensive stack unwinding that acquires RCU read
locks.  Processing a large purge_list without rescheduling can cause the
task to hold CPU for extended periods (10+ seconds), leading to RCU stalls
and potential OOM conditions.

The issue manifests in purge_vmap_node() -&gt; kasan_release_vmalloc_node()
where iterating through hundreds or thousands of vmap_area entries and
freeing their associated shadow pages causes:

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P6229/1:b..l
  ...
  task:kworker/0:17 state:R running task stack:28840 pid:6229
  ...
  kasan_release_vmalloc_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299
  purge_vmap_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299

Each call to kasan_release_vmalloc() can free many pages, and with
page_owner tracking, each free triggers save_stack() which performs stack
unwinding under RCU read lock.  Without yielding, this creates an
unbounded RCU critical section.

Add periodic cond_resched() calls within the loop to allow:
- RCU grace periods to complete
- Other tasks to run
- Scheduler to preempt when needed

The fix uses need_resched() for immediate response under load, with a
batch count of 32 as a guaranteed upper bound to prevent worst-case stalls
even under light load.(CVE-2026-43292)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipa: fix event ring index not programmed for IPA v5.0+

For IPA v5.0+, the event ring index field moved from CH_C_CNTXT_0 to
CH_C_CNTXT_1. The v5.0 register definition intended to define this
field in the CH_C_CNTXT_1 fmask array but used the old identifier of
ERINDEX instead of CH_ERINDEX.

Without a valid event ring, GSI channels could never signal transfer
completions. This caused gsi_channel_trans_quiesce() to block
forever in wait_for_completion().

At least for IPA v5.2 this resolves an issue seen where runtime
suspend, system suspend, and remoteproc stop all hanged forever. It
also meant the IPA data path was completely non functional.(CVE-2026-43345)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/kbuf: check if target buffer list is still legacy on recycle

There&apos;s a gap between when the buffer was grabbed and when it
potentially gets recycled, where if the list is empty, someone could&apos;ve
upgraded it to a ring provided type. This can happen if the request
is forced via io-wq. The legacy recycling is missing checking if the
buffer_list still exists, and if it&apos;s of the correct type. Add those
checks.(CVE-2026-43366)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()

If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().

Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.(CVE-2026-43406)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()

Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the &quot;path&quot;
pointer obtained by __getname().  If ownership of this pointer is not
passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it
before returning.(CVE-2026-43419)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: class: cdc-wdm: fix reordering issue in read code path

Quoting the bug report:

Due to compiler optimization or CPU out-of-order execution, the
desc-&gt;length update can be reordered before the memmove. If this
happens, wdm_read() can see the new length and call copy_to_user() on
uninitialized memory. This also violates LKMM data race rules [1].

Fix it by using WRITE_ONCE and memory barriers.(CVE-2026-43427)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts

The usb_control_msg(), usb_bulk_msg(), and usb_interrupt_msg() APIs in
usbcore allow unlimited timeout durations.  And since they use
uninterruptible waits, this leaves open the possibility of hanging a
task for an indefinitely long time, with no way to kill it short of
unplugging the target device.

To prevent this sort of problem, enforce a maximum limit on the length
of these unkillable timeouts.  The limit chosen here, somewhat
arbitrarily, is 60 seconds.  On many systems (although not all) this
is short enough to avoid triggering the kernel&apos;s hung-task detector.

In addition, clear up the ambiguity of negative timeout values by
treating them the same as 0, i.e., using the maximum allowed timeout.(CVE-2026-43428)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5: Fix deadlock between devlink lock and esw-&gt;wq

esw-&gt;work_queue executes esw_functions_changed_event_handler -&gt;
esw_vfs_changed_event_handler and acquires the devlink lock.

.eswitch_mode_set (acquires devlink lock in devlink_nl_pre_doit) -&gt;
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set -&gt; mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked -&gt;
mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister -&gt; flush_workqueue deadlocks
when esw_vfs_changed_event_handler executes.

Fix that by no longer flushing the work to avoid the deadlock, and using
a generation counter to keep track of work relevance. This avoids an old
handler manipulating an esw that has undergone one or more mode changes:
- the counter is incremented in mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister.
- the counter is read and passed to the ephemeral mlx5_host_work struct.
- the work handler takes the devlink lock and bails out if the current
  generation is different than the one it was scheduled to operate on.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup does the final draining before destroying the wq.

No longer flushing the workqueue has the side effect of maybe no longer
cancelling pending vport_change_handler work items, but that&apos;s ok since
those are disabled elsewhere:
- mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked disables the vport eq notifier.
- mlx5_esw_vport_disable disarms the HW EQ notification and marks
  vport-&gt;enabled under state_lock to false to prevent pending vport
  handler from doing anything.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup destroys the workqueue and makes sure all events
  are disabled/finished.(CVE-2026-43468)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests  MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY.  Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-43493 to this issue.(CVE-2026-43493)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers

Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags when
moving frags from source to destination.  __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched.  As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.

The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data().  ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft &apos;dup to &lt;local&gt;&apos; rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()&apos;d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.

Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source.  skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.

The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb&apos;s frag descriptors into the
accumulator&apos;s last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p&apos;s frag_list.  Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)-&gt;flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb&apos;s
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.

The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb.  The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.

The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb&apos;s flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb&apos;s flag into nskb.  Fold frag_skb&apos;s flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.(CVE-2026-43503)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_state_change_cb()

Add the same NULL guard already present in
l2cap_sock_resume_cb() and l2cap_sock_ready_cb().(CVE-2026-45834)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Fix slab-use-after-free in qd_put

Commit a475c5dd16e5 (&quot;gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously&quot;)
started freeing quota data objects during filesystem shutdown instead of
putting them back onto the LRU list, but it failed to remove these
objects from the LRU list, causing LRU list corruption.  This caused
use-after-free when the shrinker (gfs2_qd_shrink_scan) tried to access
already-freed objects on the LRU list.

Fix this by removing qd objects from the LRU list before freeing them in
qd_put().

Initial fix from Deepanshu Kartikey &lt;(CVE-2026-45861)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: cdns3: fix role switching during resume

If the role change while we are suspended, the cdns3 driver switches to the
new mode during resume. However, switching to host mode in this context
causes a NULL pointer dereference.

The host role&apos;s start() operation registers a xhci-hcd device, but its
probe is deferred while we are in the resume path. The host role&apos;s resume()
operation assumes the xhci-hcd device is already probed, which is not the
case, leading to the dereference. Since the start() operation of the new
role is already called, the resume operation can be skipped.

So skip the resume operation for the new role if a role switch occurs
during resume. Once the resume sequence is complete, the xhci-hcd device
can be probed in case of host mode.

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000208
Mem abort info:
...
Data abort info:
...
[0000000000000208] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1]  SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 146 Comm: sh Not tainted
6.19.0-rc7-00013-g6e64f4aabfae-dirty #135 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Texas Instruments J7200 EVM (DT)
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd+0x0/0x1c
lr : cdns_host_resume+0x24/0x5c
...
Call trace:
 usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd+0x0/0x1c (P)
 cdns_resume+0x6c/0xbc
 cdns3_controller_resume.isra.0+0xe8/0x17c
 cdns3_plat_resume+0x18/0x24
 platform_pm_resume+0x2c/0x68
 dpm_run_callback+0x90/0x248
 device_resume+0x100/0x24c
 dpm_resume+0x190/0x2ec
 dpm_resume_end+0x18/0x34
 suspend_devices_and_enter+0x2b0/0xa44
 pm_suspend+0x16c/0x5fc
 state_store+0x80/0xec
 kobj_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
 sysfs_kf_write+0x7c/0x94
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1dc
 vfs_write+0x240/0x370
 ksys_write+0x70/0x108
 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
 el0_svc+0x34/0x108
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: 52800003 f9407ca5 d63f00a0 17ffffe4 (f9410401)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---(CVE-2026-45911)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: fix inline data read failure for ztailpacking pclusters

Compressed folios for ztailpacking pclusters must be valid before adding
these pclusters to I/O chains. Otherwise, z_erofs_decompress_pcluster()
may assume they are already valid and then trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.

It is somewhat hard to reproduce because the inline data is in the same
block as the tail of the compressed indexes, which are usually read just
before. However, it may still happen if a fatal signal arrives while
read_mapping_folio() is running, as shown below:

 erofs: (device dm-1): z_erofs_pcluster_begin: failed to get inline data -4
 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008

 ...

 pc : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14
 lr : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x160/0xa14
 sp : ffffffc08b3eb3a0
 x29: ffffffc08b3eb570 x28: ffffffc08b3eb418 x27: 0000000000001000
 x26: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x25: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x24: 0000000000000001
 x23: 0000000000000008 x22: 00000000fffffffb x21: dead000000000700
 x20: 00000000000015e7 x19: ffffff808babb400 x18: ffffffc089edc098
 x17: 00000000c006287d x16: 00000000c006287d x15: 0000000000000004
 x14: ffffff80ba8f8000 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: 00000006589a77c9
 x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffffffffffffe0 x3 : 0000000000000020
 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14
  z_erofs_runqueue+0x908/0x97c
  z_erofs_read_folio+0x128/0x228
  filemap_read_folio+0x68/0x128
  filemap_get_pages+0x44c/0x8b4
  filemap_read+0x12c/0x5b8
  generic_file_read_iter+0x4c/0x15c
  do_iter_readv_writev+0x188/0x1e0
  vfs_iter_read+0xac/0x1a4
  backing_file_read_iter+0x170/0x34c
  ovl_read_iter+0xf0/0x140
  vfs_read+0x28c/0x344
  ksys_read+0x80/0xf0
  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x34
  invoke_syscall+0x60/0x114
  el0_svc_common+0x88/0xe4
  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x30
  el0_svc+0x40/0xa8
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0

Fix this by reading the inline data before allocating and adding
the pclusters to the I/O chains.(CVE-2026-45943)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: Fix memory leak in amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc()

In amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc(), if amdgpu_acpi_dev_init() returns -ENOMEM,
the function returns directly without releasing the allocated xcc_info,
resulting in a memory leak.

Fix this by ensuring that xcc_info is properly freed in the error paths.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review.(CVE-2026-45947)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: fix memory leaks in gfs2_fill_super error path

Fix two memory leaks in the gfs2_fill_super() error handling path when
transitioning a filesystem to read-write mode fails.

First leak: kthread objects (thread_struct, task_struct, etc.)
When gfs2_freeze_lock_shared() fails after init_threads() succeeds, the
created kernel threads (logd and quotad) are never destroyed. This
occurs because the fail_per_node label doesn&apos;t call
gfs2_destroy_threads().

Second leak: quota bitmap buffer (8192 bytes)
When gfs2_make_fs_rw() fails after gfs2_quota_init() succeeds but
before other operations complete, the allocated quota bitmap is never
freed.

The fix moves thread cleanup to the fail_per_node label to handle all
error paths uniformly. gfs2_destroy_threads() is safe to call
unconditionally as it checks for NULL pointers. Quota cleanup is added
in gfs2_make_fs_rw() to properly handle the withdrawal case where
quota initialization succeeds but the filesystem is then withdrawn.

Thread leak backtrace (gfs2_freeze_lock_shared failure):
  unreferenced object 0xffff88801d7bca80 (size 4480):
    copy_process+0x3a1/0x4670 kernel/fork.c:2422
    kernel_clone+0xf3/0x6e0 kernel/fork.c:2779
    kthread_create_on_node+0x100/0x150 kernel/kthread.c:478
    init_threads+0xab/0x350 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:611
    gfs2_fill_super+0xe5c/0x1240 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:1265

Quota leak backtrace (gfs2_make_fs_rw failure):
  unreferenced object 0xffff88812de7c000 (size 8192):
    gfs2_quota_init+0xe5/0x820 fs/gfs2/quota.c:1409
    gfs2_make_fs_rw+0x7a/0xe0 fs/gfs2/super.c:149
    gfs2_fill_super+0xfbb/0x1240 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:1275(CVE-2026-45961)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Fix NULL pointer dereference in acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch()

Cover a missed execution path with a new check.(CVE-2026-45982)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: fix unsigned underflow in z_erofs_lz4_handle_overlap()

Some crafted images can have illegal (!partial_decoding &amp;&amp;
m_llen &lt; m_plen) extents, and the LZ4 inplace decompression path
can be wrongly hit, but it cannot handle (outpages &lt; inpages)
properly: &quot;outpages - inpages&quot; wraps to a large value and
the subsequent rq-&gt;out[] access reads past the decompressed_pages
array.

However, such crafted cases can correctly result in a corruption
report in the normal LZ4 non-inplace path.

Let&apos;s add an additional check to fix this for backporting.

Reproducible image (base64-encoded gzipped blob):

H4sIAJGR12kCA+3SPUoDQRgG4MkmkkZk8QRbRFIIi9hbpEjrHQI5ghfwCN5BLCzTGtLbBI+g
dilSJo1CnIm7GEXFxhT6PDDwfrs73/ywIQD/1ePD4r7Ou6ETsrq4mu7XcWfj++Pb58nJU/9i
PNtbjhan04/9GtX4qVYc814WDqt6FaX5s+ZwXXeq52lndT6IuVvlblytLMvh4Gzwaf90nsvz
2DF/21+20T/ldgp5s1jXRaN4t/8izsy/OUB6e/Qa79r+JwAAAAAAAL52vQVuGQAAAP6+my1w
ywAAAAAAAADwu14ATsEYtgBQAAA=

$ mount -t erofs -o cache_strategy=disabled foo.erofs /mnt
$ dd if=/mnt/data of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1(CVE-2026-45999)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors  If an error occurs after the ssif kthread is created, but before the main IPMI code starts the ssif interface, the ssif kthread will not be stopped.  So make sure the kthread is stopped on an error condition if it is running.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46044 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46044)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()  When retry_aligned_read() encounters an overlapped stripe, it releases the stripe via raid5_release_stripe() which puts it on the lockless released_stripes llist. In the next raid5d loop iteration, release_stripe_list() drains the stripe onto handle_list (since STRIPE_HANDLE is set by the original IO), but retry_aligned_read() runs before handle_active_stripes() and removes the stripe from handle_list via find_get_stripe() -&gt; list_del_init(). This prevents handle_stripe() from ever processing the stripe to resolve the overlap, causing an infinite loop and soft lockup.  Fix this by using __release_stripe() with temp_inactive_list instead of raid5_release_stripe() in the failure path, so the stripe does not go through the released_stripes llist. This allows raid5d to break out of its loop, and the overlap will be resolved when the stripe is eventually processed by handle_stripe().  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46051 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46051)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn&apos;t intercepted by L1  Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1.  The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it&apos;s not intercepted.  Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses.  The last remaining &quot;single&quot; stub will soon be dropped as well.  [sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46076 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46076)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents  Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.  If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff &gt;= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.  nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1].  [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46078 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46078)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0  INVLPGA should cause a #UD when EFER.SVME is not set. Add a check to properly inject #UD when EFER.SVME=0.  [sean: tag for stable@]  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46082 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46082)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker  decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths: __purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via vmap_node_shrink_scan().  However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible leaks.  Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker path to ensure serialization with purge users.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46093 to this issue.(CVE-2026-46093)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: protect memcg_path kfree() with damon_sysfs_lockPatch series &quot;mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix use-after-free for [memcg_]path&quot;.Reads of &apos;memcg_path&apos; and &apos;path&apos; files in DAMON sysfs interface could racewith their writes, results in use-after-free.  Fix those.This patch (of 2):damon_sysfs_scheme_filter-&gt;mmecg_path can be read and written by users,via DAMON sysfs memcg_path file.  It can also be indirectly read, for theparameters {on,off}line committing to DAMON.  The reads for parameterscommitting are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs filesbeing destroyed while any of the parameters are being read.  But theuser-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, whilethe write is deallocating the memcg_path-pointing buffer.  As a result,the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free).  Notethat the user-reads don&apos;t race when the same open file is used by thewriter, due to kernfs&apos;s open file locking.  Nonetheless, doing the readsand writes with separate open files would be common.  Fix it by protectingboth the user-direct reads and writes with damon_sysfs_lock.(CVE-2026-46121)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt

hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev-&gt;bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration.  However, there is no check that i stays within ev-&gt;num_bis
before the array access.

