An update for libsolv is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 Security Advisory openeuler-security@openeuler.org openEuler security committee openEuler-SA-2026-2556 Final 1.0 1.0 2026-06-05 Initial 2026-06-05 2026-06-05 openEuler SA Tool V1.0 2026-06-05 libsolv security update An update for libsolv is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 A free package dependency solver using a satisfiability algorithm. The library is based on two major, but independent, blocks: Security Fix(es): MANUALLY_VERIFIED_REPORT package: libsolv-0.7.33-2.el10 ------ [Security] Heap Buffer Overflow in repo_add_solv via Negative maxsize Summary: Heap buffer overflow in `repo_add_solv` when parsing attacker-controlled `.solv` files; large encoded `maxsize`/`allsize` header values can decode to negative signed `Id` values, leading to undersized heap allocation while a subsequent `fread` uses `DATA_READ_CHUNK` (8192) bytes. Requirements to exploit: Ability to supply a crafted `.solv` file that a victim processes with libsolv (directly or via a consumer such as `dumpsolv` or an application that calls `repo_add_solv` on untrusted input). Component affected: libsolv Version affected: <= 0.7.36 Version fixed (if any already): >= TBD CVSS: 6.5 (Medium) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Impact: Moderate (proposed). Per https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification this is memory corruption reachable via untrusted `.solv` ingestion and can at least cause a denial of service; it is not clearly "High" because an attacker typically needs the victim to process attacker-controlled input (configuration/user action) and reliable system compromise is not demonstrated here. This may be "Low" instead in product contexts where the vulnerable path is not used by default, is only reachable via uncommon workflows, or is effectively mitigated (e.g., only trusted solvdb is processed). Embargo: no Acknowledgement: Aisle Research Steps to reproduce if available: See "Reproduction steps" below. Mitigation if available: Prefer only consuming trusted `.solv` / solvdb inputs; avoid parsing untrusted `.solv` files until patched. Original report: Hello libsolv maintainers, We believe that we have discovered a potential security vulnerability in `repo_add_solv` when parsing attacker-controlled `.solv` files. ### Vulnerability details `read_id` decodes into an unsigned value and returns `Id` (signed `int`), so large encoded values can become negative after conversion: ```c /* src/repo_solv.c */ static Id read_id(Repodata *data, Id max) { unsigned int x = 0; ... return x; } ``` In `repo_add_solv`, `maxsize` and `allsize` are read with `max=0` (no bounds check), then used for allocation and read length: ```c /* src/repo_solv.c */ maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); allsize = read_id(&data, 0); maxsize += 5; if (maxsize > allsize) maxsize = allsize; buf = solv_calloc(maxsize + DATA_READ_CHUNK + 4, 1); l = maxsize; if (l < DATA_READ_CHUNK) l = DATA_READ_CHUNK; if (l > allsize) l = allsize; if (!l || fread(buf, l, 1, data.fp) != 1) ``` If `maxsize` is negative, `solv_calloc(maxsize + 8192 + 4, 1)` can allocate a much smaller buffer, but `l` is then raised to `8192`, and `fread` writes `8192` bytes into that undersized heap buffer. Most relevant CWEs: - `CWE-122` (Heap-based Buffer Overflow): direct overflow sink. - `CWE-20` (Improper Input Validation): negative header fields are accepted. - `CWE-195` (Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error): signed `int` values flow into allocation sizing. ### Reproduction steps 1. Build libsolv with ASAN (or run a consumer binary that calls `repo_add_solv` on `.solv` input, e.g. `dumpsolv`). 2. Run the parser on this file (`dumpsolv crafted.solv` or equivalent). ### Crash: [root@c28a4ffb0823 workspace]# ./build-asan/tools/dumpsolv ./vuln_1_101_1_negative_maxsize.solv ================================================================= ==542==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020000000b1 at pc 0x00000041fb3c bp 0x7ffffffc5fd0 sp 0x7ffffffc5798 WRITE of size 8192 at 0x5020000000b1 thread T0 #0 0x00000041fb3b (/workspace/build-asan/tools/dumpsolv+0x41fb3b) (BuildId: 3a1e71d74bd4d38c896ffc899393aedf86bf1cfc) #1 0x7fffff662147 (/workspace/build-asan/src/libsolv.so.1+0x57147) (BuildId: ebfff12c035b97f95b2d532a1d6d237ac31e770a) #2 0x0000004e45fe (/workspace/build-asan/tools/dumpsolv+0x4e45fe) (BuildId: 3a1e71d74bd4d38c896ffc899393aedf86bf1cfc) #3 0x7fffff2f0447 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3447) (BuildId: dae6ae6929d69dca842288f5300af5a33d1bdcd7) #4 0x7fffff2f050a (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x350a) (BuildId: (CVE-2026-9149) A flaw was found in libsolv. This stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability occurs in libsolv's Debian metadata parser when processing specially crafted Debian repository metadata. An attacker could exploit this by providing malicious SHA384 or SHA512 checksum tags, leading to memory corruption and a denial of service (DoS) in the affected system.(CVE-2026-9150) An update for libsolv is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3. openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of medium. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. Medium libsolv https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2556 https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-9149 https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-9150 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9149 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9150 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 libsolv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-debuginfo-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-debugsource-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-demo-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-devel-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-tools-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm perl-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm python3-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm ruby-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm libsolv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.src.rpm libsolv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-debuginfo-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-debugsource-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-demo-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-devel-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-tools-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm perl-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm python3-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm ruby-solv-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm libsolv-help-0.7.24-5.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm MANUALLY_VERIFIED_REPORT package: libsolv-0.7.33-2.el10 ------ [Security] Heap Buffer Overflow in repo_add_solv via Negative maxsize Summary: Heap buffer overflow in `repo_add_solv` when parsing attacker-controlled `.solv` files; large encoded `maxsize`/`allsize` header values can decode to negative signed `Id` values, leading to undersized heap allocation while a subsequent `fread` uses `DATA_READ_CHUNK` (8192) bytes. Requirements to exploit: Ability to supply a crafted `.solv` file that a victim processes with libsolv (directly or via a consumer such as `dumpsolv` or an application that calls `repo_add_solv` on untrusted input). Component affected: libsolv Version affected: <= 0.7.36 Version fixed (if any already): >= TBD CVSS: 6.5 (Medium) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Impact: Moderate (proposed). Per https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification this is memory corruption reachable via untrusted `.solv` ingestion and can at least cause a denial of service; it is not clearly "High" because an attacker typically needs the victim to process attacker-controlled input (configuration/user action) and reliable system compromise is not demonstrated here. This may be "Low" instead in product contexts where the vulnerable path is not used by default, is only reachable via uncommon workflows, or is effectively mitigated (e.g., only trusted solvdb is processed). Embargo: no Acknowledgement: Aisle Research Steps to reproduce if available: See "Reproduction steps" below. Mitigation if available: Prefer only consuming trusted `.solv` / solvdb inputs; avoid parsing untrusted `.solv` files until patched. Original report: Hello libsolv maintainers, We believe that we have discovered a potential security vulnerability in `repo_add_solv` when parsing attacker-controlled `.solv` files. ### Vulnerability details `read_id` decodes into an unsigned value and returns `Id` (signed `int`), so large encoded values can become negative after conversion: ```c /* src/repo_solv.c */ static Id read_id(Repodata *data, Id max) { unsigned int x = 0; ... return x; } ``` In `repo_add_solv`, `maxsize` and `allsize` are read with `max=0` (no bounds check), then used for allocation and read length: ```c /* src/repo_solv.c */ maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); allsize = read_id(&data, 0); maxsize += 5; if (maxsize > allsize) maxsize = allsize; buf = solv_calloc(maxsize + DATA_READ_CHUNK + 4, 1); l = maxsize; if (l < DATA_READ_CHUNK) l = DATA_READ_CHUNK; if (l > allsize) l = allsize; if (!l || fread(buf, l, 1, data.fp) != 1) ``` If `maxsize` is negative, `solv_calloc(maxsize + 8192 + 4, 1)` can allocate a much smaller buffer, but `l` is then raised to `8192`, and `fread` writes `8192` bytes into that undersized heap buffer. Most relevant CWEs: - `CWE-122` (Heap-based Buffer Overflow): direct overflow sink. - `CWE-20` (Improper Input Validation): negative header fields are accepted. - `CWE-195` (Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error): signed `int` values flow into allocation sizing. ### Reproduction steps 1. Build libsolv with ASAN (or run a consumer binary that calls `repo_add_solv` on `.solv` input, e.g. `dumpsolv`). 2. Run the parser on this file (`dumpsolv crafted.solv` or equivalent). ### Crash: [root@c28a4ffb0823 workspace]# ./build-asan/tools/dumpsolv ./vuln_1_101_1_negative_maxsize.solv ================================================================= ==542==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020000000b1 at pc 0x00000041fb3c bp 0x7ffffffc5fd0 sp 0x7ffffffc5798 WRITE of size 8192 at 0x5020000000b1 thread T0 #0 0x00000041fb3b (/workspace/build-asan/tools/dumpsolv+0x41fb3b) (BuildId: 3a1e71d74bd4d38c896ffc899393aedf86bf1cfc) #1 0x7fffff662147 (/workspace/build-asan/src/libsolv.so.1+0x57147) (BuildId: ebfff12c035b97f95b2d532a1d6d237ac31e770a) #2 0x0000004e45fe (/workspace/build-asan/tools/dumpsolv+0x4e45fe) (BuildId: 3a1e71d74bd4d38c896ffc899393aedf86bf1cfc) #3 0x7fffff2f0447 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3447) (BuildId: dae6ae6929d69dca842288f5300af5a33d1bdcd7) #4 0x7fffff2f050a (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x350a) (BuildId: 2026-06-05 CVE-2026-9149 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H libsolv security update 2026-06-05 https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2556 A flaw was found in libsolv. This stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability occurs in libsolv's Debian metadata parser when processing specially crafted Debian repository metadata. An attacker could exploit this by providing malicious SHA384 or SHA512 checksum tags, leading to memory corruption and a denial of service (DoS) in the affected system. 2026-06-05 CVE-2026-9150 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3 Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H libsolv security update 2026-06-05 https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2556