When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory.  Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state.  The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.

Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly.(CVE-2026-46138)

In the Linux kernel, vports are used concurrently and protected by RCU, so netdev_put() must happen after the RCU grace period. The rtnl_delete_link() must happen under RTNL and cannot be executed in RCU context. Calling synchronize_net() while holding RTNL is not good for performance and system stability, so calling netdev_put() in RCU call is the right solution. However, when the device is deleted, rtnl_unlock() calls netdev_run_todo() and blocks until all references are gone. In the current code, this means that call_rcu() is never reached, the vport is never freed, and the reference is never released, causing a self-deadlock on device removal. The fix moves the rcu_call() before rtnl_unlock(), so the scheduled RCU callback will be executed when synchronize_net() is called from rtnl_unlock()-&gt;netdev_run_todo() while RTNL itself is already released.(CVE-2026-46165)

In the Linux kernel&apos;s RISC-V KVM subsystem, when the second kzalloc (host_context.vector.datap) fails in kvm_riscv_vcpu_alloc_vector_context, the first allocation (guest_context.vector.datap) is not freed, causing a memory leak. An attacker can trigger this via ioctl(vm_fd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU), potentially leading to resource exhaustion.(CVE-2026-46171)

In the Linux kernel, the mlx4_ib_create_srq() function fails to release resources allocated by mlx4_srq_alloc() in error handling paths, leading to a resource leak. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause resource exhaustion or denial of service.(CVE-2026-46178)

In the Linux kernel, the spi_nor_params_show() function uses sizeof(snor_f_names) to calculate the array length. Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof returns the total byte size of the pointer array (element_count  sizeof(void )), which on 64-bit systems is 8 times larger than intended. This causes an out-of-bounds read when a flag bit is set that exceeds the actual element count but falls within the inflated byte-size count. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE to pass the actual number of elements.(CVE-2026-46190)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of critical. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">Critical</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-39833</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68334</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68340</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-68801</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71068</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71087</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71130</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71152</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71194</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23001</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23011</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23025</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23054</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23074</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23100</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23138</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23247</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23269</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23272</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23312</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23340</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23378</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23389</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23406</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23407</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23410</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23411</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23439</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23440</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23441</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23444</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23448</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23450</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23452</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23461</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23473</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23475</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31392</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31398</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31399</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31400</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31403</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31408</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31421</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31422</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31426</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31429</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31430</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31441</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31442</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31446</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31449</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31450</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31451</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31452</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31467</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31469</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31487</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31495</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31496</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31498</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31499</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31505</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31510</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31511</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31512</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31516</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31518</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31525</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31528</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31531</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31532</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31533</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31540</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31542</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31546</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31555</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31566</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31570</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31590</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31595</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31628</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31630</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31651</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31665</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31667</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31675</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31677</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31678</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31684</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31685</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31689</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31697</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31698</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31699</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31708</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31738</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31752</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31755</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31771</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31773</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31779</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31781</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43020</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43036</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43040</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43043</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43061</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43064</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43079</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43099</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43148</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43156</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43163</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43186</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43212</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43240</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43262</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43273</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43288</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43292</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43345</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43366</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43406</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43419</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43427</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43428</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43468</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43493</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-43503</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45834</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45861</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45911</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45943</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45947</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45961</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45982</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-45999</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46044</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46051</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46076</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46078</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46082</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46093</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46121</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46138</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46165</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46171</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46178</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-46190</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39833</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68334</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68340</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68801</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71068</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71087</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71130</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71152</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71194</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23001</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23011</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23025</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23054</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23074</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23100</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23138</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23247</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23269</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23272</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23312</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23340</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23378</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23389</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23406</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23407</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23410</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23411</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23439</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23440</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23441</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23444</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23448</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23450</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23452</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23461</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23473</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23475</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31392</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31398</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31399</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31400</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31403</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31408</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31421</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31422</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31426</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31429</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31430</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31441</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31442</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31446</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31449</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31450</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31451</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31452</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31467</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31469</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31487</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31495</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31496</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31498</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31499</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31505</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31510</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31511</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31512</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31516</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31518</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31525</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31528</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31531</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31532</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31533</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31540</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31542</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31546</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31555</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31566</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31570</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31590</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31595</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31628</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31630</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31651</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31665</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31667</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31675</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31677</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31678</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31684</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31685</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31689</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31697</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31698</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31699</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31708</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31738</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31752</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31755</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31771</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31773</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31779</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31781</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43020</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43036</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43040</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43043</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43061</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43064</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43079</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43099</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43148</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43156</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43163</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43186</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43212</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43240</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43262</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43273</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43288</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43292</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43345</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43366</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43406</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43419</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43427</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43428</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43468</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43493</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43503</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45834</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45861</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45911</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45943</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45947</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45961</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45982</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45999</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46044</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46051</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46076</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46078</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46082</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46093</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46121</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46138</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46165</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46171</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46178</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46190</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
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			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
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			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
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			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
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			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.14.145.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
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		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
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	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer

With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads
to the following splat:

[  250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0
[  250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core
[  250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d
[  250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95
[  250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0
[  250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39
[  250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[  250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8
[  250.232454] FS:  00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  250.233851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  250.236117] Call Trace:
[  250.236599]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  250.236967]  ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130
[  250.237920]  debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310
[  250.238762]  ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10
[  250.239658]  ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70
[  250.240369]  __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140
[  250.241172]  ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10
[  250.242058]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.242842]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  250.243474]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.244262]  __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120
[  250.245015]  HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci]
[  250.245704]  __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510
[  250.246461]  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10
[  250.247338]  do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360
[  250.247924]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro.
Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-39833</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

platform/x86/amd/pmc: Add support for Van Gogh SoC

The ROG Xbox Ally (non-X) SoC features a similar architecture to the
Steam Deck. While the Steam Deck supports S3 (s2idle causes a crash),
this support was dropped by the Xbox Ally which only S0ix suspend.

Since the handler is missing here, this causes the device to not suspend
and the AMD GPU driver to crash while trying to resume afterwards due to
a power hang.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68334</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add

Attempting to add a port device that is already up will expectedly fail,
but not before modifying the team device header_ops.

In the case of the syzbot reproducer the gre0 device is
already in state UP when it attempts to add it as a
port device of team0, this fails but before that
header_ops-&gt;create of team0 is changed from eth_header to ipgre_header
in the call to team_dev_type_check_change.

Later when we end up in ipgre_header() struct ip_tunnel* points to nonsense
as the private data of the device still holds a struct team.

Example sequence of iproute2 commands to reproduce the hang/BUG():
ip link add dev team0 type team
ip link add dev gre0 type gre
ip link set dev gre0 up
ip link set dev gre0 master team0
ip link set dev team0 up
ping -I team0 1.1.1.1

Move team_dev_type_check_change down where all other checks have passed
as it changes the dev type with no way to restore it in case
one of the checks that follow it fail.

Also make sure to preserve the origial mtu assignment:
  - If port_dev is not the same type as dev, dev takes mtu from port_dev
  - If port_dev is the same type as dev, port_dev takes mtu from dev

This is done by adding a conditional before the call to dev_set_mtu
to prevent it from assigning port_dev-&gt;mtu = dev-&gt;mtu and instead
letting team_dev_type_check_change assign dev-&gt;mtu = port_dev-&gt;mtu.
The conditional is needed because the patch moves the call to
team_dev_type_check_change past dev_set_mtu.

Testing:
  - team device driver in-tree selftests
  - Add/remove various devices as slaves of team device
  - syzbot</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68340</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix neighbour use-after-free

We sometimes observe use-after-free when dereferencing a neighbour [1].
The problem seems to be that the driver stores a pointer to the
neighbour, but without holding a reference on it. A reference is only
taken when the neighbour is used by a nexthop.

Fix by simplifying the reference counting scheme. Always take a
reference when storing a neighbour pointer in a neighbour entry. Avoid
taking a referencing when the neighbour is used by a nexthop as the
neighbour entry associated with the nexthop already holds a reference.

Tested by running the test that uncovered the problem over 300 times.
Without this patch the problem was reproduced after a handful of
iterations.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88817f8e3420 by task ip/3929

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3929 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-virtme-g36b21a067510 #3 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Nvidia SN5600/VMOD0013, BIOS 5.13 05/31/2023
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6e/0x300
 print_report+0xfc/0x1fb
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x110
 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310
 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x35f/0x510
 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1ea/0x730
 mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xa1/0x1b0
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_lag_event+0xcc/0x130
 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_event+0xf5/0x3c0
 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x1015/0x1580
 notifier_call_chain+0xcc/0x150
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7e/0x100
 __netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x10b/0x210
 netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x79/0xa0
 vrf_del_slave+0x18/0x50
 do_set_master+0x146/0x7d0
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x9a0/0x2880
 rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fe/0xb90
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x123/0x380
 netlink_unicast+0x4a3/0x770
 netlink_sendmsg+0x75b/0xc90
 __sock_sendmsg+0xbe/0x160
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5b2/0x7d0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0x124/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[...]

Allocated by task 109:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x790
 neigh_alloc+0x6af/0x8f0
 ___neigh_create+0x63/0xe90
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init+0x430/0x7e0
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_type_init+0x212/0x960
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_info_init.constprop.0+0x81f/0x1280
 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get+0x392/0x6a0
 mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create+0x46a/0xfd0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_replace+0x1ed/0x5f0
 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_event_work+0x10a/0x2a0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Freed by task 154:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
 kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x1eb/0x5e0
 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1f2/0x260
 kfree_rcu_work+0x130/0x1b0
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8c/0xa0
 kvfree_call_rcu+0x93/0x5b0
 mlxsw_sp_router_neigh_event_work+0x67d/0x860
 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40
 kthread+0x355/0x5b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-68801</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>6.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

svcrdma: bound check rq_pages index in inline path

svc_rdma_copy_inline_range indexed rqstp-&gt;rq_pages[rc_curpage] without
verifying rc_curpage stays within the allocated page array. Add guards
before the first use and after advancing to a new page.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71068</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iavf: fix off-by-one issues in iavf_config_rss_reg()

There are off-by-one bugs when configuring RSS hash key and lookup
table, causing out-of-bounds reads to memory [1] and out-of-bounds
writes to device registers.

Before commit 43a3d9ba34c9 (&quot;i40evf: Allow PF driver to configure RSS&quot;),
the loop upper bounds were:
    i &lt;= I40E_VFQF_{HKEY,HLUT}_MAX_INDEX
which is safe since the value is the last valid index.

That commit changed the bounds to:
    i &lt;= adapter-&gt;rss_{key,lut}_size / 4
where `rss_{key,lut}_size / 4` is the number of dwords, so the last
valid index is `(rss_{key,lut}_size / 4) - 1`. Therefore, using `&lt;=`
accesses one element past the end.

Fix the issues by using `&lt;` instead of `&lt;=`, ensuring we do not exceed
the bounds.

[1] KASAN splat about rss_key_size off-by-one
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888102c50134 by task kworker/u8:6/63

  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 63 Comm: kworker/u8:6 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2-enjuk-tnguy-00378-g3005f5b77652-dirty #156 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: iavf iavf_watchdog_task
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
   print_report+0x170/0x4f3
   kasan_report+0xe1/0x1a0
   iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
   iavf_watchdog_task+0x2be7/0x3230
   process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
   worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
   kthread+0x344/0x660
   ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 63:
   kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
   __kmalloc_noprof+0x246/0x6f0
   iavf_watchdog_task+0x28fc/0x3230
   process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
   worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
   kthread+0x344/0x660
   ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888102c50100
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 52-byte region [ffff888102c50100, ffff888102c50134)

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x102c50
  flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
  page_type: f5(slab)
  raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000418c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff888102c50000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffff888102c50080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  &gt;ffff888102c50100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                       ^
   ffff888102c50180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffff888102c50200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71087</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="7" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/i915/gem: Zero-initialize the eb.vma array in i915_gem_do_execbuffer

Initialize the eb.vma array with values of 0 when the eb structure is
first set up. In particular, this sets the eb-&gt;vma[i].vma pointers to
NULL, simplifying cleanup and getting rid of the bug described below.

During the execution of eb_lookup_vmas(), the eb-&gt;vma array is
successively filled up with struct eb_vma objects. This process includes
calling eb_add_vma(), which might fail; however, even in the event of
failure, eb-&gt;vma[i].vma is set for the currently processed buffer.

If eb_add_vma() fails, eb_lookup_vmas() returns with an error, which
prompts a call to eb_release_vmas() to clean up the mess. Since
eb_lookup_vmas() might fail during processing any (possibly not first)
buffer, eb_release_vmas() checks whether a buffer&apos;s vma is NULL to know
at what point did the lookup function fail.

In eb_lookup_vmas(), eb-&gt;vma[i].vma is set to NULL if either the helper
function eb_lookup_vma() or eb_validate_vma() fails. eb-&gt;vma[i+1].vma is
set to NULL in case i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init() fails; the
current one needs to be cleaned up by eb_release_vmas() at this point,
so the next one is set. If eb_add_vma() fails, neither the current nor
the next vma is set to NULL, which is a source of a NULL deref bug
described in the issue linked in the Closes tag.

When entering eb_lookup_vmas(), the vma pointers are set to the slab
poison value, instead of NULL. This doesn&apos;t matter for the actual
lookup, since it gets overwritten anyway, however the eb_release_vmas()
function only recognizes NULL as the stopping value, hence the pointers
are being set to NULL as they go in case of intermediate failure. This
patch changes the approach to filling them all with NULL at the start
instead, rather than handling that manually during failure.

(cherry picked from commit 08889b706d4f0b8d2352b7ca29c2d8df4d0787cd)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71130</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="8" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference

Problem description
-------------------

DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device
and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn&apos;t make sense.

There are two distinct problems.

1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases
   the elevated refcount on the conduit&apos;s kobject. Nominally, the OF and
   non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference
   counts taken, and it is already suspicious that
   dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in
   dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue
   exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command
   &quot;before&quot; and &quot;after&quot; applying this patch:

(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2)
echo 0000:00:00.2 &gt; /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind

we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch
applied:

kobject: &apos;eno2&apos; (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: &apos;109&apos; (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)

2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF),
   it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived,
   but in this case stale, cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointer. Holding the net
   device&apos;s underlying kobject isn&apos;t actually of much help, it just
   prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject
   directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being
   unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold()
   and dev_put()).

Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on
user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 (&quot;net: dsa: link interfaces with
the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings&quot;), via netdev_upper_dev_link().
But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial
of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time
during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn&apos;t know
about it.

So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to
prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev
tracker having acquired the reference.

Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() /
dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
   ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a (&quot;net: dsa: Do not
   make user port errors fatal&quot;), and the cpu_dp-&gt;conduit pointers
   remain valid.  I haven&apos;t audited all call paths to see whether they
   will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they
   do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is
   associated to, and we can get into a situation where we&apos;ve moved all
   user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to
   it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn&apos;t let it go nonetheless
   - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit()
   and LAG conduits which disappear.
   We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU
   port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
   say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a
   reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.

As for the conduit&apos;s kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don&apos;t
care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device
object itself.

History and blame attribution
-----------------------------

The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to
follow and properly attribute a blame, but I&apos;ll try to make a short
history which I hope to be correct.

We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 i
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71152</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="9" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type

When wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it
currently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether
the given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular
transaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines
which transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but
this check was missing in wait_current_trans().

This can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and
pending ordered extents:

  1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state

  2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction()
     with TRANS_JOIN

  3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in
     TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING

  4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes

  5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING)

  6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B&apos;s
     pending ordered extents

  7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and
     enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START

  8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B
     in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits
     unconditionally

  9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
     according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[]

  10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete

  11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent
      waits for Transaction B

This can be illustrated by the following call stacks:
  CPU0                              CPU1
                                    btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
                                      start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN)
                                        join_transaction()
                                          # -EBUSY (Transaction A is
                                          # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING)
  # Transaction A completes
  # Transaction B created
  # ordered extent added to
  # Transaction B&apos;s pending list
  btrfs_commit_transaction()
    # Transaction B enters
    # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
    # waiting for pending ordered
    # extents
                                        wait_current_trans()
                                          # waits for Transaction B
                                          # (should not wait!)

Task bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered
extents:

  __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
  schedule+0x64/0xe0
  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs]
  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Task kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit:

  Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
  schedule+0x64/0xe0
  wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs]
  start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs]
  process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0
  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
  kthread+0x12d/0x150
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and
checking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans-&gt;state] against the given
type before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which
are allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily
wait and cause deadlocks.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71194</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="10" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source()

Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)-&gt;vlan.

Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear
entry-&gt;vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts.

This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over
entries queued for freeing.

Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they
are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)).

https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23001</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="11" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: ip_gre: make ipgre_header() robust

Analog to commit db5b4e39c4e6 (&quot;ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust&quot;)

Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel
in ipgre_header() [1].

This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically
change their dev-&gt;needed_headroom and/or dev-&gt;hard_header_len

In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb
with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack()
was called, syzbot managed to attach an ipgre device.

[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89ea3cb7 len:2030915468 put:2030915372 head:ffff888058b43000 data:ffff887fdfa6e194 tail:0x120 end:0x6c0 dev:team0
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1322 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:213
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline]
  skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641
  ipgre_header+0x67/0x290 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:897
  dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline]
  neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618
  NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
  ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
  NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
  mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23011</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="12" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/page_alloc: prevent pcp corruption with SMP=n

The kernel test robot has reported:

 BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kcompactd0/28
  lock: 0xffff888807e35ef0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kcompactd0/28, .owner_cpu: 0
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-00127-ga06157804399 #1 PREEMPT  8cc09ef94dcec767faa911515ce9e609c45db470
 Call Trace:
  &lt;IRQ&gt;
  __dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:95)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
  spin_dump (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:71)
  do_raw_spin_trylock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:?)
  _raw_spin_trylock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138)
  __free_frozen_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2973)
  ___free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5295)
  __free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5334)
  tlb_remove_table_rcu (include/linux/mm.h:? include/linux/mm.h:3122 include/asm-generic/tlb.h:220 mm/mmu_gather.c:227 mm/mmu_gather.c:290)
  ? __cfi_tlb_remove_table_rcu (mm/mmu_gather.c:289)
  ? rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:?)
  rcu_core (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2607 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861)
  rcu_core_si (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2879)
  handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623)
  __irq_exit_rcu (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 kernel/softirq.c:725)
  irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:741)
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052)
  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
  &lt;TASK&gt;
 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
  free_pcppages_bulk (mm/page_alloc.c:1494)
  drain_pages_zone (include/linux/spinlock.h:391 mm/page_alloc.c:2632)
  __drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2731)
  drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2747)
  kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3115)
  kthread (kernel/kthread.c:465)
  ? __cfi_kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3166)
  ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
  ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)
  ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
  ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Matthew has analyzed the report and identified that in drain_page_zone()
we are in a section protected by spin_lock(&amp;pcp-&gt;lock) and then get an
interrupt that attempts spin_trylock() on the same lock.  The code is
designed to work this way without disabling IRQs and occasionally fail the
trylock with a fallback.  However, the SMP=n spinlock implementation
assumes spin_trylock() will always succeed, and thus it&apos;s normally a
no-op.  Here the enabled lock debugging catches the problem, but otherwise
it could cause a corruption of the pcp structure.

The problem has been introduced by commit 574907741599 (&quot;mm/page_alloc:
leave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations&quot;).  The pcp locking scheme
recognizes the need for disabling IRQs to prevent nesting spin_trylock()
sections on SMP=n, but the need to prevent the nesting in spin_lock() has
not been recognized.  Fix it by introducing local wrappers that change the
spin_lock() to spin_lock_iqsave() with SMP=n and use them in all places
that do spin_lock(&amp;pcp-&gt;lock).

[</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23025</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="13" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: hv_netvsc: reject RSS hash key programming without RX indirection table

RSS configuration requires a valid RX indirection table. When the device
reports a single receive queue, rndis_filter_device_add() does not
allocate an indirection table, accepting RSS hash key updates in this
state leads to a hang.

Fix this by gating netvsc_set_rxfh() on ndc-&gt;rx_table_sz and return
-EOPNOTSUPP when the table is absent. This aligns set_rxfh with the device
capabilities and prevents incorrect behavior.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23054</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="14" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc

Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc.
We need to check for that constraint.

Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this
issue for the curious.

GangMin Kim &lt;</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23074</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="15" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()

Patch series &quot;mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl.  using
mmu_gather)&quot;, v3.

One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.

I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point. 
While doing that I identified the other things.

The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees &quot;fairly&quot;
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.

Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().

The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather.
Read: complicated

There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that&apos;s all out of scope for this series.

Runtime tested, with a focus on fixing the performance regression using
the original reproducer [2] on x86.


This patch (of 4):

We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count.  Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc-&gt;pt_share_count to identify
sharing.

We didn&apos;t convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.

Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive.  In smaps we would account them as &quot;private&quot; although they are
&quot;shared&quot;, and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.

Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23100</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="16" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording

A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu
events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code
called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.

Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect
events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is
in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).

Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against
recursion.

Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing
stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the
bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23138</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="17" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset

This reverts 28ee1b746f49 (&quot;secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets&quot;)

tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017.

Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via
SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways.

One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization.

As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation
to provide both an ISN and a TS offset.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23247</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="18" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, a vulnerability exists in the AppArmor module&apos;s unpack_pdb function. The vulnerability occurs due to failure to validate that DFA start states are within bounds, which can lead to out-of-bound reads. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability through specially crafted policy files, potentially leading to information disclosure or system crashes.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23269</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="19" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: unconditionally bump set-&gt;nelems before insertion

In case that the set is full, a new element gets published then removed
without waiting for the RCU grace period, while RCU reader can be
walking over it already.

To address this issue, add the element transaction even if set is full,
but toggle the set_full flag to report -ENFILE so the abort path safely
unwinds the set to its previous state.

As for element updates, decrement set-&gt;nelems to restore it.

A simpler fix is to call synchronize_rcu() in the error path.
However, with a large batch adding elements to already maxed-out set,
this could cause noticeable slowdown of such batches.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23272</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="20" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: kaweth: validate USB endpoints

The kaweth driver should validate that the device it is probing has the
proper number and types of USB endpoints it is expecting before it binds
to it.  If a malicious device were to not have the same urbs the driver
will crash later on when it blindly accesses these endpoints.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23312</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="21" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs

When shrinking the number of real tx queues,
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush
qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used.

qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with
qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is
serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc-&gt;seqlock instead, so
qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs
while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF.

This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy
traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs:

  iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 &amp;
  while :; do
    ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
    ethtool -L eth0 combined 2
  done

With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ...
   __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550
   ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110
   ip_output+0x1a7/0x410
   ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480
   udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590
   udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0
   ...
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s:
   ...
   alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0
   sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830
   __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0
   ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0
   udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0
   ...

  Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s:
   ...
   kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0
   pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580
   qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0
   netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840
   virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net]
   ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0
   ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890
   ...

Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by
taking qdisc-&gt;seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the
serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue().

Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state
reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23340</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="22" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: act_ife: Fix metalist update behavior

Whenever an ife action replace changes the metalist, instead of
replacing the old data on the metalist, the current ife code is appending
the new metadata. Aside from being innapropriate behavior, this may lead
to an unbounded addition of metadata to the metalist which might cause an
out of bounds error when running the encode op:

[  138.423369][    C1] ==================================================================
[  138.424317][    C1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.424906][    C1] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880077f4ffe by task ife_out_out_bou/255
[  138.425778][    C1] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 255 Comm: ife_out_out_bou Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-00169-gfbdfa8da05b6 #624 PREEMPT(full)
[  138.425795][    C1] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  138.425800][    C1] Call Trace:
[  138.425804][    C1]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[  138.425808][    C1]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[  138.425828][    C1]  print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
[  138.425839][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425844][    C1]  ? __virt_addr_valid (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:975 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/mmzone.h:2207 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:54 (discriminator 1))
[  138.425853][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425859][    C1]  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:597)
[  138.425868][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425878][    C1]  kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/generic.c:200 (discriminator 1))
[  138.425884][    C1]  __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84 (discriminator 2))
[  138.425889][    C1]  ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168)
[  138.425893][    C1]  ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:171)
[  138.425898][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425903][    C1]  ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:57)
[  138.425910][    C1]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:114)
[  138.425916][    C1]  ? __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 (discriminator 3))
[  138.425921][    C1]  ? __pfx_ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:45)
[  138.425927][    C1]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  138.425931][    C1]  tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:847 net/sched/act_ife.c:879)

To solve this issue, fix the replace behavior by adding the metalist to
the ife rcu data structure.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23378</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="23" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: Fix memory leak in ice_set_ringparam()

In ice_set_ringparam, tx_rings and xdp_rings are allocated before
rx_rings. If the allocation of rx_rings fails, the code jumps to
the done label leaking both tx_rings and xdp_rings. Furthermore, if
the setup of an individual Rx ring fails during the loop, the code jumps
to the free_tx label which releases tx_rings but leaks xdp_rings.

Fix this by introducing a free_xdp label and updating the error paths to
ensure both xdp_rings and tx_rings are properly freed if rx_rings
allocation or setup fails.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23389</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="24" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage

The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple
times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked
with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the
inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters
at each iteration and therefore skip input characters.
This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past
the input buffer boundary.

[   94.984676] ==================================================================
[   94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976

[   94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   94.986329] Call Trace:
[   94.986341]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   94.986347]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[   94.986374]  print_report+0xc8/0x270
[   94.986384]  ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986388]  kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[   94.986401]  ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986405]  aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[   94.986408]  __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400
[   94.986418]  aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0
[   94.986424]  apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570
[   94.986431]  security_file_open+0x5c/0x140
[   94.986442]  do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120
[   94.986450]  vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0
[   94.986453]  ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0
[   94.986466]  path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30
[   94.986469]  ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[   94.986477]  do_file_open+0x19d/0x360
[   94.986487]  do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100
[   94.986491]  __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[   94.986499]  do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[   94.986515]  ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0
[   94.986526]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986540]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0
[   94.986551]  ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320
[   94.986558]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986561]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986563]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0
[   94.986572]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986574]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0
[   94.986587]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   94.986588]  ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590
[   94.986595]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea

Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char,
ensuring single evaluation per outer loop.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23406</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="25" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()

The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state
is not differentially encoded.

When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain,
it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without
validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] &gt;= state_count,
therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes.

[   57.179855] ==================================================================
[   57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993

[   57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   57.181563] Call Trace:
[   57.181572]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   57.181577]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[   57.181596]  print_report+0xc8/0x270
[   57.181605]  ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181608]  kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[   57.181620]  ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181623]  verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[   57.181627]  aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740
[   57.181629]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470
[   57.181640]  unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0
[   57.181647]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181653]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181656]  ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300
[   57.181659]  aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30
[   57.181662]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181664]  ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700
[   57.181681]  ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80
[   57.181683]  ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[   57.181686]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0
[   57.181688]  ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[   57.181693]  ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130
[   57.181697]  ? policy_update+0x154/0x330
[   57.181704]  aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0
[   57.181707]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181710]  ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[   57.181712]  ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140
[   57.181715]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   57.181717]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70
[   57.181730]  policy_update+0x17a/0x330
[   57.181733]  profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0
[   57.181735]  ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0
[   57.181740]  vfs_write+0x235/0xab0
[   57.181745]  ksys_write+0xb0/0x170
[   57.181748]  do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[   57.181762]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2

Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE
entries unconditionally.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23407</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="26" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">A race condition vulnerability exists in the AppArmor security module of the Linux kernel, leading to a use-after-free issue. This vulnerability can be triggered when an attacker simultaneously opens rawdata files and removes an associated AppArmor profile. Since rawdata inodes are not refcounted, there is a time window during profile removal where the i_private pointer may reference freed memory, causing the system to access freed memory regions. This can result in program crashes, unexpected value usage, or arbitrary code execution, threatening the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23410</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="27" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">A vulnerability exists in the AppArmor security module of the Linux kernel when handling the i_private field of the inode structure. AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs callback functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. This vulnerability could allow a local attacker to bypass AppArmor&apos;s access control policies through a specially crafted request, leading to privilege escalation and impacting system confidentiality, integrity, and availability.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23411</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="28" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp_tunnel: fix NULL deref caused by udp_sock_create6 when CONFIG_IPV6=n

When CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, the udp_sock_create6() function returns 0
(success) without actually creating a socket. Callers such as
fou_create() then proceed to dereference the uninitialized socket
pointer, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.

The captured NULL deref crash:
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
  RIP: 0010:fou_nl_add_doit (net/ipv4/fou_core.c:590 net/ipv4/fou_core.c:764)
  [...]
  Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.constprop.0 (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114)
    genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209)
    [...]
    netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
    genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
    netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
    netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
    __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 1))
    __sys_sendto (./include/linux/file.h:62 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/file.h:83 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2183 (discriminator 1))
    __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2213 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1))
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (net/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

This patch makes udp_sock_create6 return -EPFNOSUPPORT instead, so
callers correctly take their error paths. There is only one caller of
the vulnerable function and only privileged users can trigger it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23439</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="29" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix race condition during IPSec ESN update

In IPSec full offload mode, the device reports an ESN (Extended
Sequence Number) wrap event to the driver. The driver validates this
event by querying the IPSec ASO and checking that the esn_event_arm
field is 0x0, which indicates an event has occurred. After handling
the event, the driver must re-arm the context by setting esn_event_arm
back to 0x1.

A race condition exists in this handling path. After validating the
event, the driver calls mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm() to update the
kernel&apos;s xfrm state. This function temporarily releases and
re-acquires the xfrm state lock.

So, need to acknowledge the event first by setting esn_event_arm to
0x1. This prevents the driver from reprocessing the same ESN update if
the hardware sends events for other reason. Since the next ESN update
only occurs after nearly 2^31 packets are received, there&apos;s no risk of
missing an update, as it will happen long after this handling has
finished.

Processing the event twice causes the ESN high-order bits (esn_msb) to
be incremented incorrectly. The driver then programs the hardware with
this invalid ESN state, which leads to anti-replay failures and a
complete halt of IPSec traffic.

Fix this by re-arming the ESN event immediately after it is validated,
before calling mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm(). This ensures that any
spurious, duplicate events are correctly ignored, closing the race
window.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23440</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="30" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Prevent concurrent access to IPSec ASO context

The query or updating IPSec offload object is through Access ASO WQE.
The driver uses a single mlx5e_ipsec_aso struct for each PF, which
contains a shared DMA-mapped context for all ASO operations.

A race condition exists because the ASO spinlock is released before
the hardware has finished processing WQE. If a second operation is
initiated immediately after, it overwrites the shared context in the
DMA area.

When the first operation&apos;s completion is processed later, it reads
this corrupted context, leading to unexpected behavior and incorrect
results.

This commit fixes the race by introducing a private context within
each IPSec offload object. The shared ASO context is now copied to
this private context while the ASO spinlock is held. Subsequent
processing uses this saved, per-object context, ensuring its integrity
is maintained.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23441</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="31" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: always free skb on ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() failure

ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them
free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning
TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the
fragmentation check both do.

Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent,
and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76,
mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free.

Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function&apos;s kdoc.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23444</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="32" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check

cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE
entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for
ndpoffset:

  if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) &gt; skb_in-&gt;len)

but the second check omits it:

  if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
       ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) &gt; skb_in-&gt;len)

This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if
the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is
placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can
extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes.
cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating
the DPE array.

Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to
express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23448</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="33" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()

Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].

smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path
(softirq) via icsk_af_ops-&gt;syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP
listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock
pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed
concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock-&gt;sk_user_data
to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself
can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().

This leads to two issues:

1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when
   accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the
   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,
   ori_af_ops) are accessed.

The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]
triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -&gt;
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path
has the same race):

  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)

  tcp_v4_rcv()
    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
    sk = req-&gt;rsk_listener
    sock_hold(sk)
    /* No lock on listener */
                               smc_close_active():
                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 sk_user_data = NULL
                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 ...
                                 smc_clcsock_release()
                                 sock_put(smc-&gt;sk) x2
                                   -&gt; smc_sock freed!
    tcp_check_req()
      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
        smc = user_data(sk)
          -&gt; NULL or dangling
        smc-&gt;queued_smc_hs
          -&gt; crash!

Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects
with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the
clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the
smc_sock from being freed.

Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely
access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in
the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on
sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN
flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.

- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that
  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace
  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when
  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&amp;smc-&gt;sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the
  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close
  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.

Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of
sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for
NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing
any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.

Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,
the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23450</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="34" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal

The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev-&gt;parent
pointer after the parent device has been freed:

	/* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */
	if (parent &amp;&amp; !parent-&gt;power.ignore_children) {
		spin_unlock(&amp;dev-&gt;power.lock);

		spin_lock(&amp;parent-&gt;power.lock);
		rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC);
		spin_unlock(&amp;parent-&gt;power.lock);

		spin_lock(&amp;dev-&gt;power.lock);
	}

Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove().

Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint
sporadically:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310
 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0
 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60
 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230
 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50
 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0
 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770
 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120
 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410
 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0
 kthread+0x37b/0x480
 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990
 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod]
 __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod]
 store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Freed by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80
 kfree+0x225/0x6c0
 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod]
 sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23452</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="35" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_unregister_user

After commit ab4eedb790ca (&quot;Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in
hci_chan_del&quot;), l2cap_conn_del() uses conn-&gt;lock to protect access to
conn-&gt;users. However, l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user()
don&apos;t use conn-&gt;lock, creating a race condition where these functions can
access conn-&gt;users and conn-&gt;hchan concurrently with l2cap_conn_del().

This can lead to use-after-free and list corruption bugs, as reported
by syzbot.

Fix this by changing l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user()
to use conn-&gt;lock instead of hci_dev_lock(), ensuring consistent locking
for the l2cap_conn structure.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23461</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="36" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23473</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="37" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: fix statistics allocation

The controller per-cpu statistics is not allocated until after the
controller has been registered with driver core, which leaves a window
where accessing the sysfs attributes can trigger a NULL-pointer
dereference.

Fix this by moving the statistics allocation to controller allocation
while tying its lifetime to that of the controller (rather than using
implicit devres).</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23475</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="38" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option

Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against
a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with
wrong credentials.  It turned out the client was reusing SMB session
from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a
different username= option had been specified to the other mounts.

By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for
principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since
cifs-utils-4.8.  So fix this by matching username mount option in
match_session() even with Kerberos.

For example, the second mount below should fail with -ENOKEY as there
is no &apos;foobar&apos; principal in keytab (/etc/krb5.keytab).  The client
ends up reusing SMB session from first mount to perform the second
one, which is wrong.

```
$ ktutil
ktutil:  add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts
Password for </Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31392</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="39" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/rmap: fix incorrect pte restoration for lazyfree folios

We batch unmap anonymous lazyfree folios by folio_unmap_pte_batch.  If the
batch has a mix of writable and non-writable bits, we may end up setting
the entire batch writable.  Fix this by respecting writable bit during
batching.

Although on a successful unmap of a lazyfree folio, the soft-dirty bit is
lost, preserve it on pte restoration by respecting the bit during
batching, to make the fix consistent w.r.t both writable bit and
soft-dirty bit.

I was able to write the below reproducer and crash the kernel. 
Explanation of reproducer (set 64K mTHP to always):

Fault in a 64K large folio.  Split the VMA at mid-point with
MADV_DONTFORK.  fork() - parent points to the folio with 8 writable ptes
and 8 non-writable ptes.  Merge the VMAs with MADV_DOFORK so that
folio_unmap_pte_batch() can determine all the 16 ptes as a batch.  Do
MADV_FREE on the range to mark the folio as lazyfree.  Write to the memory
to dirty the pte, eventually rmap will dirty the folio.  Then trigger
reclaim, we will hit the pte restoration path, and the kernel will crash
with the trace given below.

The BUG happens at:

	BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&amp;ptc-&gt;anon_map_count) &gt; 1 &amp;&amp; rw);

The code path is asking for anonymous page to be mapped writable into the
pagetable.  The BUG_ON() firing implies that such a writable page has been
mapped into the pagetables of more than one process, which breaks
anonymous memory/CoW semantics.

[   21.134473] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:118!
[   21.134497] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
[   21.135917] Modules linked in:
[   21.136085] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1735 Comm: dup-lazyfree Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-00116-g018018a17770 #1028 PREEMPT
[   21.136858] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[   21.137019] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   21.137308] pc : page_table_check_set+0x28c/0x2a8
[   21.137607] lr : page_table_check_set+0x134/0x2a8
[   21.137885] sp : ffff80008a3b3340
[   21.138124] x29: ffff80008a3b3340 x28: fffffdffc3d14400 x27: ffffd1a55e03d000
[   21.138623] x26: 0040000000000040 x25: ffffd1a55f7dd000 x24: 0000000000000001
[   21.139045] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffffd1a55f217f30
[   21.139629] x20: 0000000000134521 x19: 0000000000134519 x18: 005c43e000040000
[   21.140027] x17: 0001400000000000 x16: 0001700000000000 x15: 000000000000ffff
[   21.140578] x14: 000000000000000c x13: 005c006000000000 x12: 0000000000000020
[   21.140828] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 005c000000000000 x9 : ffffd1a55c079ee0
[   21.141077] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 005c03e000040000 x6 : 000000004000ffff
[   21.141490] x5 : ffff00017fffce00 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000002
[   21.141741] x2 : 0000000000134510 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c08228c0
[   21.141991] Call trace:
[   21.142093]  page_table_check_set+0x28c/0x2a8 (P)
[   21.142265]  __page_table_check_ptes_set+0x144/0x1e8
[   21.142441]  __set_ptes_anysz.constprop.0+0x160/0x1a8
[   21.142766]  contpte_set_ptes+0xe8/0x140
[   21.142907]  try_to_unmap_one+0x10c4/0x10d0
[   21.143177]  rmap_walk_anon+0x100/0x250
[   21.143315]  try_to_unmap+0xa0/0xc8
[   21.143441]  shrink_folio_list+0x59c/0x18a8
[   21.143759]  shrink_lruvec+0x664/0xbf0
[   21.144043]  shrink_node+0x218/0x878
[   21.144285]  __node_reclaim.constprop.0+0x98/0x338
[   21.144763]  user_proactive_reclaim+0x2a4/0x340
[   21.145056]  reclaim_store+0x3c/0x60
[   21.145216]  dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40
[   21.145585]  sysfs_kf_write+0x84/0xa8
[   21.145835]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1c8
[   21.145994]  vfs_write+0x2b8/0x368
[   21.146119]  ksys_write+0x70/0x110
[   21.146240]  __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
[   21.146380]  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
[   21.146513]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf8
[   21.146679]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
[   21.146798]  el0_svc+0x34/0x110
[   21.146926]  el0t
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31398</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="40" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization

Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in
nd_async_device_register().

Commit b6eae0f61db2 (&quot;libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while
scheduling async init&quot;) correctly added a reference on the parent device
to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete.  However, if
device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the
device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed.  Thus
resulting in use after free.

The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix.  Save a reference to the
parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the
outcome of device_add().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31399</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="41" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release

When a reader&apos;s file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading
a cache_request (rp-&gt;offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the
request&apos;s readers count but never checks whether it should free the
request.

In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the
cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer
and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.

The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is
cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from
set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was
still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no
subsequent call will clean it up.

Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after
decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear,
and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31400</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="42" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSD: Hold net reference for the lifetime of /proc/fs/nfs/exports fd

The /proc/fs/nfs/exports proc entry is created at module init
and persists for the module&apos;s lifetime. exports_proc_open()
captures the caller&apos;s current network namespace and stores
its svc_export_cache in seq-&gt;private, but takes no reference
on the namespace. If the namespace is subsequently torn down
(e.g. container destruction after the opener does setns() to a
different namespace), nfsd_net_exit() calls nfsd_export_shutdown()
which frees the cache. Subsequent reads on the still-open fd
dereference the freed cache_detail, walking a freed hash table.

Hold a reference on the struct net for the lifetime of the open
file descriptor. This prevents nfsd_net_exit() from running --
and thus prevents nfsd_export_shutdown() from freeing the cache
-- while any exports fd is open. cache_detail already stores
its net pointer (cd-&gt;net, set by cache_create_net()), so
exports_release() can retrieve it without additional per-file
storage.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31403</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="43" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the Bluetooth SCO module&apos;s sco_recv_frame() function contains a use-after-free vulnerability. The function reads conn-&gt;sk under sco_conn_lock() but immediately releases the lock without holding a reference to the socket. A concurrent close() operation can free the socket between the lock release and the subsequent sk-&gt;sk_state access, resulting in a use-after-free vulnerability. Other functions in the same file (sco_sock_timeout(), sco_conn_del()) correctly use sco_sock_hold() to safely hold references under the lock. The vulnerability is fixed by using sco_sock_hold() to acquire a reference before releasing the lock and adding sock_put() on all exit paths.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31408</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="44" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_fw: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks

The old-method path in fw_classify() calls tcf_block_q() and
dereferences q-&gt;handle.  Shared blocks leave block-&gt;q NULL, causing a
NULL deref when an empty cls_fw filter is attached to a shared block
and a packet with a nonzero major skb mark is classified.

Reject the configuration in fw_change() when the old method (no
TCA_OPTIONS) is used on a shared block, since fw_classify()&apos;s
old-method path needs block-&gt;q which is NULL for shared blocks.

The fixed null-ptr-deref calling stack:
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
 RIP: 0010:fw_classify (net/sched/cls_fw.c:81)
 Call Trace:
  tcf_classify (./include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860)
  tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4401)
  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4535 net/core/dev.c:4790)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31421</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="45" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_flow: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks

flow_change() calls tcf_block_q() and dereferences q-&gt;handle to derive
a default baseclass.  Shared blocks leave block-&gt;q NULL, causing a NULL
deref when a flow filter without a fully qualified baseclass is created
on a shared block.

Check tcf_block_shared() before accessing block-&gt;q and return -EINVAL
for shared blocks.  This avoids the null-deref shown below:

=======================================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
RIP: 0010:flow_change (net/sched/cls_flow.c:508)
Call Trace:
 tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2432)
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6980)
 [...]
=======================================================================</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31422</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="46" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: EC: clean up handlers on probe failure in acpi_ec_setup()

When ec_install_handlers() returns -EPROBE_DEFER on reduced-hardware
platforms, it has already started the EC and installed the address
space handler with the struct acpi_ec pointer as handler context.
However, acpi_ec_setup() propagates the error without any cleanup.

The caller acpi_ec_add() then frees the struct acpi_ec for non-boot
instances, leaving a dangling handler context in ACPICA.

Any subsequent AML evaluation that accesses an EC OpRegion field
dispatches into acpi_ec_space_handler() with the freed pointer,
causing a use-after-free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800721de38 by task init/1
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
  acpi_ec_space_handler (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1362)
  acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch (drivers/acpi/acpica/evregion.c:293)
  acpi_ex_access_region (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:246)
  acpi_ex_field_datum_io (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:509)
  acpi_ex_extract_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:700)
  acpi_ex_read_data_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfield.c:327)
  acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value (drivers/acpi/acpica/exresolv.c:392)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 1:
  acpi_ec_alloc (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1424)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1692)

 Freed by task 1:
  kfree (mm/slub.c:6876)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1751)

The bug triggers on reduced-hardware EC platforms (ec-&gt;gpe &lt; 0)
when the GPIO IRQ provider defers probing. Once the stale handler
exists, any unprivileged sysfs read that causes AML to touch an
EC OpRegion (battery, thermal, backlight) exercises the dangling
pointer.

Fix this by calling ec_remove_handlers() in the error path of
acpi_ec_setup() before clearing first_ec. ec_remove_handlers()
checks each EC_FLAGS_* bit before acting, so it is safe to call
regardless of how far ec_install_handlers() progressed:

  -ENODEV  (handler not installed): only calls acpi_ec_stop()
  -EPROBE_DEFER (handler installed): removes handler, stops EC</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31426</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="47" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head

SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2
value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc
bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use
skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from
skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.

However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact
requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller
(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the
requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then
slab_build_skb() -&gt; ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting
skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free
the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original
kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:

  kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected
  skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k

Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps
the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification
for KFENCE objects.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31429</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="48" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions

Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with
empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of
the extension is read before checking its length.  Fix it.

The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a
specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API.
Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly
disclosed off-list.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31430</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="49" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix memory leak when a wq is reset

idxd_wq_disable_cleanup() which is called from the reset path for a
workqueue, sets the wq type to NONE, which for other parts of the
driver mean that the wq is empty (all its resources were released).

Only set the wq type to NONE after its resources are released.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31441</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="50" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible invalid memory access after FLR

In the case that the first Function Level Reset (FLR) concludes
correctly, but in the second FLR the scratch area for the saved
configuration cannot be allocated, it&apos;s possible for a invalid memory
access to happen.

Always set the deallocated scratch area to NULL after FLR completes.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31442</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="51" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: fix use-after-free in update_super_work when racing with umount

Commit b98535d09179 (&quot;ext4: fix bug_on in start_this_handle during umount
filesystem&quot;) moved ext4_unregister_sysfs() before flushing s_sb_upd_work
to prevent new error work from being queued via /proc/fs/ext4/xx/mb_groups
reads during unmount. However, this introduced a use-after-free because
update_super_work calls ext4_notify_error_sysfs() -&gt; sysfs_notify() which
accesses the kobject&apos;s kernfs_node after it has been freed by kobject_del()
in ext4_unregister_sysfs():

  update_super_work                ext4_put_super
  -----------------                --------------
                                   ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb)
                                     kobject_del(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_kobj)
                                       __kobject_del()
                                         sysfs_remove_dir()
                                           kobj-&gt;sd = NULL
                                         sysfs_put(sd)
                                           kernfs_put()  // RCU free
  ext4_notify_error_sysfs(sbi)
    sysfs_notify(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_kobj)
      kn = kobj-&gt;sd              // stale pointer
      kernfs_get(kn)             // UAF on freed kernfs_node
                                   ext4_journal_destroy()
                                     flush_work(&amp;sbi-&gt;s_sb_upd_work)

Instead of reordering the teardown sequence, fix this by making
ext4_notify_error_sysfs() detect that sysfs has already been torn down
by checking s_kobj.state_in_sysfs, and skipping the sysfs_notify() call
in that case. A dedicated mutex (s_error_notify_mutex) serializes
ext4_notify_error_sysfs() against kobject_del() in ext4_unregister_sysfs()
to prevent TOCTOU races where the kobject could be deleted between the
state_in_sysfs check and the sysfs_notify() call.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31446</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="52" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes

ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting
index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before
accessing path[k].p_idx-&gt;ei_block, there is no validation that
p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that
level.

If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted
eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated
buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at
both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent
with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent
tree code.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31449</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="53" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: publish jinode after initialization

ext4_inode_attach_jinode() publishes ei-&gt;jinode to concurrent users.
It used to set ei-&gt;jinode before jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(),
allowing a reader to observe a non-NULL jinode with i_vfs_inode
still unset.

The fast commit flush path can then pass this jinode to
jbd2_wait_inode_data(), which dereferences i_vfs_inode-&gt;i_mapping and
may crash.

Below is the crash I observe:
```
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000010beb47f4
PGD 110e51067 P4D 110e51067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4850 Comm: fc_fsync_bench_ Not tainted 6.18.0-00764-g795a690c06a5 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:xas_find_marked+0x3d/0x2e0
Code: e0 03 48 83 f8 02 0f 84 f0 01 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 89 c3 48 39 c6 0f 82 fd 01 00 00 48 85 c9 74 3d 48 83 f9 03 77 63 4c 8b 0f &lt;49&gt; 8b 71 08 48 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 f1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02
RSP: 0018:ffffbbee806e7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000010beb4 RBX: 000000000010beb4 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000002000300000 RDI: ffffbbee806e7c10
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000002000300000 R09: 000000010beb47ec
R10: ffff9ea494590090 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000002000300000
R13: ffffbbee806e7c90 R14: ffff9ea494513788 R15: ffffbbee806e7c88
FS: 00007fc2f9e3e6c0(0000) GS:ffff9ea6b1444000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000010beb47f4 CR3: 0000000119ac5000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
filemap_get_folios_tag+0x87/0x2a0
__filemap_fdatawait_range+0x5f/0xd0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __schedule+0x3e7/0x10c0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? cap_safe_nice+0x37/0x70
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors+0x12/0x40
ext4_fc_commit+0x697/0x8b0
? ext4_file_write_iter+0x64b/0x950
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? vfs_write+0x356/0x480
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80
ext4_sync_file+0xf7/0x370
do_fsync+0x3b/0x80
? syscall_trace_enter+0x108/0x1d0
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
```

Fix this by initializing the jbd2_inode first.
Use smp_wmb() and WRITE_ONCE() to publish ei-&gt;jinode after
initialization. Readers use READ_ONCE() to fetch the pointer.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31450</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="54" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: replace BUG_ON with proper error handling in ext4_read_inline_folio

Replace BUG_ON() with proper error handling when inline data size
exceeds PAGE_SIZE. This prevents kernel panic and allows the system to
continue running while properly reporting the filesystem corruption.

The error is logged via ext4_error_inode(), the buffer head is released
to prevent memory leak, and -EFSCORRUPTED is returned to indicate
filesystem corruption.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31451</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="55" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: convert inline data to extents when truncate exceeds inline size

Add a check in ext4_setattr() to convert files from inline data storage
to extent-based storage when truncate() grows the file size beyond the
inline capacity. This prevents the filesystem from entering an
inconsistent state where the inline data flag is set but the file size
exceeds what can be stored inline.

Without this fix, the following sequence causes a kernel BUG_ON():

1. Mount filesystem with inode that has inline flag set and small size
2. truncate(file, 50MB) - grows size but inline flag remains set
3. sendfile() attempts to write data
4. ext4_write_inline_data() hits BUG_ON(write_size &gt; inline_capacity)

The crash occurs because ext4_write_inline_data() expects inline storage
to accommodate the write, but the actual inline capacity (~60 bytes for
i_block + ~96 bytes for xattrs) is far smaller than the file size and
write request.

The fix checks if the new size from setattr exceeds the inode&apos;s actual
inline capacity (EXT4_I(inode)-&gt;i_inline_size) and converts the file to
extent-based storage before proceeding with the size change.

This addresses the root cause by ensuring the inline data flag and file
size remain consistent during truncate operations.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31452</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="56" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: add GFP_NOIO in the bio completion if needed

The bio completion path in the process context (e.g. dm-verity)
will directly call into decompression rather than trigger another
workqueue context for minimal scheduling latencies, which can
then call vm_map_ram() with GFP_KERNEL.

Due to insufficient memory, vm_map_ram() may generate memory
swapping I/O, which can cause submit_bio_wait to deadlock
in some scenarios.

Trimmed down the call stack, as follows:

f2fs_submit_read_io
  submit_bio                      //bio_list is initialized.
    mmc_blk_mq_recovery
      z_erofs_endio
        vm_map_ram
          __pte_alloc_kernel
            __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim
              shrink_folio_list
                __swap_writepage
                  submit_bio_wait  //bio_list is non-NULL, hang!!!

Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to wrap up this path.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31467</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="57" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio_net: Fix UAF on dst_ops when IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is cleared and napi_tx is false

A UAF issue occurs when the virtio_net driver is configured with napi_tx=N
and the device&apos;s IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE flag is cleared
(e.g., during the configuration of tc route filter rules).

When IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE is removed from the net_device, the network stack
expects the driver to hold the reference to skb-&gt;dst until the packet
is fully transmitted and freed. In virtio_net with napi_tx=N,
skbs may remain in the virtio transmit ring for an extended period.

If the network namespace is destroyed while these skbs are still pending,
the corresponding dst_ops structure has freed. When a subsequent packet
is transmitted, free_old_xmit() is triggered to clean up old skbs.
It then calls dst_release() on the skb associated with the stale dst_entry.
Since the dst_ops (referenced by the dst_entry) has already been freed,
a UAF kernel paging request occurs.

fix it by adds skb_dst_drop(skb) in start_xmit to explicitly release
the dst reference before the skb is queued in virtio_net.

Call Trace:
 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80007e150000
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6236 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPT
  ...
  percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x158 lib/percpu_counter.c:98 (P)
  dst_release+0xe0/0x110  net/core/dst.c:177
  skb_release_head_state+0xe8/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:1177
  sk_skb_reason_drop+0x54/0x2d8 net/core/skbuff.c:1255
  dev_kfree_skb_any_reason+0x64/0x78 net/core/dev.c:3469
  napi_consume_skb+0x1c4/0x3a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1527
  __free_old_xmit+0x164/0x230  drivers/net/virtio_net.c:611 [virtio_net]
  free_old_xmit drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1081 [virtio_net]
  start_xmit+0x7c/0x530 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:3329 [virtio_net]
  ...

Reproduction Steps:
NETDEV=&quot;enp3s0&quot;

config_qdisc_route_filter() {
    tc qdisc del dev $NETDEV root
    tc qdisc add dev $NETDEV root handle 1: prio
    tc filter add dev $NETDEV parent 1:0 \
	protocol ip prio 100 route to 100 flowid 1:1
    ip route add 192.168.1.100/32 dev $NETDEV realm 100
}

test_ns() {
    ip netns add testns
    ip link set $NETDEV netns testns
    ip netns exec testns ifconfig $NETDEV  10.0.32.46/24
    ip netns exec testns ping -c 1 10.0.32.1
    ip netns del testns
}

config_qdisc_route_filter

test_ns
sleep 2
test_ns</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31469</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="58" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: use generic driver_override infrastructure

When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus&apos; match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.

Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.

Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1]

Also note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct
bus_type, as SPI - in contrast to most other buses - passes &quot;&quot; to
sysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing
&quot;\n&quot; instead of &quot;(null)\n&quot;.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31487</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="59" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks

Replace manual range and mask validations with netlink policy
annotations in ctnetlink code paths, so that the netlink core rejects
invalid values early and can generate extack errors.

- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_STATE: reject values &gt; TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT2 at
  policy level, removing the manual &gt;= TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX check.
- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_WSCALE_ORIGINAL/REPLY: reject values &gt; TCP_MAX_WSCALE
  (14). The normal TCP option parsing path already clamps to this value,
  but the ctnetlink path accepted 0-255, causing undefined behavior when
  used as a u32 shift count.
- CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS/REPLY_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with
  CTA_FILTER_F_ALL, removing the manual mask checks.
- CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with NF_CT_EXPECT_MASK, adding
  a new mask define grouping all valid expect flags.

Extracted from a broader nf-next patch by Florian Westphal, scoped to
ctnetlink for the fixes tree.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31495</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="60" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: skip expectations in other netns via proc

Skip expectations that do not reside in this netns.

Similar to e77e6ff502ea (&quot;netfilter: conntrack: do not dump other netns&apos;s
conntrack entries via proc&quot;).</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31496</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="61" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix ERTM re-init and zero pdu_len infinite loop

l2cap_config_req() processes CONFIG_REQ for channels in BT_CONNECTED
state to support L2CAP reconfiguration (e.g. MTU changes). However,
since both CONF_INPUT_DONE and CONF_OUTPUT_DONE are already set from
the initial configuration, the reconfiguration path falls through to
l2cap_ertm_init(), which re-initializes tx_q, srej_q, srej_list, and
retrans_list without freeing the previous allocations and sets
chan-&gt;sdu to NULL without freeing the existing skb. This leaks all
previously allocated ERTM resources.

Additionally, l2cap_parse_conf_req() does not validate the minimum
value of remote_mps derived from the RFC max_pdu_size option. A zero
value propagates to l2cap_segment_sdu() where pdu_len becomes zero,
causing the while loop to never terminate since len is never
decremented, exhausting all available memory.

Fix the double-init by skipping l2cap_ertm_init() and
l2cap_chan_ready() when the channel is already in BT_CONNECTED state,
while still allowing the reconfiguration parameters to be updated
through l2cap_parse_conf_req(). Also add a pdu_len zero check in
l2cap_segment_sdu() as a safeguard.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31498</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="62" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix deadlock in l2cap_conn_del()

l2cap_conn_del() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() for both info_timer
and id_addr_timer while holding conn-&gt;lock. However, the work functions
l2cap_info_timeout() and l2cap_conn_update_id_addr() both acquire
conn-&gt;lock, creating a potential AB-BA deadlock if the work is already
executing when l2cap_conn_del() takes the lock.

Move the work cancellations before acquiring conn-&gt;lock and use
disable_delayed_work_sync() to additionally prevent the works from
being rearmed after cancellation, consistent with the pattern used in
hci_conn_del().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31499</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="63" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iavf: fix out-of-bounds writes in iavf_get_ethtool_stats()

iavf incorrectly uses real_num_tx_queues for ETH_SS_STATS. Since the
value could change in runtime, we should use num_tx_queues instead.

Moreover iavf_get_ethtool_stats() uses num_active_queues while
iavf_get_sset_count() and iavf_get_stat_strings() use
real_num_tx_queues, which triggers out-of-bounds writes when we do
&quot;ethtool -L&quot; and &quot;ethtool -S&quot; simultaneously [1].

For example when we change channels from 1 to 8, Thread 3 could be
scheduled before Thread 2, and out-of-bounds writes could be triggered
in Thread 3:

Thread 1 (ethtool -L)       Thread 2 (work)        Thread 3 (ethtool -S)
iavf_set_channels()
...
iavf_alloc_queues()
-&gt; num_active_queues = 8
iavf_schedule_finish_config()
                                                   iavf_get_sset_count()
                                                   real_num_tx_queues: 1
                                                   -&gt; buffer for 1 queue
                                                   iavf_get_ethtool_stats()
                                                   num_active_queues: 8
                                                   -&gt; out-of-bounds!
                            iavf_finish_config()
                            -&gt; real_num_tx_queues = 8

Use immutable num_tx_queues in all related functions to avoid the issue.

[1]
 BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
 Write of size 8 at addr ffffc900031c9080 by task ethtool/5800

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5800 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 6.19.0-enjuk-08403-g8137e3db7f1c #241 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
  kasan_report+0xe1/0x180
  iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
  iavf_get_ethtool_stats+0x14c/0x2e0
  __dev_ethtool+0x3d0c/0x5830
  dev_ethtool+0x12d/0x270
  dev_ioctl+0x53c/0xe30
  sock_do_ioctl+0x1a9/0x270
  sock_ioctl+0x3d4/0x5e0
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x1c0
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x690
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7da0e6e36d
 ...
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 The buggy address belongs to a 1-page vmalloc region starting at 0xffffc900031c9000 allocated at __dev_ethtool+0x3cc9/0x5830
 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
 index:0xffff88813a013de0 pfn:0x13a013
 flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
 raw: 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: ffff88813a013de0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffffc900031c8f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ffffc900031c9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 &gt;ffffc900031c9080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
                    ^
  ffffc900031c9100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ffffc900031c9180: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31505</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="64" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref on l2cap_sock_ready_cb

Before using sk pointer, check if it is null.

Fix the following:

 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000260-0x0000000000000267]
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5985 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-00029-ga989fde763f4 #1 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-9.fc43 06/10/2025
 Workqueue: events l2cap_info_timeout
 RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30
 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df &lt;0f&gt; b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce
 veth0_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00005582615a5008 CR3: 000000007007e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  __kasan_check_byte+0x12/0x40
  lock_acquire+0x79/0x2e0
  lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100
  ? l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160
  l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x46/0x160
  l2cap_conn_start+0x779/0xff0
  ? __pfx_l2cap_conn_start+0x10/0x10
  ? l2cap_info_timeout+0x60/0xa0
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  l2cap_info_timeout+0x68/0xa0
  ? process_scheduled_works+0xa8d/0x18c0
  process_scheduled_works+0xb6e/0x18c0
  ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
  ? assign_work+0x3d5/0x5e0
  worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0
  kthread+0x388/0x470
  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x51e/0xb90
  ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
 veth1_macvtap: entered promiscuous mode
  ? __switch_to+0xc7d/0x1450
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Modules linked in:
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_0
 batman_adv: batadv0: Interface activated: batadv_slave_1
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim0: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim1: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim2: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 netdevsim netdevsim7 netdevsim3: set [1, 0] type 2 family 0 port 6081 - 0
 RIP: 0010:kasan_byte_accessible+0x12/0x30
 Code: 79 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 40 d6 48 c1 ef 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df &lt;0f&gt; b6 04 07 3c 08 0f 92 c0 c3 cc cce
 ieee80211 phy39: Selected rate control algorithm &apos;minstrel_ht&apos;
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006e0f808 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff89746018 RCX: 0000000080000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89746018 RDI: 000000000000004c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8aae3e70 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000260 R14: 0000000000000260 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880983c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f7e16139e9c CR3: 000000000e74e000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31510</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="65" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete

This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31511</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="66" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate PDU length before reading SDU length in l2cap_ecred_data_rcv()

l2cap_ecred_data_rcv() reads the SDU length field from skb-&gt;data using
get_unaligned_le16() without first verifying that skb contains at least
L2CAP_SDULEN_SIZE (2) bytes. When skb-&gt;len is less than 2, this reads
past the valid data in the skb.

The ERTM reassembly path correctly calls pskb_may_pull() before reading
the SDU length (l2cap_reassemble_sdu, L2CAP_SAR_START case). Apply the
same validation to the Enhanced Credit Based Flow Control data path.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31512</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="67" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown

A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item
policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue.

The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing
struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down
before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have
been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory.

xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown,
but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work.

Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the
queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a
freed struct net.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31516</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="68" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto

When the TX queue for espintcp is full, esp_output_tail_tcp will
return an error and not free the skb, because with synchronous crypto,
the common xfrm output code will drop the packet for us.

With async crypto (esp_output_done), we need to drop the skb when
esp_output_tail_tcp returns an error.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31518</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="69" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN

The BPF interpreter&apos;s signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.

The verifier&apos;s abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.

Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter&apos;s sdiv32/smod32 handlers.

s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31525</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="70" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for groups

Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access
when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back.

This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when
the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU
are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in()
using pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu.

Turns out, inherit uses event-&gt;pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the
move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use
pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context.

Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for the
group case.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31528</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="71" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: nexthop: allocate skb dynamically in rtm_get_nexthop()

When querying a nexthop object via RTM_GETNEXTHOP, the kernel currently
allocates a fixed-size skb using NLMSG_GOODSIZE. While sufficient for
single nexthops and small Equal-Cost Multi-Path groups, this fixed
allocation fails for large nexthop groups like 512 nexthops.

This results in the following warning splat:

 WARNING: net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395 at rtm_get_nexthop+0x176/0x1c0, CPU#20: rep/4608
 [...]
 RIP: 0010:rtm_get_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395)
 [...]
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6989)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
  netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
  ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:721 net/socket.c:736 net/socket.c:2585)
  ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2641)
  __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2671)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fix this by allocating the size dynamically using nh_nlmsg_size() and
using nlmsg_new(), this is consistent with nexthop_notify() behavior. In
addition, adjust nh_nlmsg_size_grp() so it calculates the size needed
based on flags passed. While at it, also add the size of NHA_FDB for
nexthop group size calculation as it was missing too.

This cannot be reproduced via iproute2 as the group size is currently
limited and the command fails as follows:

addattr_l ERROR: message exceeded bound of 1048</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31531</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="72" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: raw: fix ro-&gt;uniq use-after-free in raw_rcv()

raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(),
but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window
where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section
after raw_release() frees ro-&gt;uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the
percpu uniq storage.

Move free_percpu(ro-&gt;uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific
socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the
socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from
sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant
callbacks have drained.

[mkl: applied manually]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31532</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="73" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption

The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 (&quot;net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests&quot;), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.

When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge-&gt;offset, sge-&gt;length) and decrements
ctx-&gt;encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.

The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.

Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31533</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="74" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/i915/gt: Check set_default_submission() before deferencing

When the i915 driver firmware binaries are not present, the
set_default_submission pointer is not set. This pointer is
dereferenced during suspend anyways.

Add a check to make sure it is set before dereferencing.

[   23.289926] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[   23.293558] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[   23.298010] Freezing user space processes
[   23.302771] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.000 seconds)
[   23.309766] OOM killer disabled.
[   23.313027] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[   23.318540] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[   23.342038] serial 00:05: disabled
[   23.345719] serial 00:02: disabled
[   23.349342] serial 00:01: disabled
[   23.353782] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.358993] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[   23.361635] ata1.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.368863] ata2.00: Entering standby power mode
[   23.445187] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   23.452194] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[   23.457896] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[   23.463065] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   23.465640] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   23.469869] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/u48:18 Tainted: G S      W           6.19.0-rc4-00020-gf0b9d8eb98df #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[   23.482512] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[   23.496511] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[   23.501087] RIP: 0010:0x0
[   23.503755] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[   23.510324] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a60065fca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   23.515592] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f428290e000 RCX: 000000000000000f
[   23.522765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff9f428290e000
[   23.529937] RBP: ffff9f4282907070 R08: ffff9f4281130428 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[   23.537111] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9f42829070f8
[   23.544284] R13: ffff9f4282906028 R14: ffff9f4282900000 R15: ffff9f4282906b68
[   23.551457] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f466b2cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.559588] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.565365] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000031c230001 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
[   23.572539] PKRU: 55555554
[   23.575281] Call Trace:
[   23.577770]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   23.579905]  intel_engines_reset_default_submission+0x42/0x60
[   23.585695]  __intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x191/0x200
[   23.590360]  intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x20/0x40
[   23.594675]  gt_sanitize+0x15e/0x170
[   23.598290]  i915_gem_suspend_late+0x6b/0x180
[   23.602692]  i915_drm_suspend_late+0x35/0xf0
[   23.607008]  ? __pfx_pci_pm_suspend_late+0x10/0x10
[   23.611843]  dpm_run_callback+0x78/0x1c0
[   23.615817]  device_suspend_late+0xde/0x2e0
[   23.620037]  async_suspend_late+0x18/0x30
[   23.624082]  async_run_entry_fn+0x25/0xa0
[   23.628129]  process_one_work+0x15b/0x380
[   23.632182]  worker_thread+0x2a5/0x3c0
[   23.635973]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   23.640279]  kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
[   23.643464]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.647263]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.651045]  ret_from_fork+0x131/0x190
[   23.654837]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   23.658634]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   23.662597]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   23.664826] Modules linked in:
[   23.667914] CR2: 0000000000000000
[   23.671271] ------------[ cut here ]------------

(cherry picked from commit daa199abc3d3d1740c9e3a2c3e9216ae5b447cad)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31540</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="75" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/platform/uv: Handle deconfigured sockets

When a socket is deconfigured, it&apos;s mapped to SOCK_EMPTY (0xffff). This causes
a panic while allocating UV hub info structures.

Fix this by using NUMA_NO_NODE, allowing UV hub info structures to be
allocated on valid nodes.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31542</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="76" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: bonding: fix NULL deref in bond_debug_rlb_hash_show

rlb_clear_slave intentionally keeps RLB hash-table entries on
the rx_hashtbl_used_head list with slave set to NULL when no
replacement slave is available. However, bond_debug_rlb_hash_show
visites client_info-&gt;slave without checking if it&apos;s NULL.

Other used-list iterators in bond_alb.c already handle this NULL-slave
state safely:

- rlb_update_client returns early on !client_info-&gt;slave
- rlb_req_update_slave_clients, rlb_clear_slave, and rlb_rebalance
compare slave values before visiting
- lb_req_update_subnet_clients continues if slave is NULL

The following NULL deref crash can be trigger in
bond_debug_rlb_hash_show:

[    1.289791] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[    1.292058] RIP: 0010:bond_debug_rlb_hash_show (drivers/net/bonding/bond_debugfs.c:41)
[    1.293101] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a7d00 EFLAGS: 00010286
[    1.293333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102b48200 RCX: ffff888102b48204
[    1.293631] RDX: ffff888102b48200 RSI: ffffffff839daad5 RDI: ffff888102815078
[    1.293924] RBP: ffff888102815078 R08: ffff888102b4820e R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.294267] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888100f929c0
[    1.294564] R13: ffff888100f92a00 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc900004a7ed8
[    1.294864] FS:  0000000001395380(0000) GS:ffff888196e75000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.295239] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.295480] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102adc004 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[    1.295897] Call Trace:
[    1.296134]  seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231)
[    1.296341]  seq_read (fs/seq_file.c:164)
[    1.296493]  full_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:378 (discriminator 1))
[    1.296658]  vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572)
[    1.296981]  ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:717)
[    1.297132]  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
[    1.297325]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Add a NULL check and print &quot;(none)&quot; for entries with no assigned slave.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31546</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="77" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path

Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:

    WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524

When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in &apos;exiting&apos;.

After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().

  CPU0			     CPU1		       CPU2
  futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
  // acquires the PI futex
  exit()
    futex_cleanup_begin()
      futex_state = EXITING;
			     futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 attach_to_pi_owner()
				   // observes EXITING
				   *exiting = owner;  // takes ref
				   return -EBUSY
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
				 put_task_struct();   // drops ref
			       // exiting still points to owner
			       goto retry;
			       futex_lock_pi_atomic()
				 lock_pi_update_atomic()
				   cmpxchg(uaddr)
					*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
				   // value changed
				 return -EAGAIN;
			       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
				 WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)

Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31555</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="78" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: Fix fence put before wait in amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib

amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() submits a GPU job and gets a fence
from amdgpu_ib_schedule(). This fence is used to wait for job
completion.

Currently, the code drops the fence reference using dma_fence_put()
before calling dma_fence_wait().

If dma_fence_put() releases the last reference, the fence may be
freed before dma_fence_wait() is called. This can lead to a
use-after-free.

Fix this by waiting on the fence first and releasing the reference
only after dma_fence_wait() completes.

Fixes the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c:697 amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() warn: passing freed memory &apos;f&apos; (line 696)

(cherry picked from commit 8b9e5259adc385b61a6590a13b82ae0ac2bd3482)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31566</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="79" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: gw: fix OOB heap access in cgw_csum_crc8_rel()

cgw_csum_crc8_rel() correctly computes bounds-safe indices via calc_idx():

    int from = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;from_idx, cf-&gt;len);
    int to   = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;to_idx,   cf-&gt;len);
    int res  = calc_idx(crc8-&gt;result_idx, cf-&gt;len);

    if (from &lt; 0 || to &lt; 0 || res &lt; 0)
        return;

However, the loop and the result write then use the raw s8 fields directly
instead of the computed variables:

    for (i = crc8-&gt;from_idx; ...)        /* BUG: raw negative index */
    cf-&gt;data[crc8-&gt;result_idx] = ...;    /* BUG: raw negative index */

With from_idx = to_idx = result_idx = -64 on a 64-byte CAN FD frame,
calc_idx(-64, 64) = 0 so the guard passes, but the loop iterates with
i = -64, reading cf-&gt;data[-64], and the write goes to cf-&gt;data[-64].
This write might end up to 56 (7.0-rc) or 40 (&lt;= 6.19) bytes before the
start of the canfd_frame on the heap.

The companion function cgw_csum_xor_rel() uses `from`/`to`/`res`
correctly throughout; fix cgw_csum_crc8_rel() to match.

Confirmed with KASAN on linux-7.0-rc2:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cgw_csum_crc8_rel+0x515/0x5b0
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880076619c8 by task poc_cgw_oob/62

To configure the can-gw crc8 checksums CAP_NET_ADMIN is needed.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31570</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="80" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SEV: Drop WARN on large size for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION

Drop the WARN in sev_pin_memory() on npages overflowing an int, as the
WARN is comically trivially to trigger from userspace, e.g. by doing:

  struct kvm_enc_region range = {
          .addr = 0,
          .size = -1ul,
  };

  __vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &amp;range);

Note, the checks in sev_mem_enc_register_region() that presumably exist to
verify the incoming address+size are completely worthless, as both &quot;addr&quot;
and &quot;size&quot; are u64s and SEV is 64-bit only, i.e. they _can&apos;t_ be greater
than ULONG_MAX.  That wart will be cleaned up in the near future.

	if (range-&gt;addr &gt; ULONG_MAX || range-&gt;size &gt; ULONG_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;

Opportunistically add a comment to explain why the code calculates the
number of pages the &quot;hard&quot; way, e.g. instead of just shifting @ulen.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31590</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="81" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Stop cmd_handler work in epf_ntb_epc_cleanup

Disable the delayed work before clearing BAR mappings and doorbells to
avoid running the handler after resources have been torn down.

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800083f46004
  [...]
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1]  SMP
  [...]
  Call trace:
   epf_ntb_cmd_handler+0x54/0x200 [pci_epf_vntb] (P)
   process_one_work+0x154/0x3b0
   worker_thread+0x2c8/0x400
   kthread+0x148/0x210
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31595</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="82" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1

Zen1&apos;s hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial
results from previous operations.  Those results can be leaked by
another, attacker thread.

Fix that with a chicken bit.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31628</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="83" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with &quot;%pISpc&quot;.

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

  [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter&apos;s maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
  explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
  mapped-v4 example</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31630</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="84" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect

Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to
the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31651</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="85" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy

nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().

Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.

KASAN report:
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80

 Call Trace:
  nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
  nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
  nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
  __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
  tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
  __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320

 Allocated by task 75:
  nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
  nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
  nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
  nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00

 Freed by task 26:
  nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
  process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31665</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="86" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core

A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered
reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for
example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5
controller):

  ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; input_mutex -&gt; dev-&gt;mutex -&gt; ff-&gt;mutex

The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:

1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff-&gt;mutex and calls
   uinput_dev_upload_effect() -&gt; uinput_request_submit() -&gt;
   uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev-&gt;mutex.

2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev-&gt;mutex and calls
   uinput_create_device() -&gt; input_register_device(), which acquires
   input_mutex.

3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and
   calls kbd_connect() -&gt; input_register_handle(), which acquires
   dev-&gt;mutex.

4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under
   dev-&gt;mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff-&gt;mutex.

Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect
udev-&gt;state and udev-&gt;dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of
acquiring udev-&gt;mutex.  The function only needs to atomically check
device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via
uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock
(ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep).  This
breaks the ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; udev-&gt;mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in
the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.

To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect
writes to udev-&gt;state in uinput_create_device() and
uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.

Additionally, move init_completion(&amp;request-&gt;done) from
uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before
uinput_request_reserve_slot().  Once the slot is allocated,
uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from
the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the
request becomes visible.

Lock ordering after the fix:

  ff-&gt;mutex -&gt; state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
  udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
  udev-&gt;mutex -&gt; input_mutex -&gt; dev-&gt;mutex -&gt; ff-&gt;mutex (no back-edge)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31667</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="87" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: sch_netem: fix out-of-bounds access in packet corruption

In netem_enqueue(), the packet corruption logic uses
get_random_u32_below(skb_headlen(skb)) to select an index for
modifying skb-&gt;data. When an AF_PACKET TX_RING sends fully non-linear
packets over an IPIP tunnel, skb_headlen(skb) evaluates to 0.

Passing 0 to get_random_u32_below() takes the variable-ceil slow path
which returns an unconstrained 32-bit random integer. Using this
unconstrained value as an offset into skb-&gt;data results in an
out-of-bounds memory access.

Fix this by verifying skb_headlen(skb) is non-zero before attempting
to corrupt the linear data area. Fully non-linear packets will silently
bypass the corruption logic.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31675</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="88" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: af_alg - limit RX SG extraction by receive buffer budget

Make af_alg_get_rsgl() limit each RX scatterlist extraction to the
remaining receive buffer budget.

af_alg_get_rsgl() currently uses af_alg_readable() only as a gate
before extracting data into the RX scatterlist. Limit each extraction
to the remaining af_alg_rcvbuf(sk) budget so that receive-side
accounting matches the amount of data attached to the request.

If skcipher cannot obtain enough RX space for at least one chunk while
more data remains to be processed, reject the recvmsg call instead of
rounding the request length down to zero.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31677</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="89" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

openvswitch: defer tunnel netdev_put to RCU release

ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy() may run after NETDEV_UNREGISTER already
detached the device. Dropping the netdev reference in destroy can race
with concurrent readers that still observe vport-&gt;dev.

Do not release vport-&gt;dev in ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy(). Instead, let
vport_netdev_free() drop the reference from the RCU callback, matching
the non-tunnel destroy path and avoiding additional synchronization
under RTNL.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31678</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="90" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, a memory out-of-bounds access vulnerability exists in the act_csum module&apos;s tcf_csum_act() function when processing nested VLAN headers. When an skb still carries in-payload VLAN tags, the function walks nested VLAN headers directly from skb-&gt;data. The current code reads vlan-&gt;h_vlan_encapsulated_proto and then pulls VLAN_HLEN bytes without first ensuring that the full VLAN header is present in the linear area. If only part of an inner VLAN header is linearized, accessing h_vlan_encapsulated_proto reads past the linear area, and the following skb_pull(VLAN_HLEN) may violate skb invariants.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31684</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="91" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets

`eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address
and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address.

The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when
`par-&gt;fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par-&gt;fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()`
can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid.

Fix this by removing the `par-&gt;fragoff != 0` condition so that packets
with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31685</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.4</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="92" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

EDAC/mc: Fix error path ordering in edac_mc_alloc()

When the mci-&gt;pvt_info allocation in edac_mc_alloc() fails, the error path
will call put_device() which will end up calling the device&apos;s release
function.

However, the init ordering is wrong such that device_initialize() happens
*after* the failed allocation and thus the device itself and the release
function pointer are not initialized yet when they&apos;re called:

  MCE: In-kernel MCE decoding enabled.
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kobject: &apos;(null)&apos;: is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
  WARNING: lib/kobject.c:734 at kobject_put, CPU#22: systemd-udevd
  CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(full)
  RIP: 0010:kobject_put
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   edac_mc_alloc+0xbe/0xe0 [edac_core]
   amd64_edac_init+0x7a4/0xff0 [amd64_edac]
   ? __pfx_amd64_edac_init+0x10/0x10 [amd64_edac]
   do_one_initcall
   ...

Reorder the calling sequence so that the device is initialized and thus the
release function pointer is properly set before it can be used.

This was found by Claude while reviewing another EDAC patch.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31689</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="93" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don&apos;t attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388

  CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
   sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31697</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="94" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the PDH cert, don&apos;t attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033

  CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc.                                                       Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
   sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31698</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="95" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp: Don&apos;t attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed

When retrieving the PEK CSR, don&apos;t attempt to copy the blob to userspace
if the firmware command failed.  If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
  Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405

  CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G     U     O        7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
   print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
   check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
   instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
   _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
   _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
   copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
   sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
   sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
   vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
   do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31699</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="96" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path

smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path.  The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp-&gt;Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.

A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.

Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload.  Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31708</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="97" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vxlan: validate ND option lengths in vxlan_na_create

vxlan_na_create() walks ND options according to option-provided
lengths. A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the
computed option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.

Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31738</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="98" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bridge: br_nd_send: validate ND option lengths

br_nd_send() walks ND options according to option-provided lengths.
A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the computed
option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.

Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31752</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="99" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: cdns3: gadget: fix NULL pointer dereference in ep_queue

When the gadget endpoint is disabled or not yet configured, the ep-&gt;desc
pointer can be NULL. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when
__cdns3_gadget_ep_queue() is called, causing a kernel crash.

Add a check to return -ESHUTDOWN if ep-&gt;desc is NULL, which is the
standard return code for unconfigured endpoints.

This prevents potential crashes when ep_queue is called on endpoints
that are not ready.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31755</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="100" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: move wake reason storage into validated event handlers

hci_store_wake_reason() is called from hci_event_packet() immediately
after stripping the HCI event header but before hci_event_func()
enforces the per-event minimum payload length from hci_ev_table.
This means a short HCI event frame can reach bacpy() before any bounds
check runs.

Rather than duplicating skb parsing and per-event length checks inside
hci_store_wake_reason(), move wake-address storage into the individual
event handlers after their existing event-length validation has
succeeded. Convert hci_store_wake_reason() into a small helper that only
stores an already-validated bdaddr while the caller holds hci_dev_lock().
Use the same helper after hci_event_func() with a NULL address to
preserve the existing unexpected-wake fallback semantics when no
validated event handler records a wake address.

Annotate the helper with __must_hold(&amp;hdev-&gt;lock) and add
lockdep_assert_held(&amp;hdev-&gt;lock) so future call paths keep the lock
contract explicit.

Call the helper from hci_conn_request_evt(), hci_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_sync_conn_complete_evt(), le_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_le_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(),
hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_pa_sync_established_evt(), and
hci_le_past_received_evt().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31771</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="101" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state

The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored
STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH.
That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing
flow actually achieved.

For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear
and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local
side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when
storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.

This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code,
which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31773</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="102" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix potential out-of-bounds read in iwl_mvm_nd_match_info_handler()

The memcpy function assumes the dynamic array notif-&gt;matches is at least
as large as the number of bytes to copy. Otherwise, results-&gt;matches may
contain unwanted data. To guarantee safety, extend the validation in one
of the checks to ensure sufficient packet length.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31779</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="103" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/ioc32: stop speculation on the drm_compat_ioctl path

The drm compat ioctl path takes a user controlled pointer, and then
dereferences it into a table of function pointers, the signature method
of spectre problems.  Fix this up by calling array_index_nospec() on the
index to the function pointer list.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31781</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="104" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load

Load Long Term Keys stores the user-provided enc_size and later uses
it to size fixed-size stack operations when replying to LE LTK
requests. An enc_size larger than the 16-byte key buffer can therefore
overflow the reply stack buffer.

Reject oversized enc_size values while validating the management LTK
record so invalid keys never reach the stored key state.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43020</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="105" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: use skb_header_pointer() for TCPv4 GSO frag_off check

Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value warning in gso_features_check()
called from netif_skb_features() [1].

gso_features_check() reads iph-&gt;frag_off to decide whether to clear
mangleid_features. Accessing the IPv4 header via ip_hdr()/inner_ip_hdr()
can rely on skb header offsets that are not always safe for direct
dereference on packets injected from PF_PACKET paths.

Use skb_header_pointer() for the TCPv4 frag_off check so the header read
is robust whether data is already linear or needs copying.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1543a7d954d9c6d00407</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43036</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="106" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipv6: ndisc: fix ndisc_ra_useropt to initialize nduseropt_padX fields to zero to prevent an info-leak

When processing Router Advertisements with user options the kernel
builds an RTM_NEWNDUSEROPT netlink message. The nduseroptmsg struct
has three padding fields that are never zeroed and can leak kernel data

The fix is simple, just zeroes the padding fields.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43040</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="107" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: af-alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalk

The AF_ALG interface fails to unmark the end of a Scatter/Gather List (SGL)
when chaining a new af_alg_tsgl structure. If a sendmsg() fills an SGL
exactly to MAX_SGL_ENTS, the last entry is marked as the end. A subsequent
sendmsg() allocates a new SGL and chains it, but fails to clear the end
marker on the previous SGL&apos;s last data entry.

This causes the crypto scatterwalk to hit a premature end, returning NULL
on sg_next() and leading to a kernel panic during dereference.

Fix this by explicitly unmarking the end of the previous SGL when
performing sg_chain() in af_alg_alloc_tsgl().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43043</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="108" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

serial: 8250: Fix TX deadlock when using DMA

`dmaengine_terminate_async` does not guarantee that the
`__dma_tx_complete` callback will run. The callback is currently the
only place where `dma-&gt;tx_running` gets cleared. If the transaction is
canceled and the callback never runs, then `dma-&gt;tx_running` will never
get cleared and we will never schedule new TX DMA transactions again.

This change makes it so we clear `dma-&gt;tx_running` after we terminate
the DMA transaction. This is &quot;safe&quot; because `serial8250_tx_dma_flush`
is holding the UART port lock. The first thing the callback does is also
grab the UART port lock, so access to `dma-&gt;tx_running` is serialized.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43061</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="109" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dmaengine: idxd: Fix not releasing workqueue on .release()

The workqueue associated with an DSA/IAA device is not released when
the object is freed.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43064</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="110" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/intel/uncore: Skip discovery table for offline dies

This warning can be triggered if NUMA is disabled and the system
boots with fewer CPUs than the number of CPUs in die 0.

WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 7257 at uncore.c:1157 uncore_pci_pmu_register+0x136/0x160 [intel_uncore]

Currently, the discovery table continues to be parsed even if all CPUs
in the associated die are offline.  This can lead to an array overflow
at &quot;pmu-&gt;boxes[die] = box&quot; in uncore_pci_pmu_register(), which may
trigger the warning above or cause other issues.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43079</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="111" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: icmp: fix null-ptr-deref in icmp_build_probe()

ipv6_stub-&gt;ipv6_dev_find() may return ERR_PTR(-EAFNOSUPPORT) when the
IPv6 stack is not active (CONFIG_IPV6=m and not loaded), and passing
this error pointer to dev_hold() will cause a kernel crash with
null-ptr-deref.

Instead, silently discard the request. RFC 8335 does not appear to
define a specific response for the case where an IPv6 interface
identifier is syntactically valid but the implementation cannot perform
the lookup at runtime, and silently dropping the request may safer than
misreporting &quot;No Such Interface&quot;.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43099</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="112" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/smp: Add check for kcalloc() failure in parse_thread_groups()

As kcalloc() may fail, check its return value to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference when passing it to of_property_read_u32_array().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43148</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="113" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: pegasus: enable basic endpoint checking

pegasus_probe() fills URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:

  - usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev, 1) for RX data
  - usb_sndbulkpipe(dev, 2) for TX data
  - usb_rcvintpipe(dev, 3)  for status interrupts

A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.

Add a pegasus_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic
constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and
usb_check_int_endpoints() calls before any resource allocation to
verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched
descriptors at probe time, and avoid triggering assertion.

Similar fix to
- commit 90b7f2961798 (&quot;net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking&quot;)
- commit 9e7021d2aeae (&quot;net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking&quot;)</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43156</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="114" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md/bitmap: fix GPF in write_page caused by resize race

A General Protection Fault occurs in write_page() during array resize:
RIP: 0010:write_page+0x22b/0x3c0 [md_mod]

This is a use-after-free race between bitmap_daemon_work() and
__bitmap_resize(). The daemon iterates over `bitmap-&gt;storage.filemap`
without locking, while the resize path frees that storage via
md_bitmap_file_unmap(). `quiesce()` does not stop the md thread,
allowing concurrent access to freed pages.

Fix by holding `mddev-&gt;bitmap_info.mutex` during the bitmap update.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43163</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="115" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()

On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace-&gt;nodelen
to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field
as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against
trace-&gt;type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are
present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits
0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated
region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory
and leads to a kernel panic.

Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to
derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:

  - in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
    the open-coded computation;
  - in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
    nodelen is inconsistent with the type field, before any data is
    written.

Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they
are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to
0xff1ffc00).</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43186</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="116" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

LoongArch: Make cpumask_of_node() robust against NUMA_NO_NODE

The arch definition of cpumask_of_node() cannot handle NUMA_NO_NODE -
which is a valid index - so add a check for this.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43212</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="117" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel&apos;s ima kexec buffer

When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as &quot;mem=&lt;size&gt;&quot;, the physical range that contains the carried
over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a
kernel panic.

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
    RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) – not-present page

Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done
in commit cbf9c4b9617b (&quot;of: check previous kernel&apos;s ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds&quot;) do a similar check on x86.

Without carrying the measurement list across kexec, the attestation
would fail.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43240</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="118" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: fiemap page fault fix

In gfs2_fiemap(), we are calling iomap_fiemap() while holding the inode
glock.  This can lead to recursive glock taking if the fiemap buffer is
memory mapped to the same inode and accessing it triggers a page fault.

Fix by disabling page faults for iomap_fiemap() and faulting in the
buffer by hand if necessary.

Fixes xfstest generic/742.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43262</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="119" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: supply snapshot context in ceph_zero_partial_object()

The ceph_zero_partial_object function was missing proper snapshot
context for its OSD write operations, which could lead to data
inconsistencies in snapshots.

Reproducer:
../src/vstart.sh --new -x --localhost --bluestore
./bin/ceph auth caps client.fs_a mds &apos;allow rwps fsname=a&apos; mon &apos;allow r fsname=a&apos; osd &apos;allow rw tag cephfs data=a&apos;
mount -t ceph </Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43273</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="120" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: move ext4_percpu_param_init() before ext4_mb_init()

When running `kvm-xfstests -c ext4/1k -C 1 generic/383` with the
`DOUBLE_CHECK` macro defined, the following panic is triggered:

==================================================================
EXT4-fs error (device vdc): ext4_validate_block_bitmap:423:
                        comm mount: bg 0: bad block bitmap checksum
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff110000fa2cc000
PGD 3e01067 P4D 3e02067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2386 Comm: mount Tainted: G W
                        6.18.0-gba65a4e7120a-dirty #1152 PREEMPT(none)
RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_add_batch+0x13/0xa0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted+0xcb/0xe0
 ext4_validate_block_bitmap+0x2a1/0x2f0
 ext4_read_block_bitmap+0x33/0x50
 mb_group_bb_bitmap_alloc+0x33/0x80
 ext4_mb_add_groupinfo+0x190/0x250
 ext4_mb_init_backend+0x87/0x290
 ext4_mb_init+0x456/0x640
 __ext4_fill_super+0x1072/0x1680
 ext4_fill_super+0xd3/0x280
 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x132/0x1d0
 vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xd0
 vfs_cmd_create+0x59/0xe0
 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4f6/0x6b0
 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
==================================================================

This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
        mkfs.ext4 -F -q -b 1024 /dev/sda 5G
        tune2fs -O quota,project /dev/sda
        mount /dev/sda /tmp/test

With DOUBLE_CHECK defined, mb_group_bb_bitmap_alloc() reads
and validates the block bitmap. When the validation fails,
ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted() attempts to update
sbi-&gt;s_freeclusters_counter. However, this percpu_counter has not been
initialized yet at this point, which leads to the panic described above.

Fix this by moving the execution of ext4_percpu_param_init() to occur
before ext4_mb_init(), ensuring the per-CPU counters are initialized
before they are used.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43288</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="121" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/vmalloc: prevent RCU stalls in kasan_release_vmalloc_node

When CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is enabled, freeing KASAN shadow pages during
vmalloc cleanup triggers expensive stack unwinding that acquires RCU read
locks.  Processing a large purge_list without rescheduling can cause the
task to hold CPU for extended periods (10+ seconds), leading to RCU stalls
and potential OOM conditions.

The issue manifests in purge_vmap_node() -&gt; kasan_release_vmalloc_node()
where iterating through hundreds or thousands of vmap_area entries and
freeing their associated shadow pages causes:

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P6229/1:b..l
  ...
  task:kworker/0:17 state:R running task stack:28840 pid:6229
  ...
  kasan_release_vmalloc_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299
  purge_vmap_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299

Each call to kasan_release_vmalloc() can free many pages, and with
page_owner tracking, each free triggers save_stack() which performs stack
unwinding under RCU read lock.  Without yielding, this creates an
unbounded RCU critical section.

Add periodic cond_resched() calls within the loop to allow:
- RCU grace periods to complete
- Other tasks to run
- Scheduler to preempt when needed

The fix uses need_resched() for immediate response under load, with a
batch count of 32 as a guaranteed upper bound to prevent worst-case stalls
even under light load.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43292</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="122" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipa: fix event ring index not programmed for IPA v5.0+

For IPA v5.0+, the event ring index field moved from CH_C_CNTXT_0 to
CH_C_CNTXT_1. The v5.0 register definition intended to define this
field in the CH_C_CNTXT_1 fmask array but used the old identifier of
ERINDEX instead of CH_ERINDEX.

Without a valid event ring, GSI channels could never signal transfer
completions. This caused gsi_channel_trans_quiesce() to block
forever in wait_for_completion().

At least for IPA v5.2 this resolves an issue seen where runtime
suspend, system suspend, and remoteproc stop all hanged forever. It
also meant the IPA data path was completely non functional.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43345</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="123" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/kbuf: check if target buffer list is still legacy on recycle

There&apos;s a gap between when the buffer was grabbed and when it
potentially gets recycled, where if the list is empty, someone could&apos;ve
upgraded it to a ring provided type. This can happen if the request
is forced via io-wq. The legacy recycling is missing checking if the
buffer_list still exists, and if it&apos;s of the correct type. Add those
checks.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43366</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="124" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()

If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().

Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43406</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="125" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()

Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the &quot;path&quot;
pointer obtained by __getname().  If ownership of this pointer is not
passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it
before returning.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43419</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="126" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: class: cdc-wdm: fix reordering issue in read code path

Quoting the bug report:

Due to compiler optimization or CPU out-of-order execution, the
desc-&gt;length update can be reordered before the memmove. If this
happens, wdm_read() can see the new length and call copy_to_user() on
uninitialized memory. This also violates LKMM data race rules [1].

Fix it by using WRITE_ONCE and memory barriers.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43427</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="127" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts

The usb_control_msg(), usb_bulk_msg(), and usb_interrupt_msg() APIs in
usbcore allow unlimited timeout durations.  And since they use
uninterruptible waits, this leaves open the possibility of hanging a
task for an indefinitely long time, with no way to kill it short of
unplugging the target device.

To prevent this sort of problem, enforce a maximum limit on the length
of these unkillable timeouts.  The limit chosen here, somewhat
arbitrarily, is 60 seconds.  On many systems (although not all) this
is short enough to avoid triggering the kernel&apos;s hung-task detector.

In addition, clear up the ambiguity of negative timeout values by
treating them the same as 0, i.e., using the maximum allowed timeout.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43428</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="128" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5: Fix deadlock between devlink lock and esw-&gt;wq

esw-&gt;work_queue executes esw_functions_changed_event_handler -&gt;
esw_vfs_changed_event_handler and acquires the devlink lock.

.eswitch_mode_set (acquires devlink lock in devlink_nl_pre_doit) -&gt;
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set -&gt; mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked -&gt;
mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister -&gt; flush_workqueue deadlocks
when esw_vfs_changed_event_handler executes.

Fix that by no longer flushing the work to avoid the deadlock, and using
a generation counter to keep track of work relevance. This avoids an old
handler manipulating an esw that has undergone one or more mode changes:
- the counter is incremented in mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister.
- the counter is read and passed to the ephemeral mlx5_host_work struct.
- the work handler takes the devlink lock and bails out if the current
  generation is different than the one it was scheduled to operate on.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup does the final draining before destroying the wq.

No longer flushing the workqueue has the side effect of maybe no longer
cancelling pending vport_change_handler work items, but that&apos;s ok since
those are disabled elsewhere:
- mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked disables the vport eq notifier.
- mlx5_esw_vport_disable disarms the HW EQ notification and marks
  vport-&gt;enabled under state_lock to false to prevent pending vport
  handler from doing anything.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup destroys the workqueue and makes sure all events
  are disabled/finished.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43468</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="129" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests  MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY.  Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-43493 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43493</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="130" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers

Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail
to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags when
moving frags from source to destination.  __pskb_copy_fclone() defers
the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying
frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs,
type} and never touches skb_shinfo()-&gt;flags; skb_shift() moves frag
descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched.  As a result, the
destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or
page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as
false.

The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses
skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured
through skb_cow_data().  ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c,
esp6.c), and a single nft &apos;dup to &lt;local&gt;&apos; rule -- or any other
nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()&apos;d
skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged
user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via
authencesn-ESN stray writes.

Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors
were actually moved from the source.  skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand()
share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly
allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so
skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change.

The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list().
The former moves the incoming skb&apos;s frag descriptors into the
accumulator&apos;s last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and
the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole
onto p&apos;s frag_list.  Downstream skb_segment() reads only
skb_shinfo(p)-&gt;flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb&apos;s
shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker.

The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an
MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue
into a freshly allocated nskb.  The helper falls into the same family
and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place
writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but
a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently.

The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag
merge takes only head_skb&apos;s flag, and the inner switch that rebinds
frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the
new frag_skb&apos;s flag into nskb.  Fold frag_skb&apos;s flag at both sites
so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-43503</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="131" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_state_change_cb()

Add the same NULL guard already present in
l2cap_sock_resume_cb() and l2cap_sock_ready_cb().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45834</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="132" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Fix slab-use-after-free in qd_put

Commit a475c5dd16e5 (&quot;gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously&quot;)
started freeing quota data objects during filesystem shutdown instead of
putting them back onto the LRU list, but it failed to remove these
objects from the LRU list, causing LRU list corruption.  This caused
use-after-free when the shrinker (gfs2_qd_shrink_scan) tried to access
already-freed objects on the LRU list.

Fix this by removing qd objects from the LRU list before freeing them in
qd_put().

Initial fix from Deepanshu Kartikey &lt;</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45861</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="133" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: cdns3: fix role switching during resume

If the role change while we are suspended, the cdns3 driver switches to the
new mode during resume. However, switching to host mode in this context
causes a NULL pointer dereference.

The host role&apos;s start() operation registers a xhci-hcd device, but its
probe is deferred while we are in the resume path. The host role&apos;s resume()
operation assumes the xhci-hcd device is already probed, which is not the
case, leading to the dereference. Since the start() operation of the new
role is already called, the resume operation can be skipped.

So skip the resume operation for the new role if a role switch occurs
during resume. Once the resume sequence is complete, the xhci-hcd device
can be probed in case of host mode.

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000208
Mem abort info:
...
Data abort info:
...
[0000000000000208] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1]  SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 146 Comm: sh Not tainted
6.19.0-rc7-00013-g6e64f4aabfae-dirty #135 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Texas Instruments J7200 EVM (DT)
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd+0x0/0x1c
lr : cdns_host_resume+0x24/0x5c
...
Call trace:
 usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd+0x0/0x1c (P)
 cdns_resume+0x6c/0xbc
 cdns3_controller_resume.isra.0+0xe8/0x17c
 cdns3_plat_resume+0x18/0x24
 platform_pm_resume+0x2c/0x68
 dpm_run_callback+0x90/0x248
 device_resume+0x100/0x24c
 dpm_resume+0x190/0x2ec
 dpm_resume_end+0x18/0x34
 suspend_devices_and_enter+0x2b0/0xa44
 pm_suspend+0x16c/0x5fc
 state_store+0x80/0xec
 kobj_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
 sysfs_kf_write+0x7c/0x94
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1dc
 vfs_write+0x240/0x370
 ksys_write+0x70/0x108
 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
 el0_svc+0x34/0x108
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: 52800003 f9407ca5 d63f00a0 17ffffe4 (f9410401)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45911</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="134" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: fix inline data read failure for ztailpacking pclusters

Compressed folios for ztailpacking pclusters must be valid before adding
these pclusters to I/O chains. Otherwise, z_erofs_decompress_pcluster()
may assume they are already valid and then trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.

It is somewhat hard to reproduce because the inline data is in the same
block as the tail of the compressed indexes, which are usually read just
before. However, it may still happen if a fatal signal arrives while
read_mapping_folio() is running, as shown below:

 erofs: (device dm-1): z_erofs_pcluster_begin: failed to get inline data -4
 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008

 ...

 pc : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14
 lr : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x160/0xa14
 sp : ffffffc08b3eb3a0
 x29: ffffffc08b3eb570 x28: ffffffc08b3eb418 x27: 0000000000001000
 x26: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x25: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x24: 0000000000000001
 x23: 0000000000000008 x22: 00000000fffffffb x21: dead000000000700
 x20: 00000000000015e7 x19: ffffff808babb400 x18: ffffffc089edc098
 x17: 00000000c006287d x16: 00000000c006287d x15: 0000000000000004
 x14: ffffff80ba8f8000 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: 00000006589a77c9
 x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffffffffffffe0 x3 : 0000000000000020
 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14
  z_erofs_runqueue+0x908/0x97c
  z_erofs_read_folio+0x128/0x228
  filemap_read_folio+0x68/0x128
  filemap_get_pages+0x44c/0x8b4
  filemap_read+0x12c/0x5b8
  generic_file_read_iter+0x4c/0x15c
  do_iter_readv_writev+0x188/0x1e0
  vfs_iter_read+0xac/0x1a4
  backing_file_read_iter+0x170/0x34c
  ovl_read_iter+0xf0/0x140
  vfs_read+0x28c/0x344
  ksys_read+0x80/0xf0
  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x34
  invoke_syscall+0x60/0x114
  el0_svc_common+0x88/0xe4
  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x30
  el0_svc+0x40/0xa8
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0

Fix this by reading the inline data before allocating and adding
the pclusters to the I/O chains.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45943</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="135" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: Fix memory leak in amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc()

In amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc(), if amdgpu_acpi_dev_init() returns -ENOMEM,
the function returns directly without releasing the allocated xcc_info,
resulting in a memory leak.

Fix this by ensuring that xcc_info is properly freed in the error paths.

Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45947</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="136" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: fix memory leaks in gfs2_fill_super error path

Fix two memory leaks in the gfs2_fill_super() error handling path when
transitioning a filesystem to read-write mode fails.

First leak: kthread objects (thread_struct, task_struct, etc.)
When gfs2_freeze_lock_shared() fails after init_threads() succeeds, the
created kernel threads (logd and quotad) are never destroyed. This
occurs because the fail_per_node label doesn&apos;t call
gfs2_destroy_threads().

Second leak: quota bitmap buffer (8192 bytes)
When gfs2_make_fs_rw() fails after gfs2_quota_init() succeeds but
before other operations complete, the allocated quota bitmap is never
freed.

The fix moves thread cleanup to the fail_per_node label to handle all
error paths uniformly. gfs2_destroy_threads() is safe to call
unconditionally as it checks for NULL pointers. Quota cleanup is added
in gfs2_make_fs_rw() to properly handle the withdrawal case where
quota initialization succeeds but the filesystem is then withdrawn.

Thread leak backtrace (gfs2_freeze_lock_shared failure):
  unreferenced object 0xffff88801d7bca80 (size 4480):
    copy_process+0x3a1/0x4670 kernel/fork.c:2422
    kernel_clone+0xf3/0x6e0 kernel/fork.c:2779
    kthread_create_on_node+0x100/0x150 kernel/kthread.c:478
    init_threads+0xab/0x350 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:611
    gfs2_fill_super+0xe5c/0x1240 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:1265

Quota leak backtrace (gfs2_make_fs_rw failure):
  unreferenced object 0xffff88812de7c000 (size 8192):
    gfs2_quota_init+0xe5/0x820 fs/gfs2/quota.c:1409
    gfs2_make_fs_rw+0x7a/0xe0 fs/gfs2/super.c:149
    gfs2_fill_super+0xfbb/0x1240 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:1275</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45961</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="137" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Fix NULL pointer dereference in acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch()

Cover a missed execution path with a new check.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45982</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="138" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

erofs: fix unsigned underflow in z_erofs_lz4_handle_overlap()

Some crafted images can have illegal (!partial_decoding &amp;&amp;
m_llen &lt; m_plen) extents, and the LZ4 inplace decompression path
can be wrongly hit, but it cannot handle (outpages &lt; inpages)
properly: &quot;outpages - inpages&quot; wraps to a large value and
the subsequent rq-&gt;out[] access reads past the decompressed_pages
array.

However, such crafted cases can correctly result in a corruption
report in the normal LZ4 non-inplace path.

Let&apos;s add an additional check to fix this for backporting.

Reproducible image (base64-encoded gzipped blob):

H4sIAJGR12kCA+3SPUoDQRgG4MkmkkZk8QRbRFIIi9hbpEjrHQI5ghfwCN5BLCzTGtLbBI+g
dilSJo1CnIm7GEXFxhT6PDDwfrs73/ywIQD/1ePD4r7Ou6ETsrq4mu7XcWfj++Pb58nJU/9i
PNtbjhan04/9GtX4qVYc814WDqt6FaX5s+ZwXXeq52lndT6IuVvlblytLMvh4Gzwaf90nsvz
2DF/21+20T/ldgp5s1jXRaN4t/8izsy/OUB6e/Qa79r+JwAAAAAAAL52vQVuGQAAAP6+my1w
ywAAAAAAAADwu14ATsEYtgBQAAA=

$ mount -t erofs -o cache_strategy=disabled foo.erofs /mnt
$ dd if=/mnt/data of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-45999</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="139" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors  If an error occurs after the ssif kthread is created, but before the main IPMI code starts the ssif interface, the ssif kthread will not be stopped.  So make sure the kthread is stopped on an error condition if it is running.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46044 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46044</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="140" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()  When retry_aligned_read() encounters an overlapped stripe, it releases the stripe via raid5_release_stripe() which puts it on the lockless released_stripes llist. In the next raid5d loop iteration, release_stripe_list() drains the stripe onto handle_list (since STRIPE_HANDLE is set by the original IO), but retry_aligned_read() runs before handle_active_stripes() and removes the stripe from handle_list via find_get_stripe() -&gt; list_del_init(). This prevents handle_stripe() from ever processing the stripe to resolve the overlap, causing an infinite loop and soft lockup.  Fix this by using __release_stripe() with temp_inactive_list instead of raid5_release_stripe() in the failure path, so the stripe does not go through the released_stripes llist. This allows raid5d to break out of its loop, and the overlap will be resolved when the stripe is eventually processed by handle_stripe().  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46051 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46051</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="141" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn&apos;t intercepted by L1  Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1.  The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it&apos;s not intercepted.  Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses.  The last remaining &quot;single&quot; stub will soon be dropped as well.  [sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46076 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46076</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.9</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="142" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents  Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.  If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff &gt;= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.  nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1].  [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46078 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46078</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="143" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0  INVLPGA should cause a #UD when EFER.SVME is not set. Add a check to properly inject #UD when EFER.SVME=0.  [sean: tag for stable@]  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46082 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46082</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="144" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker  decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths: __purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via vmap_node_shrink_scan().  However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible leaks.  Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker path to ensure serialization with purge users.  The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-46093 to this issue.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46093</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="145" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: protect memcg_path kfree() with damon_sysfs_lockPatch series &quot;mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix use-after-free for [memcg_]path&quot;.Reads of &apos;memcg_path&apos; and &apos;path&apos; files in DAMON sysfs interface could racewith their writes, results in use-after-free.  Fix those.This patch (of 2):damon_sysfs_scheme_filter-&gt;mmecg_path can be read and written by users,via DAMON sysfs memcg_path file.  It can also be indirectly read, for theparameters {on,off}line committing to DAMON.  The reads for parameterscommitting are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs filesbeing destroyed while any of the parameters are being read.  But theuser-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, whilethe write is deallocating the memcg_path-pointing buffer.  As a result,the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free).  Notethat the user-reads don&apos;t race when the same open file is used by thewriter, due to kernfs&apos;s open file locking.  Nonetheless, doing the readsand writes with separate open files would be common.  Fix it by protectingboth the user-direct reads and writes with damon_sysfs_lock.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46121</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.0</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="146" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt

hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev-&gt;bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration.  However, there is no check that i stays within ev-&gt;num_bis
before the array access.

When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory.  Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state.  The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.

Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46138</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>8.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="147" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, vports are used concurrently and protected by RCU, so netdev_put() must happen after the RCU grace period. The rtnl_delete_link() must happen under RTNL and cannot be executed in RCU context. Calling synchronize_net() while holding RTNL is not good for performance and system stability, so calling netdev_put() in RCU call is the right solution. However, when the device is deleted, rtnl_unlock() calls netdev_run_todo() and blocks until all references are gone. In the current code, this means that call_rcu() is never reached, the vport is never freed, and the reference is never released, causing a self-deadlock on device removal. The fix moves the rcu_call() before rtnl_unlock(), so the scheduled RCU callback will be executed when synchronize_net() is called from rtnl_unlock()-&gt;netdev_run_todo() while RTNL itself is already released.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46165</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="148" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel&apos;s RISC-V KVM subsystem, when the second kzalloc (host_context.vector.datap) fails in kvm_riscv_vcpu_alloc_vector_context, the first allocation (guest_context.vector.datap) is not freed, causing a memory leak. An attacker can trigger this via ioctl(vm_fd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU), potentially leading to resource exhaustion.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46171</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="149" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the mlx4_ib_create_srq() function fails to release resources allocated by mlx4_srq_alloc() in error handling paths, leading to a resource leak. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause resource exhaustion or denial of service.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46178</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="150" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the spi_nor_params_show() function uses sizeof(snor_f_names) to calculate the array length. Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof returns the total byte size of the pointer array (element_count  sizeof(void )), which on 64-bit systems is 8 times larger than intended. This causes an out-of-bounds read when a flag bit is set that exceeds the actual element count but falls within the inflated byte-size count. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE to pass the actual number of elements.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-06-05</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-46190</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-06-05</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2582</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>